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ABSTRACT

Satta, Mark R. Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2016. A Defense of the Ambiguity Theory
of ‘Knows’. Major Professor: Matthias Steup.
In recent years, questions regarding the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions
(sentences of the form ‘S knows that P’ where S is a subject and P a proposition) and
knowledge denials (sentences of the form ‘S doesn’t know that P’) have been at the fore
of a certain sector of analytic epistemology and philosophy of language. These questions
include “How do we determine the truth conditions of a particular knowledge ascription
or denial?”, “What sorts of factors are relevant in this determination?”, and “Is context
among the relevant factors in a non-trivial way, and if so, how?” A variety of proposals
have been generated in order to answer these questions—including proposals that offer a
primarily semantic response. However, very little attention has been given to the
possibility that part of the best answer to these questions about the truth conditions for
knowledge ascriptions and denials is to posit that ‘knowledge’, ‘knows’, and their
cognate terms are ambiguous.
This dissertation offers a defense of a proposal along these lines. More
specifically this dissertation is a defense of the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’. The
ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ is the view ‘knows’ and its cognates have more than one
propositional sense (i.e. a sense that can properly be used in ‘knows that’ constructions)
and that which sense of ‘knows’ is being employed in a knowledge ascription or denial
plays a role in fixing the truth conditions of a knowledge ascription (in virtue of
contributing to the meaning of the claim). In this dissertation, this claim is defended first
by making clear how the ambiguity theory differs from others proposals on offer, second,
by comparing the ambiguity theory to other leading proposals and arguing that the
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ambiguity theory fares as well if not better, and third, by providing other independent
arguments in favor of the view. My hope is that the work done here will give the
ambiguity theory a more prominent presence in the relevant philosophical debates.

1

INTRODUCTION

How do we determine the truth conditions of a particular knowledge ascription or
denial? What sorts of factors are relevant in this determination? Is context among the
relevant factors in a non-trivial way, and if so, how? What about practical stakes?
Questions like these regarding the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions (sentences of
the form ‘S knows that P’ where S is a subject and P a proposition) and knowledge
denials (sentences of the form ‘S doesn’t know that P’) have been at the fore of a certain
sector of analytic epistemology and philosophy of language for well over a quarter of a
century now. For a long while there appeared to be a single battle line dividing the field
into two camps.
On the one side were those who sought a purely epistemological answer to these
questions—i.e. those seeking to answer the linguistic question about truth conditions of
ascriptions and denials only derivatively via answering questions like “what is the nature
of knowledge itself?” and “what does it mean to know something?”. On the other side
were those who proposed a linguistic answer—i.e. those seeking to answer the linguistic
questions about the truth conditions of ascriptions and denials directly, by positing the
context-sensitive nature of the words ‘knows’, ‘knowledge’, etc. The two camps—using
the terminology of Peter Unger—have come to be known as invariantism and
contextualism respectively.1
This basic divide between the contextualists and invariantists gave rise to a
second, initially co-extensive, but supervening, divide. The new divide was between two
types of attempts to explain any “shifty” (to borrow a term from Fantl and McGrath) or
seemingly context-sensitive behavior of knowledge ascriptions. One type of explanation
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As we go along we’ll see that using this initial divide to describe the distinction between contextualism
and invariantism won’t do, but it’s a useful starting point with a certain philosophical heritage.
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posited that this appearance of shiftiness was a purely pragmatic phenomenon concerning
only what it is appropriate to assert. This is the view of the classical invariantist. The
other type of explanation posited that this shiftiness was rooted in semantics and that as a
result there can be changes in the literal truth values of such sentences. This is the view of
the (at this point classical) contextualist.
In the years since, the picture has been complicated in a number of ways. The
initial lines have been redrawn and many new dividing lines have been added. Proponents
of subject-sensitive invariantism, for example, posit a pragmatic “shiftiness” in the nature
of knowing itself (as opposed to in the nature of ‘knowing’ itself). That is to say, subjectsensitive invariantists don’t think the answer to the “contextualist data” (i.e. the
considerations offered by contextualists in favor of their view) lends itself to a semantic
answer concerning the nature of ‘knowing’ over the nature of knowing itself. Like
contextualists, subject-sensitive invariantists think there is a role that practical concerns
play in the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions. But, unlike for contextualists, for
subject-sensitive invariantists it is the practical concerns of the subject of knowledge
ascriptions, as opposed to that of the ascriber of knowledge, that matter.
Still others have retained the contextualists’ interest in using a semantics of
context-sensitivity for knowledge ascriptions and denials to solve epistemic puzzles, but
posit that it is the assessor’s context that matters, not the attributor’s context (as the
contextualists argue). Others have made a distinction between the truth conditions of the
knowledge ascribing and denying sentences themselves from the truth conditions of
knowledge ascribing and denying utterances—suggesting different accounts and semantic
mechanisms for the truth of each. And still others have made the distinction between the
context-sensitivity of the content of knowledge ascriptions and denials and other
mechanisms for the context-sensitivity of the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions
and denials. These theorists have posited things like epistemic or knowledge parameters,
similar to more familiar parameters such as those of world and time, as the means by
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which the context-sensitivity of the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions and denials
is obtained.2
But within all these complications the following has not been challenged: If there
is something interestingly non-invariantist going on with the semantics of knowledge
ascriptions (whether understood as sentences, utterances, or both) that affects truth
conditions, then the reason why this is so rests upon some kind of mechanism allowing
for context-sensitivity—i.e. a mechanism for which the upshot is a strict covariation
between certain contexts and certain truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions and
denials. But taking this for granted seems to me to be a mistake because such an
assumption rules out a number of, what I take to be, plausible views, including the views
that ‘knows’ is ambiguous, that ‘knows’ is vague, or that the contextualist data is best
accounted for by positing an incoherence in our ordinary, non-explicated concept of
knowledge. This dissertation, in part, seeks to offer a reason to toss out this assumption
by arguing for the plausibility of an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’—i.e. the theory that
‘knows’ is ambiguous and that this ambiguity affects the truth conditions of knowledge
ascriptions and denials.
Perhaps in part because of the aforementioned assumption, the ambiguity theory
has received very little attention in the literature on the truth conditions for knowledge
ascriptions and denials. But I think it is a view worthy of attention. This dissertation is
structured in a manner that, I hope, will be conducive to garnering some attention for the
view. More specifically, this dissertation is comprised of the four papers I take the
ambiguity theory to be currently in the greatest need of if the view is to start being taken
seriously by a broader audience. Those four papers are as follows.
Chapter 1 provides a rather detailed history of contextualism by way of an
examination of the assumptions brought to the discussion from philosophy of language,
and at the end of this chapter a case for the distinction between contextualism and the
ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ is made. The point of engaging in this activity is to make
clear what the relevant distinctions are between the numerous contextualist views
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currently on offer and the ambiguity theory. There are at least two reasons why this is
important. First, only once this is all laid out can one see clearly what some of the largely
unquestioned assumptions in the discussion on the truth conditions of knowledge
ascriptions and denials have been heretofore. And it will be useful to see what these
assumptions are in order to begin challenging certain ones. Second, I’ve found that a
common initial reaction to the ambiguity theory is the intuition that somehow the
ambiguity theory must end up simply being a type of contextualism. I think this view is a
mistake, and in order for one to clearly understand what’s at stake in the discussion, one
needs to see why this is a mistake. Thus, in many ways addressing these matters
functions as a necessary precursor to the three chapters that follow—each of which pull
from the discussion in the first chapter in their own way.
Chapter 2 and 3 pit the ambiguity theory against, what I take to be, its two
greatest rivals—namely, epistemic contextualism and non-skeptical classical
invariantism. In Chapter 2, I argue that the ambiguity theory has all the same strengths as
contextualism and has a number of advantages that contextualism lacks. In Chapter 3, I
look at the counterbalancing strengths and weaknesses of non-skeptical classical
invariantism and argue that, on balance, the ambiguity theory currently appears to be the
better supported view. In Chapter 4, in response to the only substantive criticism of the
ambiguity theory already in the literature that I know of, I argue that the view that
‘knows’ is ambiguous enjoys a linguistic grounding in virtue of its status as a commonly
used English verb. My hope is that the combined effect of these considerations will allow
the ambiguity theory to gain traction in the philosophical discussion on the nature of the
truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions.

5

CHAPTER 1: THEORIES OF MEANING, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM, AND A NEW CONTENDER

As the title would suggest, this dissertation is a defense of the ambiguity theory of
‘knows’. The ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ is the view that ‘knows’ and its cognates have
more than one propositional sense—i.e. that ‘knows’ and its cognates have more than one
sense that can properly be used in ‘knows that’ (etc.) constructions—and that which sense
of ‘knows’ is employed in a knowledge ascription is part of what determines the truth
conditions for that knowledge ascription. Large portions of this first chapter say very
little about the ambiguity theory directly. This may naturally raise the question: why
write this chapter? The answer to that question is multi-fold, but my primary reason for
writing this chapter is a practical one. Based on my experiences it would seem that if the
ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ is to be viewed as a serious position in the literature on
knowledge ascriptions then a clear case for why it is not (merely) another type of
epistemic contextualism needs to be made. I believe that providing a discussion of some
of the relevant philosophy of language along with a clear presentation of the history and
development of epistemic contextualism is the best way to begin making such a case.
My reason for thinking that the ambiguity theory must be clearly distinguished
from contextualism in order for the ambiguity theory to be accepted as a serious position
in the literature on knowledge ascriptions stems from the reactions I have received from
epistemologists (and philosophers in general) when they are first presented with the
ambiguity theory. Two types of reactions are by far the most common. The first is a
supportive reaction in which the philosopher expresses that the ambiguity theory seems
initially plausible and/or appealing. (The reaction is probably slightly more common from
philosophers specializing in an area other than epistemology.) The second reaction
consists in the putting forward of some question or other along the following lines “Isn’t
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that just a type of contextualism?” or “How is your theory any different than
contextualism?”. (This reaction is probably slightly more common from epistemologists.)
Usually, the conversation that follows if one’s initial response to the ambiguity theory is
that it seems like a type of contextualism is a conversation about what counts as
epistemic contextualism. And often once down that road it is difficult to get back to a
conversation about the merits of the ambiguity theory itself.
My hope is that in presenting a history of epistemic contextualism with an
emphasis on how the view has developed over time and how assumptions in the
philosophy of language have shaped that development will show two things. First, I hope
it will show what lies at the heart of epistemic contextualism (which is more than simply
sense variation across contexts). Second, once one sees what lies at the heart of the view,
I hope it will be evident why the ambiguity theory is not a type of contextualism. Thus,
by including this chapter I hope to guide the mind of the reader who would otherwise
stop to argue that the ambiguity theory is “just a type of contextualism” past this affair
and onto the consideration of how the ambiguity theory holds up against its competitors
(contextualism included).
Incidentally, another reason why I take writing this chapter to be worthwhile is
that the examination which follows, indirectly, reveals an advantage that the ambiguity
theory has over a number of newer contextualist positions being introduced into the
literature on knowledge ascriptions. This advantage is that the ambiguity theory is
compatible with a broader range of general semantic theories than those other views. For
someone (such as myself) who is inclined to accept a more formal or minimalist
semantics, the fact that the ambiguity theory is compatible with such a theory of meaning
is an important strength of the view.
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 provides a somewhat
lengthy, but I think necessary, excursus into semantics. The purpose of this endeavor is to
make clear what the landscape is in a relevant portion of the philosophy of language. An
understanding of these views in philosophy language will prove useful in understanding
why the new types of epistemic contextualism being put forward have the trajectory they
do (or so I will argue). But more importantly, it will help to highlight certain consistent
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commitments that all versions of contextualism heretofore have in common,
commitments which the ambiguity theory does not share.
Section 2 begins with a presentation and examination of epistemic contextualism
as it has been articulated by some of its earliest and most prolific defenders. The goals of
this first portion of the section are, one, to make clear the traditional picture of epistemic
contextualism and, two, to prime the reader to pay attention to certain implicit
assumptions about the nature of the view that have been called into question by some
more contemporary theorists who have put forward new views under the banner of
epistemic contextualism. Section 2 ends with a presentation and examination of these
newer views.
In Section 3, the background laid in the first two sections begins to earn its keep.
The goal of this section is to highlight some common features at the heart of all the views
under the contextualist banner, and to argue that, because the ambiguity theory lacks
these features, that it ought to be viewed as a distinct position. The taxonomic point that
the ambiguity theory isn’t a type of contextualism isn’t of great importance itself, but the
recognition and acceptance of the differences between contextualism and the ambiguity
theory are. This is a necessary precursor to understanding what’s at stake between the
two views and why the ambiguity theory ought to be seriously considered. To close out
Section 3, the content of the earlier sections will be used to show an advantage that the
ambiguity theory has over many of the other newer forms of contextualism being put
forward. This will be but the first of many advantages that, throughout this dissertation, I
will argue the ambiguity theory has over its competitors.
1.1 Theories of Semantics
Our guide for this excursion through the semantic landscape is Emma Borg, and
our primary guidebook her 2012 monograph Pursuing Meaning. There are other
guidebooks which also could have served us very well,3 but, in addition to being clear
and easy to follow, the way in which Borg carves up the terrain in Pursuing Meaning is
particularly amenable for the purposes of this chapter. And these seemed to me sufficient
3

Other such useful guidebooks include Cappelen and Lepore (2005) and Recanati (2004).
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reasons to select this particular guide and guidebook. My only hope is that the clarity of
Borg’s work is not too greatly diminished by this presentation of it.
I’m going to go ahead and give away some bits of the ending now in order to help
focus our attention on certain important points as we go, and then we’ll wrap back around
to covering things in more detail. Borg presents five different positions one could adopt
concerning the relationship between semantics and pragmatics. Two of these positions—
minimalism and indexicalism—she describes as falling under the heading of “general
formal approaches to semantics.” My claim is that when epistemic contextualism first
came onto the scene, the resulting discussion between the contextualists and the
invariantists was an “in house” disagreement between parties all accepting, at least
implicitly, a general formal approach to semantics. In this in-house disagreement several
tenets, including the tenets of general formal approaches to semantics, functioned as mere
background assumptions. Because these assumptions were implicit and shared between
the contextualist (who in most cases expressed an “indexicalist”-leaning view) and the
invariantist (who in most cases expressed a “minimalist”-leaning view) it would be easy
for one with general formal semantic leanings to miss that certain assumptions were
present at all.
Enter Borg’s next two positions—dual pragmatics and relativism. On these
theories of semantics, certain tenets of the general formal approach to semantics are
abandoned. The relevant upshot of this for our purposes is that, on a dual pragmatics or
relativist theory of semantics, knowledge ascriptions and knowledge denials are capable
of being context-sensitive in very different sorts of ways from the ways in which the
early epistemic contextualists have traditionally suggested they are. As views like dual
pragmatics and relativism have gained in popularity, the new possibilities they allow for
concerning knowledge ascription have been recognized by philosophers and new views
concerning the relationship between context and the truth conditions of knowledge
ascriptions and denials have entered the discussion as a result. Because these new views
often hinge on a rejection of one or more of the implicit assumptions found in the earlier
conversation between invariantists and contextualists, the language used and concepts
employed in the conversation shifted in several ways. A clear recognition of these
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necessary linguistic and conceptual shifts and the changes in thought that have motivated
them are important for fully understanding traditional forms of contextualism, the newer
contextualist positions on offer, and ultimately, the ambiguity theory of ‘knows.’
So let’s take our first step towards this fuller understanding and turn to Borg’s
take on the semantic terrain. In order to frame her discussion, Borg uses four theses and a
“context-shifting argument” (to be explained momentarily) to show the distinctions
between the five different semantic positions she examines. The five views are explained,
in large part, by which of the following four theses they accept and which they reject and
how, as a result, they deal with context-shifting arguments. The four theses are as
follows:
(i)

Semantic content for well-formed declarative sentences is truth-evaluable
content.

(ii)

Semantic content for a sentence is fully determined by its syntactic structure
and lexical content: the meaning of a sentence is exhausted by the meaning of
its parts and their mode of composition.

(iii)

There are only a limited number of context-sensitive expressions in natural
language.

(iv)

Recovery of semantic content is possible without access to current speaker
intentions (crudely, grasp of semantic content involves ‘word reading’ not
‘mindreading’).4

The other marker of categorization is the response to context-shifting arguments (CSAs
for short). A CSA is a case put forward to elicit the intuition that a sentence must be
context-sensitive due to a change in the truth value of the sentence when only a change in
the context of utterance has occurred (without a change in anything lexico-synactic). The
sample CSA Borg provides goes as follows:
“[I]magine a fridge which contains only a small puddle of
milk on its floor. Two conversations concerning the fridge
take place:

4

Borg (2012, 4-5).

10
Scenario 1: Hugo is dejectedly stirring a cup of black coffee.
Noting this Odile says ‘There is milk in the fridge.’
Scenario 2: Hugo has been cleaning the fridge. Odile opens
the fridge door and says ‘There is milk in the fridge.’
The intuition which drives much of the current debate in this
area is that what Odile says can differ in truth value between
these two scenarios.”5
The general hope of one using a CSA to advocate for a non-formal semantics is that our
intuition in such a case will be that Odile has said something false in Scenario 1, but true
in Scenario 2. A way to see the distinctions between each of the views Borg considers is
to see how each addresses this intuition that the CSA is meant to elicit. (We’ll look at
those responses shortly.)
To further aid her presentation of the terrain, Borg also identifies two broad
categories on opposite ends of a spectrum (one of which has been mentioned already). On
one end of the spectrum is the “general formal approach to semantics extant in the work
of theorists like the early Wittgenstein, Frege, Russell, Carnap, Davidson, and Kaplan
(and many others).”6 At the other end of the spectrum is “full-blooded used-based
theories”7 in which both individual word and sentence meanings remain indeterminate
without a context of use. The general formal approach is characterized as a family of
views that accept theses (i) and (ii) above (i.e. a family of views that accept that semantic
content for declarative sentences is truth-evaluable and that semantic content of sentences
is determined by syntax and lexical content). The used-based approach is characterized as
a family of views, inspired largely by the later works of Wittgenstein, in which the formal
approach is rejected in favor of the view that “it is only in use that words and concepts
come to have particular conditions of application.”8
Borg begins the discussion with her preferred view—minimal semantics (or
simply minimalism). According to Borg, minimalism “as the name suggests, wants to

5
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Borg (2012, 2).
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offer a pretty minimal account of the inter-relations between semantics and pragmatics”9
and “holds that while context can affect literal semantic content in the case of genuine
(i.e. lexically or syntactically marked) context-sensitive expressions (e.g. indexicals,
demonstratives, tense markers), this is pretty much the limit of pragmatic input to
semantic content.”10
The minimalist accepts each of the four theses—(i)-(iv)—listed earlier and is the
furthest on the formal semantics end of the spectrum. Borg reaffirms minimalism’s
commitment to these theses writing that,
“According to minimal semantics, natural language
sentences mean things, the things they mean are in some
sense complete (that is to say, they are propositional, truthevaluable contents), and these literal meanings are
determined as a function of the lexical elements a sentence
contains together with its syntactic form. Thus minimalism
claims that well-formed sentences like ‘La neige est
blanche’, ‘Everyone likes chocolate’ and ‘Two plus two
equals four’ possess literal linguistic meanings (semantic
content), meanings which (in some, broad sense) make
claims about the way the world is, and furthermore that the
semantic content each has is (more or less) that which it
appears to wear on its sleeve…”11
The commitment to the complete (truth-evaluable) meaning of sentences constitutes a
commitment to (i) and the claim that this occurs in virtue of the lexical content and
syntax alone constitutes a commitment to (ii). It is the tendency of the minimalist to think
that the semantic content of sentences is “that which it appears to wear on its sleeve”
which constitutes her commitment to (iii), with a commitment to (iv) (or at least
something close to it) falling out naturally from the previous commitments.
Given the commitments of the minimalist, a natural response for the minimalist to
a CSA like the one given above is to claim that the truth value of the sentence has not
changed across the scenarios. Rather, what has changed is what is conveyed (i.e. what is
pragmatically implied), and this change in implication—not literal meaning—is what

9
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grounds the intuition (which, on this response, is ultimately a mistaken intuition) that the
truth value of the claim itself has changed.12 Someone familiar with the literature on
knowledge ascriptions likely already sees the parallels between this general tendency and
the strategy of many classical invariantists to point to the distinction between truth
conditions and what’s appropriate to assert in resisting contextualism.
Borg next presents the position of indexicalism. The indexicalist, like the
minimalist, accepts the tenets of formal semantics—(i) and (ii). But unlike the
minimalist, the indexicalist thinks that context-sensitivity in natural language is far more
common than it initially appears. Thus, the indexicalist rejects (iii) on the grounds that “if
our intuitions suggest that the content of a sentence shifts, in various respects, across
shifts in context of utterance, then this is compelling evidence for the existence of a
lexico-syntactic context-sensitivity in that sentence.”13 Because indexicalism doesn’t
require any particular means by which this lexico-syntactic context-sensitivity occurs,
indexicalism itself represents a family of more specific views on which specific means
for the context-sensitivity are posited.14 However, the umbrella of views which count as
part of indexicalism is importantly limited to those views on which the presence of the
context-sensitivity is lexico-syntactic. Therefore, in responding to CSAs, the indexicalist
is likely to claim that there has been a shift in the content (and thus potentially the truth
conditions) of the sentence across contexts, but that whatever means by which this shift is
explained must itself be lexico-syntactic (e.g. positing the presence of hidden indexicals
or the context-sensitivity of predicate expressions—two examples Borg provides).15 Just
as there are certain parallels between invariantism and minimalism, so also there are
parallels between traditional forms of epistemic contextualism and indexicalism
concerning the relationship between semantics and pragmatics they put forward.
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If the traditional contextualist tends to have in mind an indexicalist-leaning
picture about semantics more generally and the invariantist a minimalist-leaning picture
of semantics, an important upshot of this is that there is a good deal of semantic common
ground that they share. I will later argue that it is this common ground that led to certain
assumptions initially resting implicitly as part of the conversation concerning epistemic
contextualism until certain newer advocates of epistemic contextualism—who did not
share the formal semantic assumptions of the invariantist and traditional contextualist—
came onto the scene.
The third view Borg presents she calls contextualism in Pursuing Meaning. This
usage of the word ‘contextualism’ should not be confused with the primary view being
considered in this chapter: epistemic contextualism (i.e. contextualism about ‘knows’).16
In order to try and mitigate confusion I will refer to this third view as either semantic
contextualism or, as often as is possible, by the name Borg gives the view in her earlier
work—dual pragmatics.17 Borg writes of semantic contextualism/dual pragmatics that it
rejects “the idea that the route to semantic content runs exclusively via lexico-syntactic
elements”—i.e. it rejects (ii)—and that according to dual pragmatics the following holds:
“Instead, to properly account for the depth and range of
context-sensitivity in the propositions we literally express on
occasions of utterance, we must allow pragmatic features a
much freer reign within the semantic realm…The proposal
of contextualism [i.e. dual pragmatics] is thus that pragmatic
properties get to act twice: once in the usual Gricean, postsemantic way to deliver implicatures, but also once again in
a non-standard, inherently semantic way to deliver the
proposition literally expressed by the sentence as relativized
to a given context”18
Thus, unlike the minimalist and the idexicalist, the dual pragmatist doesn’t limit the
influence of the pragmatic on meaning to the lexico-syntactic. So in assessing what is
happening in a CSA, the dual pragmatist can claim that there is a change in semantic
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content even if there is no context-sensitive lexico-syntactic element present. Borg writes
that the dual pragmatist can say the following in response to the CSA she provides:
“So, when Odile utters ‘There is milk in the fridge’ in the
first kind of scenario above, what she literally asserts may be
that there is milk in the fridge in a form suitable for coffee—
the context acts to enrich the proposition literally expressed
even though this is not demanded by any lexico-syntactic
element of the sentence.”19
Borg calls this pragmatic effect on semantic content which is free of any lexico-syntactic
element in the sentence ‘free pragmatic enrichment’.20
The fourth view Borg puts forward she calls semantic relativism. According to
Borg, minimalism, indexicalism, and dual pragmatics all share the common feature of
treating “contextually determined content as contributing to the proposition expressed by
a sentence as uttered in a given content”, but relativism parts ways from all of these
views by treating “contextual material (in at least some cases) as contributing to the
parameters against which a proposition is assessed for truth or falsity.”21 Thus, on the
relativist account, there may be additional context-sensitive parameters posited beyond
those which are more standard to accept like the parameters of world and time. For
example, with a sentence like ‘Jill is rich’ there may be “a contextually determined
parameter of richness against which the unique propositional content expressed” by the
sentence needs to be assessed.22 Like indexicalism, relativism describes a family of views
which vary depending on the specific nature of the additional context-sensitive
parameters posited.
There are a couple of important points to note about relativism. First, like dual
pragmatics, the type of context-sensitivity posited is outside of the lexico-syntactic
element, but unlike dual pragmatics, relativism goes even a step farther by positing the
context-sensitivity as lying beyond the content of the sentence completely (at least in
some circumstances). Second, relativism, unlike the other views mentioned heretofore,
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posits relevant context-sensitivity from the context of the assessor. Thus, a view like
semantic relativism dovetails nicely with a view like John MacFarlane’s epistemic
relativism concerning knowledge ascriptions and denials.23
Relatively little needs to be said about the final view Borg puts forward—
occasionalism. Borg writes that “[a]ccording to occasionalism there is simply no such
thing as determinate content outside a context, for it is only in use that words and
concepts come to have particular conditions of application.”24 The reason why relatively
little needs to be said about the view is that if occasionalism is true, it trivially follows
that some form of epistemic contextualism is true if epistemic contextualism is
understood as the view that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions are contextsensitive. This is because on occasionalism all natural language is context-sensitive.
Thus, on occasionalism there is no reason to make a distinct argument for the contextsensitivity of knowledge ascriptions in addition to the general arguments offered in
support of the context-sensitivity of language in general.
Before turning to the history and development of epistemic contextualism itself, it
will be useful to consider one additional linguistic matter. Consider the three-tier
distinction between 1) the content of a sentence as uttered in a particular context, 2) the
content (literally) asserted by an utterance, and 3) the content that is (merely) conveyed
or implied by an utterance. One may deny that these three levels are distinct in actuality,
but it’s reasonable to acknowledge at least the conceptual distinctness of the three.
(Additionally, one may recognize the distinctness of these three levels yet think that
certain entailment relations hold such the content on one level always matches the
content on another.)
Traditionally, epistemic contextualism has been expressed as being about
sentences uttered in particular contexts. Yet it is not uncommon for it to appear as if
epistemic contextualism is also about the content literally asserted in particular context. I
will argue in the next section that the reason for this is that for a long time the distinction
between the truth values of sentences uttered in a context and the truth values of the
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utterances themselves was irrelevant in the debate between contextualism and
invariantism due to certain commonalities shared by the participants about semantics
more generally. As a result, it was not problematic to treat the content of a sentence, as
uttered in the particular context, and the literal content of the utterance of that sentence
itself as one and the same. Thus, interchangeable talk of sentences and utterances allowed
for epistemic contextualism to be a view about the truth conditions of assertions in
addition to a view about the truth value of sentences. And perhaps for a time, due to this
interchangeability, there was no fact of the matter as to whether the view was about
merely sentences versus about sentences and assertions both. However, advocates of
some newer forms of contextualism have made use of the distinction between the content
of a sentence uttered in a particular context and the content literally asserted by that
utterance. Thus, this distinction has become important. Conversely, some of these newer
views gloss over the distinction between the content literally asserted by an utterance
versus the content merely pragmatically conveyed by an utterance—a distinction
important in the work of several prominent classical invariantists. Thus, in parsing out the
different views on offer, it will be important to keep track of which level of linguistic
content is being discussed.
1.2 The History and Development of Epistemic Contextualism
Credit for the introduction of the term contextualism (and its counterpart term
invariantism)—at least as these terms are typically used in epistemology and the literature
on knowledge ascriptions—is given to Peter Unger who explains and uses these terms in
his 1984 book Philosophical Relativity.25 Unger does not provide formal definitions for
either term, but he explains the terms in such a way that a reader can clearly gain an
understanding of the general meaning of the terms sufficient for Unger’s purposes.
As Unger uses the terms, contextualism and invariantism are two disparate,
general semantic positions which can be applied to many other terms aside from ‘knows’
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Unger (1984). Unger uses the semantic positions of contextualism and invariantism as a crucial part of
his arguments for semantic relativity and philosophical relativity—views which are not relevant to the
discussion at hand.
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and its cognates.26 We’ll start by looking at a few things Unger says about these general
positions. Because Unger does not formally define the terms, I (obviously) cannot offer
any formal definitions of his here. However, there are a number of things that he does say
about contextualism and invariantism which I take to be worth reporting and commenting
on. To begin, it is important to note that Unger speaks of contextualism and invariantism
as “two semantic approaches.”27 Related to this, Unger says of the two views that,
“…there is much that the contextualist and the invariantist
may take as common coin: Both can say that there is a lot
of pragmatic understanding and a lot of semantic
understanding. But, within a certain range, there may be
room for different allocations: The contextualist has the
semantic understanding amount to more than the
invariantist would have, and the pragmatic amount to
less.”28
Here are several things worth noting. First, the key distinction offered between the
contextualist and the invariantist, as general positions, is a difference in the amount of
work that semantics does versus pragmatics in creating understanding. For the
contextualist, semantics plays a greater role than it does for the invariantist. For the
invariantist, pragmatics plays a greater role than it does for the contextualist.
Second, as expressed here, the difference between contextualism and invariantism
is a matter of degree, not a matter of a complete difference in kind. And perhaps for
certain middle-of-the-road semantic positions it will not be clear whether or not the
position is contextualist or invariantist. (This possibility may help make sense of Unger’s
claim that “As we shall develop [contextualism and invariantism], each of these views is
only vaguely conceived.”29) However, this spectrum view of contextualism and
invariantism generally is compatible with the view that contextualism and invariantism
about ‘knows’ specifically is not a matter of difference on a spectrum. When looking at
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contextualism and invariantism as general semantic inclinations, one’s being a
contextualist or an invariantist in regards to ‘knows’ merely moves one a notch in the
direction of general contextualism or general invariantism respectively, but when
considering contextualism or invariantism about ‘knows’, the difference can be
characterized appropriately as a difference in kind and as absolute. This is because when
it comes to the matter at hand (the appropriate semantic treatment of ‘knows’) the
answers given by the two positions are simply opposing accounts of the semantics of the
specific term in question (e.g., “yes, ‘knows’ is context-sensitive” versus “no, it is not”).
Third, Unger’s characterization of contextualism and invariantism generally is
that, contextualism and invariantism are not treated as opposites per se nor are they
treated as exhaustive of the logical space. This is evidenced by the fact that Unger
considers a third position (a view which he calls sortalism) which he concludes is inferior
to both contextualism and invariantism and which he considers to be neither a form of
contextualism nor a form of invariantism. Unger focuses on contextualism and
invariantism because he thinks there is no other position which is as good as either
(except for the other)—not because there aren’t any other possible positions.30
Finally, when it comes to Unger’s account of contextualism about ‘knows’, Unger
doesn’t deal with what specific semantic mechanism makes ‘knows’ context-sensitive
(e.g. he does not claim that knowledge is an indexical or anything like that), but it is clear
that he takes ‘knows’ itself to be context-sensitive in a semantic sense.31 While Unger is
credited with the introduction of the term ‘contextualism’ into epistemology, it is Keith
DeRose and Stewart Cohen who have been the most influential and prolific proponents of
the view. It is to their characterizations of contextualism that we turn next. Let’s start
with DeRose.
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In DeRose’s twenty-plus years of writing in defense of contextualism, he has put
forward a number of similar (and compatible) definitions for contextualism. Here are a
couple of those definitions:
“…a ‘contextual’ theory of knowledge attributions…is a
theory according to which the truth conditions of sentences
of the form ‘S knows that p’ or ‘S does not know that p’
vary in certain ways according to the context in which the
sentences are uttered.”32
“Contextualists hold that the truth conditions of
knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences
(sentences of the form ‘S knows that P’ and ‘S doesn’t
know that P’ and related variants of such sentences)
fluctuate in certain ways according to the context in which
they are uttered. What so varies is the epistemic standards
that S must meet (or in the case of the denial of knowledge,
fail to meet) for such a statement to be true.”33
(The latter quote occurs later in DeRose’s work and definitions very similar to this are
retained in other works.34) There are a number of things worth noting here.
First, both definitions address an impact of context on sentences. More
specifically, both definitions address an impact of context on the truth conditions of
sentences.35 Second, the type of context referred to in both cases is a context of
utterance—i.e. the context of the speaker who utters the knowledge ascription or denial.
This is why a view like John MacFarlane’s relativism which appeals to a context of
assessment is generally not viewed as a type of contextualism.36 Third, in the case of
DeRose’s latter definition, it is the epistemic standard of the context of utterance which is
identified as the feature of context which can impact the truth conditions of a knowledgeascribing or knowledge-denying sentence.
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Thus, at least as DeRose construes contextualism we have a relationship in which
the epistemic standard present in a context of utterances constitutes the first relatum, and
the truth conditions of the sentence uttered in that sentence constitute the second relatum.
But what exactly is the nature of this relationship? DeRose writes in the first quote that
the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions and denials “vary in certain ways” with
changes in the context of utterance and in the second quote that they “fluctuate in certain
ways” with such changes. So, the relationship is such that certain changes in the one—the
context of utterance—lead to, or bring about, changes in the other—the truth conditions
of the relevant knowledge ascription or denial.
Two points are worth making explicit. First, it is the context that is responsible, in
some sense, for the change in the truth conditions, not the other way around. Second, the
relevant variation in the truth conditions seems to be guaranteed with the right changes in
the context—i.e. it is not the case that a particular change in context, which is sufficient
to bring about a change in the relevant knowledge ascription, could, all other things being
equal, fail to bring about such a change. When I say that certain variations in context
guarantee certain variations in the truth conditions of the sentence uttered what I am
getting at is the fact that the rules of variation seem to be determinate and mechanistic.
When the right sort of change occurs in the context of utterance, the corresponding
change in the truth conditions will occur.
To see how this sort of thing gets played in the cases offered by contextualists,
let’s turn to DeRose’s oft-cited bank cases.
Bank Case A: My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to stop at
the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we
notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although
we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially
important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive
straight home and deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, ‘Maybe the
bank won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturday.’ I reply, ‘No, I
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know it’ll be open tomorrow. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It’s open until
noon.’
Bank Case B: My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon as in Case A, and
notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning,
explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and
discovered that it was open until noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large
and very important check. If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account
before Monday morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very
bad situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of
these facts. She then says, ‘Banks do change their hours. Do you know the bank will be
open tomorrow?’ Remaining as confident as I was before that the bank will be open then,
still, I reply, “Well, no, I don’t know. I’d better go in and make sure.’37
DeRose follows up his description of these cases writing the following: “Assume in each
case that the bank will in fact be open on the Saturday in question, and that there is
nothing unusual about either case that has not been included in my description of it.”38
DeRose thinks that his first-person knowledge ascription in Case A is true, and that his
first-person knowledge denial in Case B is also true. The reason why the knowledge
ascription can be true in Case A and the knowledge denial true in Case B is because the
fixed degree of justification DeRose had in both cases, which was sufficient for a true
knowledge ascription in Case A, was made insufficient by a change in context. The
context was the only different input between the two situations, and this was sufficient
for the change in output.
But for the point at hand what’s most important to note is that DeRose would also
claim that had he restated his knowledge ascription from Case A in Case B, his
knowledge ascription would have been false in Case B and it doesn’t seem it could have
been otherwise given that context. The presentation of outcomes like this by
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contextualists functions as evidence that there is a mechanistic shift between certain
changes in context and the truth conditions of the relevant knowledge ascriptions and
denials. That this is so will prove an important point in differentiating contextualism from
the ambiguity theory.
So far we’ve seen that epistemic contextualism is a view about the relationship
between a context of utterance and the truth conditions of the sentence uttered in that
context—namely, a relationship in which certain changes in context are sufficient to
bring about certain changes in the truth conditions of the relevant knowledge ascriptions
and denials. It is my claim that this constitutes the heart of epistemic contextualism and
that the best test of whether or not a view ought to count as a type of epistemic
contextualism is whether or not it satisfies this description. In the examination of newer
forms of contextualism that follows I hope to be able to reinforce this claim.
At this point it will be useful to turn to how another prolific defender of epistemic
contextualism, Stewart Cohen, has described the view. Cohen opens his frequently-cited
1999 defense of contextualism with the following:
“Suppose one speaker says about a subject S and a
proposition P, ‘S knows P.’ At the very same time, another
speaker says of the very same subject and proposition, ‘S
does not know P.” Must one of the two be speaking
falsely? According to the view I will call ‘contextualism’,
both speakers can be speaking the truth. Contextualism is
the view that ascriptions of knowledge are contextsensitive—the truth values of sentences containing the
words ‘know’, and its cognates depend on contextually
determined standards. Because of this, sentences of the
form ‘S knows P’ can, at one time, have different truth
values in different contexts. Now when I say ‘contexts’, I
mean ‘contexts of ascription’. So the truth values of a
sentence containing the knowledge predicate can vary
depending on things like purposes, intentions, expectations,
presuppositions, etc. of the speakers who utter these
sentences.”39
In this passage Cohen touches upon a number of important issues. To begin, note that
Cohen preserves the same core of what constitutes epistemic contextualism as DeRose.
39
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For Cohen, epistemic contextualism is a view about the relationship between the truth
values of knowledge ascriptions and context (via contextually determined [epistemic]
standards). Cohen describes the relationship as a dependency such that the truth
conditions of the sentences are dependent upon context. This preserves both the fact that
it is context which influences truth conditions, not the other way around, and the
mechanistic relationship between the appropriate change in context and the appropriate
correlative change in the truth conditions of the relevant knowledge ascription.
Cohen also notes that contextualism allows for the following thesis to be true:
Surface Conflict Without Inconsistency (SCWI): It is possible for a speaker to say
about a subject S and a proposition P “S knows that P” and at the very same time for
another speaker to say about the same subject and proposition that “S doesn’t know that
P” and for both speakers to be speaking truly.
This is an important result for contextualism, practically speaking, because it is this result
that in many cases allows the contextualist to solve the skeptical and other
epistemological paradoxes it is invoked to solve. Cohen is clearly right that this is an
upshot of epistemic contextualism—a point which has been acknowledged by a number
of others, including DeRose, who have written on contextualism as well.
However, in noting the positive result that contextualism allows for the truth of
SCWI, some philosophers have mischaracterized the relationship between contextualism
and SCWI as something stronger than it is. Consider, for example, the following passage
by DeRose.
“Thus, the contextualist will allow that one speaker can
truthfully say ‘S knows that P,’ while another speaker, in a
different context where higher standards are in place, can
truthfully say ‘S doesn’t know P’ at the same time. The
“invariantist” – Peter Unger’s good name for one who denies
contextualism – will have none of this. According to her,
there’s a single, invariant set of standards which, at least as
far as truth conditions go, govern the use of knowledge
attributions regardless of the context in which they’re
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uttered; thus, our two speakers can’t both be speaking a
truth.”40
A similar understanding is conveyed by John Turri who writes that,
“Invariantism denies that the truth conditions of knowledge
ascriptions are context-sensitive. They remain constant,
invariantists say, across contexts.”41
These descriptions imply that, in addition to being the denial of contextualism,
invariantism is also the denial of SCWI. If it were true both that invariantism is the denial
of contextualism (i.e. any view which is not contextualist is invariantist) and that
invariantism is the denial of SCWI (i.e. any view which is does not affirm SCWI is
invariantist) then only on contextualism would SCWI be true and never on invariantism
could SCWI be true. I will argue later on in this chapter that there are non-contextualist
views (e.g. the ambiguity theory) on which SCWI is true and that as a result this is a bad
characterization of both contextualism and invariantism. However, for the time being, I
am merely pointing out that this stronger connection between contextualism and SCWI
has been rather hastily assumed.
Another important feature of Cohen’s description of contextualism is that it
provides some insight into a very basic and important question for the topic at hand,
namely, what counts as the context of utterance? We gained some insight earlier into this
question from our examination of Unger and DeRose and their interest in the epistemic
standards of a particular context. But this quote from Cohen provides us with something
more concrete when he writes that on contextualism “the truth values of a sentence
containing the knowledge predicate can vary depending on things like purposes,
intentions, expectations, presuppositions, etc. of the speakers who utter these sentences.”
Presumably, Cohen thinks variation in connections with these things can occur on
contextualism because Cohen considers these things to be aspects of the context of
utterance.
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DeRose provides some details as to what he counts as context which are in
keeping with Cohen’s description when DeRose writes that the following aspects of an
attributor’s conversational context “are the kinds of features which affect whether
attributions of knowledge are true”:
“How important is it that the parties to the discussion in
which the subject may be engaged be right on the matter in
question (how high are the stakes for them)? What has
transpired in the conversation in which the subject may be
engaged? In what ‘community’ is the subject operating, and
what epistemic standards are appropriate to that
community’s intents and purposes?”42
Patrick Rysiew uses this passage and the one cited earlier from Cohen to conclude that
for DeRose and Cohen ‘context’ as they use it in describing epistemic contextualism
“means none other than such things as the interests, expectations, and so forth of
knowledge attributors.”43
This conclusion strikes me as problematic for three reasons. First, neither Cohen
nor DeRose make the claim that the types of considerations they list are exhaustive of the
kinds of things that count as context—nor does their language strike me as implying this.
Thus, Rysiew’s usage of the phrase “none other” seems unwarranted. Second, the main
point of both of these passages seems to be that it is matters related to the
speaker/attributor (as opposed to the, potentially distinct, assessor of the utterance) which
are relevant to the variation in truth conditions. Which aspects of the speaker’s context
are the ones to be focusing on is a secondary point.
Third, and most significantly for our purposes, I think Rysiew’s focus on only
“interests, expectations, and so forth” puts forth too much of an “internalist”-bent to the
description of the factors that count as context for DeRose and Cohen. On a natural
reading of Rysiew’s claim, context is something that exists entirely “in the head” of the
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speaker as it were.44 But this doesn’t seem to match up with the picture of context utilized
in much of the discussion of and argumentation for contextualism. For starters, this
description does not take into account the more “external” sort of elements DeRose
discusses like what has transpired in an attributor’s conversation and the “community” in
which the attributor is operating. Second, if we look at the popular cases used to motivate
contextualism (things like DeRose’s bank cases and Cohen’s airport case, which will be
discussed in detail later on) the nature of the external circumstances seem to be playing a
role in what the context of utterance is along with the more internal factors. Thus, the
context of utterance seems to contain both aspects internal and external to the utterer.45
While less than constitutive of the view, entailing the truth of SCWI and
employing a rather broad view of what counts as part of the context of utterance are traits
found both in the more traditional versions of contextualism advocated by DeRose and
Cohen as well as in the newer versions of contextualism which we’ll turn to momentarily.
However, before turning to those newer views, two more points about the nature of
DeRose and Cohen’s versions of contextualism are worth noting. First, for both Cohen
and DeRose, the means by which knowledge ascribing and denying sentences gain their
special sense of context-sensitivity is via the lexically marked context-sensitivity of
‘knows’. In their traditional presentations of the view, they have not consistently limited
themselves to seeing ‘knows’ as an indexical in a narrow sense of that term, but they
seem to have consistently considered their contextualism to be rooted in some kind of
context-sensitivity for the content picked out by ‘knows’ itself. Second, neither DeRose
nor Cohen have taken any pains to separate out the truth conditions of knowledge
ascribing or denying sentences uttered in particular contexts from the truth conditions of
knowledge ascribing or denying utterances themselves.
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Rysiew may not have meant to give this overly internalist description of contextualism. Depending on
what Rysiew means to include in “and so forth” perhaps he and I are in agreement. Evidence that Rysiew is
amenable to “and so forth” containing the additional elements I pointed out is found when Rysiew writes in
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on epistemic contextualism that on the dominant form of
contextualism “features of the knowledge attributor(s)' psychology and/or conversational-practical
situation” are the relevant aspects of context (Rysiew, (2011)).
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In thinking back to the view of the semantic landscape provided to us via Borg in
Section 1, we can see that nothing put forward by DeRose or Cohen challenges a “general
formal approach to semantics”. DeRose and Cohen treat well-formed declarative
sentences as truth-evaluable and the means by which they posit the context-sensitivity of
knowledge ascriptions is via a lexico-syntactical route in virtue of some kind of lexically
marked context-sensitivity for ‘knows’ and its cognates. The solution DeRose and Cohen
offer to the contextualist data is one which doesn’t challenge formal semantics, and
perhaps even implicitly supports it via the limited nature of the context-sensitive
considerations they put forward. Similarly, invariantists, in virtue of their assumption that
the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions and denials can be determined without any
special context-sensitivity considerations, also seem to be implicitly supporting views on
the formal semantics end of the spectrum. For a long while these implicit assumptions
were able to play a quiet, guiding role in the conversations between the invariantists and
the contextualists. However, in more recent years, new versions of contextualism have
been put forward: views incompatible with formal semantics. And these new views have
required a restructuring in how the debate between contextualism and invariantism is
framed. It is to these newer views that we now turn.
These newer contextualist views come in two types. Both types have an analog
with (and require the acceptance of) one of the types of more use-based approaches to
semantics discussed in Section 1. The first type of new view is called “pragmatic
contextualism”, the primary defender of which is Geoff Pynn.46 This type of view
requires acceptance of a certain form of dual pragmatics and employs free pragmatic
enrichment. The second type of newer view has gone by various names including “truthcontextualism” as defended by Berit Brogaard and “nonindexical contextualism” as
defended by John MacFarlane.47 In what follows I’ll refer to this view as nonindexical
contextualism, noting that by a nonindexical expression I mean an expression that fails to
be indexical in Brogaard’s broad sense of indexical expressions which consist of any
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Brogaard (2008), MacFarlane (2007, 2009). These defenders don’t necessarily endorse the view, but
they, at the very least, argue the superiority of this form of “contextualism” over more traditional forms like
the contextualism of DeRose and Cohen.
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“expression whose content varies with context.”48 Nonindexical contextualism requires
the employment of at least a limited form of semantic relativism. As a result, both
pragmatic contextualism and nonindexical contextualism challenge certain earlier
assumptions in the literature on knowledge ascriptions and have required new distinctions
to be acknowledged in the discussion. As these new distinctions have been made, the
contextualist umbrella has generally expanded to take these new views under its purview.
However, as I hope to show, this is because these views have not conflicted with the real
essence of epistemic contextualism. To see why this is so, let’s look at pragmatic
contextualism and nonindexical contextualism in a little more detail.
Let’s begin with pragmatic contextualism. Geoff Pynn notes that “[c]ontextualism
in epistemology has traditionally been understood as the view that ‘know’ functions
semantically like an indexical term, encoding different contents in contexts with different
epistemic standards.”49 Pynn describes pragmatic contextualism as “an alternative version
of contextualism on which ‘know’ is a semantically stable term, and the truth conditional
variability in knowledge claims is a matter of pragmatic enrichment.”50 Pynn also points
out that pragmatic contextualism “distinguishes sharply between the contents encoded by
knowledge sentences and the propositions asserted by speakers who make knowledge
claims.”51 For Pynn, context impacts only the truth conditions of the latter—i.e. the truth
conditions of assertions or utterances—but not of the former—i.e. the uttered sentences
themselves. Thus, Pynn needs to make a distinction between our earlier labeled 1), the
content of a sentence as uttered in a particular context, and 2), the content (literally)
asserted by an utterance; a distinction which by and large was lacking in relevance in
earlier discussions of contextualism. But Pynn not only needs to make this distinction. He
also needs to accept that the truth conditions of the one can pull apart from the truth
conditions of the other. That is to say, his account requires that the truth conditions of
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sentences uttered in contexts will at times have different truth conditions than the
assertions themselves.
The method by which Pynn claims this occurs is a form of pragmatic “narrowing”
in which contexts with stringent knowledge standards narrow down the acceptable range
of epistemic standards that will result in knowledge.52 So for example, in a low stakes
situation, the knowledge claim made in Bank Case A is true in virtue of a wide enough
range of epistemic standards resulting in knowledge and in Bank Case B such a
knowledge claim is false because the range of epistemic standards resulting in knowledge
has been restricted. Put in these rather neutral terms, this may sound no different than the
proposal DeRose, who also appeals to epistemic standards, gives. However, there are two
important differences.
First, for DeRose, this change in truth conditions occurs because ‘knows’ itself is
context-sensitive. However, Pynn states that on pragmatic contextualism ‘knows’ is “a
semantically stable term”—i.e. not context-sensitive. Rather, for Pynn, what changes
across Case A and Case B is not the semantics of simply ‘knows’ itself, but rather the
actual content of the utterance as a whole. Just as, according to the pragmatic enrichment
theorist, the utterance “You’re not going to die” said by a mother to a child with a scratch
literally means “You’re not going to die because of this scrape”,53 so also, according to
the pragmatic contextualist, the utterance “I know the bank is open on Saturdays” literally
means something fuller than what the syntax and lexical content alone give us. (What is
this fuller meaning? A variety of answers are compatible with pragmatic contextualism as
a method, and a specific answer is not important for our purposes.)54 This is in contrast
with a traditional form of contextualism which sees the extra content included via the
lexically marked context-sensitivity of ‘know’. It follows that an accurate accounting of
the difference between contextualism and invariantism should not focus just what the two
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Pynn writes that “[t]here are several different ways one could elaborate PC” (2015a, 33). In the way that
Pynn focuses on what it is that an assertion of a knowledge ascription says is that the subject is in the
particular epistemic position relevant to the situation at hand (2015a, 35). Thus, the move is very similar to
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views say about the nature of ‘knows’, for pragmatic contextualism agrees with
invariantist that ‘knows’ is semantically stable. Rather, the difference between
invariantism and contextualism must be explained in terms of whole utterances.
This leads to the second key difference between pragmatic contextualism and
more traditional forms of contextualism. This second difference is that pragmatic
contextualism is, at its heart, a theory about the truth conditions of knowledge ascribing
and denying utterances only, whereas (as I understand the view) traditional forms of
contextualism say something about the truth conditions of both knowledge ascribing and
denying utterances and sentences.
These two differences between Pynn’s view and the view of traditional
contextualists require the challenging of two assumptions that had been at play, at least
implicitly, in the conversation about the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions. The
first assumption challenged is that the truth conditions of knowledge ascribing and
denying sentences and the truth conditions of knowledge ascribing and denying
utterances do not differ. The second assumption challenged is that the context-sensitivity
of knowledge ascribing and denying utterances enters in via a lexico-syntactic means.
Thus, Pynn’s view requires an acceptance of dual pragmatics, as least as it pertains to the
content of utterances.
However, it’s important to note a feature that has remained the same between
traditional forms of contextualism and pragmatic contextualism—a feature exemplified
by their respons to the bank cases. That feature is the mechanistic covariation between
context and truth conditions (at least in the case of utterances). It is the change in context
that is responsible for the change in truth conditions, and on neither view is the relevance
of context relegated to merely helping make clear (without helping determine meaning)
what the truth conditions or content of the utterances are.
With that in mind, let’s turn to the second kind of new contextualist proposal:
nonindexical contextualism. With nonindexical contextualism, Berit Brogaard and John
MacFarlane (among others) bring another important distinction to the literature on
knowledge ascriptions—namely, the distinction between shifts in semantic content across
contexts from shifts in truth conditions across contexts. Traditionally, contextualism has
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been defined in terms of a change in truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions resulting
from a change in context. However, it has typically been assumed that the means by
which this change occurs is via a change in the content of the knowledge ascription
across contexts. Thus, MacFarlane is certainly correct when he writes that “Philosophers
on all sides of the contextualism debate have had an overly narrow conception of what
semantic sensitivity could be. They have conflated context sensitivity (dependence of
truth or extension on features of context) with indexicality (dependence of content on
features of context).”55
The central move of the nonindexical contextualist is to put forward a theory on
which the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions, but not the content of the knowledge
ascriptions, shift with changes in context. Brogaard succinctly puts forth the idea as
follows.
“Here is my working hypothesis: ‘know’ has the same
semantic value in any context of use. The content of ‘know’
is (or determines) a function from circumstances to
extensions. But the circumstances are non-standard: they
contain a judge parameter in addition to the time and world
parameters.”56
It is important for our purposes to see the ways in which this view is both similar to and
different from more traditional forms of epistemic contextualism. One key difference is
that on nonindexical contextualism, ‘knows’ is, like on pragmatic contextualism,
semantically stable, unlike traditional contextualism on which ‘knows’ is context
sensitive. Another key difference, as mentioned before, is that on nonindexical
contextualism, unlike on pragmatic contextualism or traditional contextualism, it is only
the truth conditions, and not the content, that varies across contexts. However,
nonindexical contextualism shares in common with traditional contextualism no need to
posit free pragmatic enrichment like pragmatic contextualism does. For this reason,
nonindexical contextualism represents a less stark departure from the general formal
semantics presupposed in traditional forms of contextualism. However, it is not without
its controversial element.
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As Brogaard notes, “[t]he controversial part is that the circumstance of evaluation
contains a judge parameter in addition to a time and a world parameter.”57 If we think
back to the theories of semantics covered in Section 1, we can frame this controversy in
terms of a movement towards the used-based end of the semantic spectrum via a move
toward relativism which was defined as a view on which “contextual material (in at least
some cases) [contributes] to the parameters against which a proposition is assessed for
truth or falsity.”58 While positing this one extra judge parameter on its own may not take
us too far in the direction of relativism, either the nonindexical contextualist opens herself
up to positing other such parameters, or she ends up with an idiosyncratic view on which
a parameter is employed to explain a particular set of problematic data even though such
parameters are not generally posited as existing. Thus, nonindexical contextualism is
either saddled with a significant movement in the direction of relativism or is an odd
duck-out-of-water sort of view.59 Of course, this first horn in this “dilemma” is only a
problem if one wishes to retain a formal semantics. Retaining formal semantics doesn’t
seem to be a high priority for those advocating nonindexical contextualism, so for them it
is a cost perhaps only to the extent that it will be harder for them to convince those with
formal semantic tendencies to accept their view.
So we’ve gotten clear what some of nonindexical contextualism’s differences
from traditional contextualism are as well as what a potential cost of accepting the view
might be. However, it is important to note a feature that nonindexical contextualism
shares with both pragmatic contextualism and traditional forms of contextualism: namely,
that context has the power to change what the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions
and denials are. More specifically, on all these views, context has the power to make
certain knowledge ascriptions and denials true in some contexts where that same claim
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would have been false if uttered in other contexts and vice versa. It is this feature that has
emerged as the heart of epistemic contextualism. And while the ambiguity theory allows
for something similar, it is importantly different. It is this difference that sets the
ambiguity theory apart. And it is this difference that I think makes the ambiguity theory
so promising. We’ll now turn to an examination of the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ and
what that difference is.
1.3 Contextualism and the Ambiguity Theory of ‘Knows’
The ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ is the view that ‘knows’ and its cognates have
more than one propositional sense or meaning—that is to say, there is more than one
sense of ‘knows’ and its cognates properly available for use in ‘knows that’ (etc.)
constructions—and that as a result, which sense of ‘knows’ is employed in a knowledge
ascription or denial determines, in part, the meaning (and as a result the truth conditions)
of that knowledge ascription or denial.
Epistemic contextualism (i.e. contextualism about ‘knows’ and its cognates), as
covered in the previous section, is the view that the truth conditions of knowledge
ascriptions and denials vary in certain ways according to the context in which the
sentences are uttered. Unlike the ambiguity theory which posits a specific semantic
mechanism (i.e. ambiguity) and a specific means (i.e. via content determination) by
which the alterations in the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions and denials occur,
contextualism is less specific on these fronts, with its defining focus being on the ability
of context to change the truth conditions of knowledge and denials across contexts. And
as we’ve seen in the previous section the mechanisms and means by which a contextualist
may suggest that this occur are quite varied—from ‘knows’ functioning as an indexical,
to pragmatic enrichment, to assessment against a judge parameter. In thinking about
matters this way it might seem natural to suggest that the ambiguity theory provides just
another means by which these changes occur. While this initial line of thought is perhaps
reasonable, it is mistaken.
I will suggest that there are at least two important reasons why it is mistaken.
First, ambiguity and context-sensitivity, as linguistic features, are different in kind.
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Second, and more importantly, all types of context-sensitivity function to limit the ways
in which a knowledge ascription or denial can be true within a given context, while
ambiguity keeps open in all contexts all the ways that a knowledge ascription or denial
can be true within any given context. That is to say, unlike on contextualism, on the
ambiguity theory there need not be any change in the possible truth conditions of a
knowledge ascription or denial from one context to another. This is because, at its core,
epistemic contextualism is about the context-driven covariation between certain contexts
and truth conditions, but, at its core, the ambiguity theory is about the ambiguity-driven
expansion of possible semantic content for a sentence in all contexts. Thus, while the two
views entail a number of common or similar outcomes, they should not be conflated.
Let’s begin with the nature of the linguistic difference between the two views.
One interested in making the case that the ambiguity theory ought to be viewed as
distinct from contextualism has a certain presumption from linguistics going in his
favor—namely, the fact that ambiguity and context-sensitivity are generally recognized
as distinct semantic phenomena. Adam Sennet makes the point nicely writing that,
“Context sensitivity is (potential) variability in content due
purely to changes in the context of utterance without a
change in the convention of word usage. Thus, ‘I am
hungry’ varies in content speaker to speaker because ‘I’ is
context sensitive and shifts reference depending on who
utters it. ‘I’, however, is not massively ambiguous. ‘Bank’
is ambiguous, not (at least, not obviously) context sensitive.
Of course, knowledge of context may well help
disambiguate an ambiguous utterance. Nonetheless,
ambiguity is not characterized by interaction with (extralinguistic) context but is a property of the meanings of the
terms.”60
Sennet’s examples clearly show that a word can be ambiguous without being contextsensitive and that a word can be context-sensitive without being ambiguous. While both
ambiguity and context-sensitivity allow for a change in content across context (as is
evident in our uses of both ‘I’ and ‘bank’), with context-sensitive words the change in
semantic content is due purely (to use Sennet’s phrase) to the change in context, while
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with ambiguous words context plays a role relegated to the pragmatic where context
merely makes it likely or sensible that a change in semantic content may occur via a
change in the speaker’s intention with certain changes in context.61 Even if one were to
make the case that ‘bank’ is context-sensitive, the context-sensitivity of ‘bank’ wouldn’t
be because it was ambiguous and conversely with ‘I’. This is, in part, because ambiguity
is the non-context-bound property of a word having more than one meaning, any of
which can be the meaning used in any context where the appropriate syntax is present,62
while context-sensitivity is the property of content variation resulting from a change in
context. This distinction is in keeping with the general assumption in linguistics that
context-sensitivity and ambiguity are distinct linguistic phenomena.
A practical way to see the difference is to apply the following sort of test. Imagine
that you are scheduled to meet me on a street with a river on one side and numerous
establishments on the other side, one of which is a bank. We’d agreed upon only an
approximate location to meet and you are in that general vicinity looking for me. You
decide it would be easier to call and ask where I am rather than continue to somewhat
aimlessly wander. I pick up the phone and you ask, “where are you?”
If I reply “I’m by the bank” you may wonder, appropriately, whether I am talking
about being by the riverside or the financial institution and may ask for clarification. I can
thus disambiguate my unclear referent by specifying that “I’m next to the First Bank and
Trust on the corner of First and Main.” While this clears up the ambiguity, this doesn’t
negate that fact that I just as easily could have been referring to the riverside with my
original utterance. The same does not hold with the word ‘I’. It wouldn’t make sense if
you were to question who I was referring to with the term ‘I’ (assuming that you realized
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you were speaking with me). The context fixed the referent in that situation. Of course,
‘I’ can be used to pick out lots of speakers across contexts, but the context we were in
made only one referent available. It’s our adept usage of both ambiguous and contextsensitive terms that allows Sennet to give the examples of ‘I’ and ‘bank’ as paradigmatic
cases of each and trust that we can recognize discrete categories of linguistic types.63
The significance of this difference can be heightened if we turn to John Perry’s
useful distinction between the presemantic and semantic which he describes in the
following way,
“Sometimes we use context to figure out with which
meaning a word is being used, or which of several words
that look or sound alike is being used, or even which
language is being spoken. These are presemantic uses of
context: context helps us to figure out meaning. In the case
of indexicals, however, context is used semantically. It
remains relevant after the language, words and meanings
are all known; the meaning directs us to certain aspects of
context.”64
I (along with Perry and Borg65) take the difference between ‘I’ and ‘bank’ to be a case of
such a difference. The way in which context determines the meaning of ‘I’ is semantic.
That is, context remains relevant after the language, words, and meanings are all known.
The task of determining which sense of ‘bank’ is being employed is presemantic. We use
context to figure out what meaning a speaker has employed, but once we’ve successfully
done that, there is nothing especially context-sensitive about ‘bank’ that remains. It seems
clear to me that contextualists have traditionally seen context playing a robust, semantic
role that cannot be relegated to the presemantic. But part of what the ambiguity theory
claims in stating that the variability in meaning is a result of an ambiguity in the term
‘knows’ is that the role context is playing is solely presemantic and as a result purely
pragmatic. This seems to clearly constitute a difference in kind. This difference is
important, and perhaps sufficient on its own for the ambiguity theory to be viewed as a
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position distinct from contextualism. However, there is an even more important
difference lurking nearby.
We noted earlier that contextualism entails the truth of the following claim:
Surface Conflict Without Inconsistency (SCWI): It is possible for a speaker to say
about a subject S and a proposition P “S knows that P” and at the very same time for
another speaker to say about the same subject and proposition that “S doesn’t know that
P” and for both speakers to be speaking truly.
This principle follows because contextualism allows for the differing contexts of the
different speakers to contain distinct truth conditions for the expression of the same
proposition.
The ambiguity theory entails the truth of SCWI too. But for a different reason.
The reason why this is so is because the speakers can select different senses of ‘knows’ in
their utterances which in turn will alter the content of their ascriptions and derivatively
the truth conditions of those ascriptions as well. But note that, unlike the case of
contextualism which required that the two speakers be in different contexts, two speakers
in the same context can diverge in their responses and both be saying something true in
some circumstances, so long as they each are using a different sense of ‘knows’.
This reveals the central divide between epistemic contextualism and the
ambiguity theory. At bottom, epistemic contextualism seeks to solve epistemological
problems by allowing the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions and denials to
change across contexts. This is a feature that has remained consistent and central across
the over quarter century of development of epistemic contextualism. However, at bottom,
the ambiguity theory seeks to solve epistemological problems by allowing for there to be
a wider range of truth conditions for knowledge ascribing and denying sentences and
utterances in virtue of providing more options for what the content of those ascriptions
and denials might be.
In the next chapter, much of the case for the ambiguity theory over epistemic
contextualism will hinge on this distinction between the two views. And because this
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differing feature between the ambiguity theory and contextualism is one that all versions
of contextualism have in common, my criticisms of contextualism in chapter 2 will, for
the most part, apply to all forms of contextualism.
But in closing, I think it’s worth pointing out that there’s a weakness that the
newer forms of contextualism have which both the traditional forms of contextualism and
the ambiguity theory are not saddled with—namely, as noted earlier, the newer forms of
epistemic contextualism, like pragmatic contextualism and nonindexical contextuailsm,
are compatible with only a limited set of theories of semantics. Neither one is compatible
with a strict minimalism or indexicalism as Borg has defined the terms. Yet both the
ambiguity theory and traditional forms of contextualism rely only on non-controversial
semantic mechanisms (no one is denying that ambiguity and context-sensitivity exist) and
as a result don’t employ any linguistic assumptions that limit the types of views of
semantics they are compatible with. This feature is one that traditional contextualism and
the ambiguity theory share in common. But we turn now to an examination of their
differences in chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 2: CONTEXTUALISM AND THE AMBIGUITY THEORY OF
‘KNOWS’

The generally agreed upon virtues of contextualism are that it solves certain
persistent epistemological problems relating to skeptical arguments and that it preserves
the truth of most of our everyday, ordinary usages of ‘knows’ and its cognates.66 For
these reasons, many epistemologists find contextualism very appealing. However, many
others resist contextualism because the view seems, to them, to come with certain
unacceptable costs. Those who reject contextualism are often labeled invariantists.
Typically, according to invariantism there is only one sense of the word ‘know’. But
rejecting contextualism does not require that one accept that there is only one sense of the
word know (or so I will aim to show).
In this paper I argue for the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’—the view that ‘knows’
and its cognates67 have more than one sense and that which sense of ‘knows’ is used in a
knowledge ascription or denial determines, in part, the meaning (and as a result the truth
conditions) of that knowledge ascription or denial.68 It is, in a way, remarkable how little
attention the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ has received (although a few modern advocates
of the view will be discussed later) and, in particular, it is remarkable how little
contextualists have said against it, given that the ambiguity theory has so many of the
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benefits of contextualism and avoids so many of the costs. This paper is in part an
attempt to direct some attention towards the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’. 69
Section 1 lays out the theoretical landscape by defining contextualism,
invariantism and the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ and clarifying the differences and
relationships between the positions. In Section 2 I argue that the ambiguity theory has the
same virtues as contextualism. In Section 3, I provide an ambiguity-theory-friendly
account of why contextualism may be initially appealing. In Section 4, I argue that the
ambiguity theory has several advantages over contextualism—making the ambiguity
theory a view worthy of consideration and the superior theory unless counterbalancing
considerations can be offered.
2.1 Contextualism, Invariantism, and the Ambiguity Theory of ‘Knows’
In keeping with standard usage, I use the phrase epistemic contextualism, or more
simply contextualism, to refer to the view that the truth conditions of knowledge
ascriptions and denials (e.g. sentences of the form “S knows that P” and “S doesn’t know
that P”), in virtue of making a knowledge claim, shift in accordance with certain changes
in the context of utterance. Or, to put it another way, contextualism is the view that the
truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions and denials depend, in part, upon the
attributor’s conversational context because of the way in which ‘knows’ contributes to
the claim.70 Among the relevant aspects of context are both factors internal to the utterer
In what follows, generally, the terms ‘know’, ‘knows’, ‘knowing’ and even at points ‘knowledge’ will be
used in an interchangeable fashion in the context of discussing the ambiguity theory of ‘knows.’ One might
object that this glosses over the fact (if it is a fact) that it is signifiers, vocables, or some other linguistic
entity, and not words themselves, that are ambiguous. While I see the sense in such an objection, I am not
too concerned about it for several reasons. First, in discussions of indexical forms of contextualism, shifts
between talk of ‘know’, ‘knows’, etc. is typical and seems to have be part of the accepted convention.
Second, I see nothing wrong with treating a lexeme as ambiguous, and with the exception of ‘knowledge’,
all the forms used are part of the same lexeme. Finally, if a reader is not swayed by these considerations, I
would ask such a reader to consider me to be arguing for a family of related views (an ambiguity theory of
‘know’, an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’, etc.) in which I take evidence for the ambiguity of any one of the
words signifiers under discussion as equal evidence for the ambiguity of the others.
70
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119), and Steup (2005), among many others. Keith DeRose (1999) and Geoff Pynn (2015) discuss other
uses of the term contextualism in epistemology, like that found in the work of Davis Annis (1978), but
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paper.
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(e.g. the utterer’s purposes, interests, stakes, etc.) and factors external to the utterer (the
conversation the utterer is contributing to, the community the utterer is a part of, etc.).71
I also take the following clarification from Patrick Rysiew to express something
essential about the view:
“The thesis is that it is only relative to a contextuallydetermined standard that a knowledge sentence expresses a
complete proposition: change the standard, and you change
what the sentence expresses; acontextually, however, no
such proposition is expressed. In this respect, knowledge
utterances are supposed to resemble utterances involving
uncontroversially context-sensitive terms…truth values shift
only because, according to EC, different propositions are
expressed in different contexts.”72
As Geoff Pynn has recently noted “[c]ontextualism is a broad tent,”73 and the linguistic
mechanisms by which context allows for the completion of a proposition differ among
alternative types of contextualism. However, what remains essential in all cases is that
context is required to recover the complete meaning and/or truth conditions of knowledge
ascriptions and denials,74 and that a shift in context can control a shift in truth conditions
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See, for example, Cohen (1999, 58 and 61) and DeRose (1999, 191 and 195). The claim that context
contains both these internal and external elements has perhaps been denied by others at points. For
example, Patrick Rysiew writes that “and ‘context’ here [in a discussion of epistemic contextualism] means
none other than such things as the interests, expectations, and so forth of knowledge attributors.”
Depending on what he means to include in “and so forth” this may count as an implicit denial of what I’ve
called the external factors of context, but if that is what Rysiew meant, he has provided no argument for
this claim. And it other places Rysiew seems to adopt the internal/external blend that I’ve put forward when
he writes that on the dominant form of contextualism “features of the knowledge attributor(s)' psychology
and/or conversational-practical situation” are the relevant aspects of context (Rysiew, (2011)). Similarly,
DeRose, in his emphasis on the internal factors at points, may implicitly be denying at least the centrality of
the external factors. The place where DeRose seems to do this most strongly is in DeRose (2005) in
particular sections III and VII, and perhaps in DeRose (2004), but this also seems to be offset by
considerations like the quote of his above. At the end of the day, given the set of elucidations of context
available in the literature and the reliance on external elements of context to generate intuitions and
outcomes in contextualist data like DeRose’s bank cases and Cohen’s airport case, I think the best
understanding of ‘context’ (both in general and as used by the epistemic contextualist) is that it contains
both these internal and external elements.
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Rysiew (2011); emphasis in original.
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Pynn (2015b, 14).
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From here on out the language of “and knowledge denials” will typically be dropped, but should be
viewed as implied where appropriate.
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by changing the proposition expressed. This point will be useful later in clarifying the
distinction between contextualism and the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’.75
Invariantism, in the epistemological sphere, is often simply taken to be the view
that contextualism is false.76 However, invariantism is frequently described in a way that
makes it more than simply the denial of contextualism. For example DeRose writes that,
“Thus, the contextualist will allow that one speaker can
truthfully say ‘S knows that P,’ while another speaker, in a
different context where higher standards are in place, can
truthfully say ‘S doesn’t know P’ at the same time. The
“invariantist” – Peter Unger’s good name for one who denies
contextualism – will have none of this. According to her,
there’s a single, invariant set of standards which, at least as
far as truth conditions go, govern the use of knowledge
attributions regardless of the context in which they’re
uttered; thus, our two speakers can’t both be speaking a
truth.”77
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Presenting contextualism in these terms captures essential components uniting the traditional forms of
contextualism advocated by those like Lewis, DeRose, and Cohen, but it somewhat suppresses a few
important nuances that certain newer forms of contextualism have to offer. Geoff Pynn, for example, offers
a view dubbed pragmatic contextualism which requires considering the truth conditions of knowledge
ascribing and knowledge denying assertions apart from the truth conditions of knowledge ascribing and
knowledge denying sentences—and posits, as a starting point in philosophy of language, that the truth
conditions of sentences and their accompanying utterances can indeed come apart (see Pynn (2015a) and
(2015b)). Pynn’s view properly speaking is about assertions/utterances only and not sentences, but I don’t
believe that appealing to that distinction here will be relevant for my arguments so I’ve chosen to gloss
over it in this paper. On another front, views like those found in the work of Nikola Kompa (2002), Berit
Brogaard (2008), and John MacFarlane (2007, 2009) are best understood as claiming not that context is
required in order for a proposition to be expressed, but rather that a context is required in order to
determine the truth conditions of the proposition in virtue of the existence of an epistemic parameter of
evaluation, much like more commonly affirmed parameters of evaluation like time, place, or possible
world. While such views may allow for the expression of a proposition without a context, they still share
two important traits in common with more standard forms of contextualism: 1) they require a context for
the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions and denials and, 2) they posit that context determines in part
what those truth conditions are. Thus, for my purpose, I take what I say in this paper to apply to these views
just as forcefully as other forms of contextualism. For a reader wary of this claim, I would suggest
considering my argument against contextualism to not include this particular sub-family of views.
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For example, Rysiew (2011) writes that “one is an invariantist (with respect to a given class of
statements) just in case one rejects contextualism (with respect to statements of that class)”.
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DeRose (1999, 188). John Turri conveys a similar understanding writing that “Invariantism denies that
the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive. They remain constant, invariantists say,
across contexts.” (Turri (2010), 78). John Hawthorne may be saying something similar when he writes that
“[a]ccording to the invariantist, the semantic value of ‘know’, and accordingly the extension of ‘know’,
does not vary across contexts of use” (Hawthorne 2004, 113). See also Kompa (2002) and Brendel & Jager
(2004, 146-7).
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This description implies that, in addition to being the denial of contextualism,
invariantism is also the denial of the following view:
Surface Conflict Without Inconsistency (SCWI): it is possible for a speaker to say
about a subject S and a proposition P “S knows that P” and at the very same time for
another speaker to say about the same subject and proposition that “S doesn’t know that
P” and for both speakers to be speaking truly.
The denial of contextualism does not entail the denial of SCWI unless it is assumed that
the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’ provides the only way for SCWI to be true. One aim of
this paper is to show that this assumption is false. I will argue that on the ambiguity
theory SCWI is true and that the ambiguity theory is not a type of contextualism. If I am
right, there has been an inconsistency in how the term invariantism has been used. In
order to keep things clear in the discussion ahead, in this paper by ‘invariantism’ I mean
the view that (1) contextualism is false and that (2) SCWI is false. Thus defined, the
ambiguity theory is not a type of invariantism.78
The ambiguity theory of ‘knows’, like invariantism, combines two theses. The
first is that ‘knows’ has more than one sense—specifically more than one propositional
sense, i.e. a sense that can properly be used in ‘knows that’ constructions.79 The second is
that which sense of ‘knows’ is being employed plays a role in fixing the truth conditions
of a knowledge ascription (in virtue of contributing to the meaning of the ascription).
Thus, so long as the ambiguity theorist doesn’t hold a view that requires that context be
determined in order to fix meaning in general, the ambiguity theory allows that the
meaning and truth conditions of a knowledge ascription can be determined even when the
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Although the ambiguity theory would be a type of invariantism using the definition from Rysiew in
footnote 66.
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I take it that for each distinct sense of ‘knows’ there is also a distinct referent. (The ambiguity theory as
stated doesn’t technically rule out the option that there are multiple senses but only a single referent.
However, this seems to me to be a very strange view and one which I do not seriously consider). Thus one
could advocate a “companion view” to the ambiguity theory about the referents of ‘knowledge’ instead of
senses. Matthias Steup’s Multiple Concepts Theory of knowledge (Steup, 2005) might be able to serve as
such a view. The ambiguity theory remains neutral on the nature of these referents. It would be a matter of
one’s additional epistemological views what those referents would be—e.g. relations, mental states, etc.
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context is not. That is to say, the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions can be known
on the ambiguity theory even if the attributor’s context is unknown or if the ascription is
presented acontextually (if such a thing is possible).
While until recently the ambiguity theory has not been much defended (or even
discussed), it is a view that has been previously suggested and endorsed. Two such early
ambiguity theorists are Norman Malcolm80 and Fred Feldman.81 Malcolm’s and
Feldman’s positions are very similar. Both posit two senses of ‘knowledge’ (what
DeRose calls a “high” and a “low” sense”82) one of which is ‘knowledge’ in a rigorous,
high-standards, “philosophical” sense and the other ‘knowledge’ in a practical, every-day
sense.
While both Malcolm and Feldman adopt a “two senses” view of ‘knowledge’, it is
important to note that the ambiguity theory itself doesn’t say anything about the number
of senses ‘knows’ has or the conditions under which these different senses are satisfied.83
This point has been noticed by Matthias Steup who has more recently advocated an
ambiguity theory-like position which he dubs the “Multiple Concepts Theory” (MCT).84
Steup writes that “[a]ccording to MCT, there are as many concepts of knowledge as there
are different standards of knowledge.”85 While Steup chooses to frame his discussion in
terms of the multiple concepts of knowledge instead of the multiple senses of
‘knowledge’, I take MCT to be completely compatible with the ambiguity theory. 86
Another recent advocate of a form of the ambiguity theory is Baron Reed. The
metaphysical picture Reed advocates is that “knowledge in general is a determinable; the
different knowledge relations that are grounded in particular degrees of justification are
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Feldman (1986, 33-37).
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DeRose (1999, 195).
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Viewed in this way the ambiguity theory is a genus for which there could be a number of species of more
specific views. Of course, the ambiguity theorist working on the “species-level” will need to provide details
about how many senses of ‘knows’ there are and under what conditions each sense is satisfied. But my aim
in this paper is only to defend the “genus.”
84
Steup (2005).
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Steup (2005, 6).
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In fact, the relationship between MCT and the ambiguity theory seems to be a much stronger relationship
than merely a relationship of compatibility. Steup identifies a view which he calls “New Contextualism”
(NC) which he refers to as a “semanticized mirror image of MCT.” I take this description of being a
semanticized mirror image of MCT to also apply to the ambiguity theory.
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its determinates.”87 He compares this to the nature of colors writing that, “[t]he same sort
of metaphysical structure can be found in color: blue, for example, is a determinable with
the various particular shades of blue as its determinates.”88 Reed combines this
metaphysical account of blue with the following semantic account of ‘blue’: the “various
usages of ‘blue’ are possible because it is ambiguous.”89 And Reed takes the same
semantic account to apply in the case of ‘knows’.
The fact that the ambiguity theory itself doesn’t say anything about the number of
senses ‘knows’ has is a particularly important point because it shows that what
distinguishes the ambiguity theory from contextualism is not the number of senses the
theory posits. This point has sometimes gone unnoticed. For example DeRose writes that,
“Theories according to which there are two senses of ‘know’
– a ‘low,’ ‘weak,’ or ‘ordinary sense’ on the one hand, and a
‘high,’ ‘strong,’ or ‘philosophical’ sense, which is much
more demanding, on the other – can be viewed as limiting
cases of contextualist views…current contextualist theories
don’t hold that there are just two different sets of epistemic
standards governing the truth conditions of knowledge
attributions, but rather posit a wide variety of different
standards.”90
By taking Malcolm’s two senses view of ‘knowledge’ to be a “limiting case” of
contextualism, DeRose implies that the only relevant difference between Malcolm’s view
and the view of the contemporary defender of contextualism is the number of epistemic
standards governing the truth conditions of knowledge attributions. This seems to be a
mistake. After all, if there is nothing other than the number of senses posited that
separates the ambiguity theory from contextualism, we lack an explanation as to what
differentiates Reed’s theory from contextualism. Ambiguity theories of ‘know’ that are
multivocal like Reed’s and Steup’s prompt one to note that there is a second, important
difference between a view like Malcolm’s and a view like DeRose’s.
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DeRose (1999, 191-192). Similarly, Jason Stanley (2005, 81) considers the ambiguity theory to be a type
of epistemic contextualism.
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This second difference deals with what is required in order for a given utterance
or sentence expression of a knowledge ascription or denial to pick out a proposition. On
contextualism, what is required (in addition to the things we standardly think are
required) is a context. On the ambiguity theory a context is not required, but a sense of
‘knows’ is. This in turn results in a difference between contextualism and the ambiguity
theory as to what determines the truth conditions of a knowledge ascription or denial. For
the proponent of contextualism, context is one such determinant, but for the proponent of
the ambiguity theory context is not (at least not in any way beyond the way in which
context may always be required). This difference between contextualism and the
ambiguity theory is no mere difference in degree as is the difference between a view that
advocates two epistemic standards versus a view that advocates more than two epistemic
standards. This difference between contextualism and the ambiguity theory is a difference
in kind.
In order to see clearly that this is a difference in kind and not just degree, one
needs to clearly see the distinction, linguistically, between ambiguity and contextsensitivity. Adam Sennet makes the point nicely writing that
“Context sensitivity is (potential) variability in content due
purely to changes in the context of utterance without a
change in the convention of word usage. Thus, ‘I am
hungry’ varies in content speaker to speaker because ‘I’ is
context sensitive and shifts reference depending on who
utters it. ‘I’, however, is not massively ambiguous. ‘Bank’
is ambiguous, not (at least, not obviously) context sensitive.
Of course, knowledge of context may well help
disambiguate an ambiguous utterance. Nonetheless,
ambiguity is not characterized by interaction with (extralinguistic) context but is a property of the meanings of the
terms.”91
Sennet’s examples clearly show that a word can be ambiguous without being contextsensitive and that a word can be context-sensitive without being ambiguous. While both
ambiguity and context-sensitivity allow for a change in content across context (as is
91

Sennet (2011).
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evident in our uses of both ‘I’ and ‘bank’), with context-sensitive words the change in
semantic content is due purely (to use Sennet’s phrase) to the change in context, while
with ambiguous words context plays a role relegated to the pragmatic where context
merely makes it likely or sensible that a change in semantic content may occur via a
change in the speaker’s intention with certain changes in context.92 Even if one were to
make the case that ‘bank’ is context-sensitive, the context-sensitivity of ‘bank’ wouldn’t
be because it was ambiguous and conversely with ‘I’. This is, in part, because ambiguity
is the non-context-bound property of a word having more than one meaning, any of
which can be the meaning used in any context where the appropriate syntax is present,93
while context-sensitivity is the property of content variation resulting from a change in
context. This distinction is in keeping with the general assumption in linguistics that
context-sensitivity and ambiguity are distinct linguistic phenomena.
Still, one may acknowledge this difference in kind between context-sensitivity
and ambiguity, but still want to resist that there is a difference in kind between
contextualism and the ambiguity theory by suggesting that it is a specific element of
context which fixes the sense of ‘knows’ with that specific element of context being
speaker’s intention. There is a certain initial plausibility to this suggestion. After all
Cohen includes speaker’s intentions among the elements that make up context,94 and in
places DeRose gives a great amount of influence to speaker’s intentions to determine
context.95 It is true that a speaker’s intention is part of the context of the utterance, and on
the account of speaker meaning which I currently favor, it is the speaker’s intention
which fixes the sense in cases of ambiguity.
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I favor a view according to which it is the speaker’s intention which plays the primary role in
disambiguation, at least on the level of answering the question as to what proposition an utterance picks out
in the case of lexically ambiguous utterances. But the specifics of this are not crucial for my case. For
someone with a different view of what disambiguates a word, that thing can serve the role that I’ve given to
a speaker’s intention.
93
I include the qualifier of “where the appropriate syntax is present” to cover instances where due to an
ambiguous term’s meanings including different parts of speech certain meanings are blocked due to
syntactic structure. Take for example the word ‘duck’ which has both noun-form and verb-form meanings.
The syntax of the sentence “She saw him duck” blocks the possibility that the referent of ‘duck’ could be
the animal instead of the action. This example is given by Emma Borg (2004, 143). Sennet (2011) uses a
similar example to make a similar point.
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Cohen (1999, 61).
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DeRose (2004 and 2005) in particular.
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However, there are three important points to be made in response to this
suggestion. First, in looking at the popular thought experiments used to ground
contextualism—like DeRose’s bank cases and Cohen’s airport case—it seems clear that
speaker’s intention is only one of several constituents making up the speaker’s context—
including constituents that are external to the speaker. The upshot of this is that, despite
the fact that the exact boundaries of what counts as context for the proponent of context
are rarely made explicit, it is clear that much more than speaker’s intention is typically
taken to be part of context. Thus, even if we consider anything determined by speaker
intention to be context-sensitive, the proponent of the ambiguity theory differs in kind
from the traditional proponent of contextualism because the proponent of the ambiguity
theory rejects the additional elements of context beyond speaker intention as having a
role in determining the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions and denials. (Or at least
this will be the case for an ambiguity theorist who takes the sense of an ambiguous term
to be determined by speaker’s intention.)
Second, as Reed has noted, having determination of sense by speaker’s intention
count as a type of context-sensitivity makes ‘knows’ context-sensitive in only a very
trivial sense which would certainly also make all ambiguous words context-sensitive
along with just about every other word as well.96 This seems to be a good reason to reject
mere sensitivity to a speaker’s intention as grounds for context-sensitivity.97
Third, this explanation seems to undermine the distinct ways in which we use
context in relation to meaning. John Perry makes a useful distinction between the
semantic and the presemantic which he describes in the following way,
“Sometimes we use context to figure out with which
meaning a word is being used, or which of several words
that look or sound alike is being used, or even which
language is being spoken. These are presemantic uses of
96

Reed (2013, 57). A similar point is raised by Patrick Rysiew who writes that “insofar as ‘context’ is
taken to refer to the interests, expectations, and so forth of attributors, it is a tautology—something that
everyone has got to accept—that in some sense ‘ascriptions of knowledge are context-sensitive’” (Rysiew
2001, 478). See also Cohen (1999, 57).
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Unless one wants to take a more use-based approach to language in which such a result is desired, in
which case epistemic contextualism loses any of its distinctively epistemic flavor and becomes just a
general theory of language.

49
context: context helps us to figure out meaning. In the case
of indexicals, however, context is used semantically. It
remains relevant after the language, words and meanings
are all known; the meaning directs us to certain aspects of
context.”98
I (along with Perry99) take this difference between ‘I’ and ‘bank’ to be a case of such a
difference—the way in which context determines the meaning of ‘I’ is clearly semantic.
That is, context remains relevant after the language, words, and meanings are all known.
The task of determining which sense of ‘bank’ is being employed is clearly a presemantic
task. We use context to figure out what meaning a speaker has employed, but once we’ve
successfully done that, there is nothing especially context-sensitive about ‘bank’ that
remains. It seems clear to me that contextualists have traditionally seen context playing a
robust, semantic role that cannot be relegated entirely to the presemantic. But part of
what the ambiguity theory claims in stating that the variability in meaning is a result of an
ambiguity in the term ‘knows’ is that the role context is playing is solely presemantic and
as a result purely pragmatic. This seems to clearly constitute a difference in kind.
That being said, my primary goal in this section has been to make clear the
differences between the ambiguity theory, contextualism, and invariantism as they are
typically presented. I have done so by denying that the ambiguity theory is a type of
contextualism or invariantism, but at the end of the day my primary concern is not with
taxonomy. If one wished to change or expand their characterization of contextualism
such that the ambiguity theory counted as a type of contextualism, they are of course
welcome to do so, but it is important that it be understood that there are key differences in
kind that separate the ambiguity theory from traditional forms of contextualism and not
merely a difference in the number of epistemic standards involved.
In what follows it will be useful to have a more specific form of the ambiguity
theory in mind to compare to contextualism. Thus, for dialectical purposes only, I will
endorse a “two senses” view of ‘knows’ similar to the positions adopted by Malcolm and
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Perry (2001, 39-40).
Perry (2001, 40-42). Emma Borg advocates seeing ambiguity as presemantic as well (2004).
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Feldman.100 For the purposes of this paper the specifics of these senses are not important
so long as the low sense is such that it allows for most of our everyday knowledge
ascriptions and denials to come out true and the high sense is such that only maximally
justified (or close to maximally justified) beliefs count as knowledge.101
2.2 The Strengths of Contextualism and the Ambiguity Theory
As previously stated, the generally agreed upon strengths of epistemic
contextualism are (1) that it can be used to solve persistent, skepticism-driven
epistemological puzzles in a manner which explains why many people have competing
intuitions that both skeptical and non-skeptical responses to such puzzles are plausible
and (2) that it preserves the truth of our everyday knowledge ascriptions. In this section I
argue that the ambiguity theory also has these strengths.
One type of puzzle which contextualism solves is exemplified in the following
scenario from Stewart Cohen.102
“Mary and John are at the L. A. airport contemplating taking
a certain flight to New York. They want to know whether the
flight has a layover in Chicago. They overhear someone ask
a passenger Smith if he knows whether the flight stops in
Chicago. Smith looks at the flight itinerary he got from the
travel agent and responds, ‘Yes, I know—it does stop in
Chicago.’ It turns out that Mary and John have a very
important business contact they have to make at the Chicago
airport. Mary says, ‘How reliable is that itinerary? It could
100

Steup (2005) makes a similar dialectical move.
One might wonder what other senses of ‘knowledge’ one could reasonably posit. Discipline-specific
senses of knowledge strike me as good candidates for additional senses of ‘knowledge.’ On such a view to
say that one has, for example, “scientific knowledge” or “historical knowledge” is to say something more
than simply that the subject matter of such claims is scientific or historical. It is also to say that the specific
criteria which constitute the epistemic standard for “scientific knowledge” or “historical knowledge” are
satisfied. On such a view the words ‘scientific’ or ‘historical’ provide information not only about the
content of the proposition known, but also the type of epistemic standard satisfied. Another option for an
addition sense of knows would be a “middle” sense between the “high” and “low” senses identified above.
Or if Reed’s suggestion that ‘knows’ works like color words (Reed, 2013) is right, there may be perhaps
hundreds of fine-grained senses of ‘knows.’ For some useful and plausible additional suggestions as to
what some of those specific sense (or kinds of senses) might be see Reed (2013, Section VII).
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Another popular scenario is DeRose’s “bank case” (DeRose, 1992). Both contextualism and the
ambiguity theory solve the bank case in a similar fashion to the respective ways in which they solve
Cohen’s airport case.
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contain a misprint. They could have changed the schedule at
the last minute.’ Mary and John agree that Smith doesn’t
really know that the plane will stop in Chicago.”103
It would appear that Smith has a standard for knowledge which differs from Mary’s and
John’s.
The puzzle comes about by asking which (if any) party’s knowledge ascription is
true. Cohen thinks that to conclude that just Smith’s, just Mary’s and John’s, or neither
Smith’s nor Mary’s and John’s ascription is true are all dissatisfactory options. After all,
to conclude that Smith’s ascription is true is to conclude that Mary and John could
sensibly say “Smith knows the plane will stop in Chicago but we still need to verify that
this is true.” But to conclude that either just Mary’s and John’s ascription is true or that
neither Smith’s nor Mary’s and John’s ascription is true is to conclude that many other
everyday ascriptions of knowledge are incorrect and to move very strongly in the
direction of skepticism.
Cohen concludes instead, by appeal to contextualism, that “[n]either standard is
simply correct or simply incorrect.”104 Cohen writes that,
“Rather context determines which standard is correct. Since
the standards for knowledge ascriptions can vary across
contexts, each claim, Smith’s as well as Mary and John’s,
can be correct in the context in which it was made. When
Smith says, ‘I know…’, what he says is true given the
weaker standard operating in that context. When Mary and
John say ‘Smith does not know…’, what they say is true
given the stricter standard operating in their context. And
there is no context independent correct standard.”105
Many, like Cohen, consider each of the options he rejects dissatisfying. Thus, many
consider it a virtue of a theory if it is able to supply an alternative. Contextualism does
this. But so does the ambiguity theory.
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On the ambiguity theory both Smith’s knowledge attribution and Mary’s and
John’s knowledge denial can be right in both their contexts, so long as Smith is using
‘know’ in the low sense and Mary and John are using ‘know’ in the high sense. Of
course, Mary and John would be incorrect if they claimed Smith was wrong in claiming
to have known that the flight would stop in Chicago. So long as Smith was using the
word ‘know’ in the low sense (and it seems reasonable to think that he was), he is correct
even in Mary and John’s context.
To see why this is so, let P stand for the claim that the flight has a layover in
Chicago. Let knowL stand for ‘know’ in the low sense. And let knowH stand for ‘know’ in
the high sense. Smith’s and Mary’s and John’s claims can now be expressed as follows:
Smith: I knowL that P
Mary & John: Smith doesn’t knowH that P
Given that Smith saw on the printed itinerary that the flight had a layover in Chicago,
Smith has sufficient evidence to make his claim that “I knowL that P” true. The
differences between his low-standard context and Mary’s and John’s more demanding
higher-standard context do not and could not make Smith’s statement false. Were Smith
to have overheard Mary and John say he didn’t know, and were he to have said “No, I
truly do knowL that P,” he would still be saying something true.
But while Smith’s claim would remain true, it just wouldn’t be very relevant,
practically speaking, to Mary and John given their context. And given the relevance of
the high sense of ‘know’ for Mary and John, it would be easy to see how Mary and John
might carelessly conclude that Smith was wrong because they hadn’t taken his intended
sense into account.106 Thus, the ambiguity theory seems to be able to provide as
satisfying a response as contextualism to Cohen’s scenario and other scenarios of a
similar type—namely, it shows how both Smith on the one hand and Mary and John on
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This solution does not, of course, prohibit genuine disagreement about whether or not Smith knowsH or
knowsL that P. For example, if Smith were to say to John and Mary “I knowH that P because my evidence
entails P” then Smith would be contending their claim that he doesn’t knowH that P. However, in such a
case Smith would simply be wrong.
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the other can be correct by showing that Smith is correct when using knowL and Mary
and John are correct when using knowH.107
The other popular type of epistemological puzzle which the proponent of
contextualism claims to be able to solve comes in the form of inconsistent triads of a
particular structure. One such triad is the following:
(i)

If I know I have hands, then I know I’m not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV)

(ii)

I know I have hands

(iii)

I don’t know I’m not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV)108

Cohen considers the best type of response to such a triad to be one in which not only is a
solution provided as to which premises are true but in which an explanation of the
independent plausibility of each of the premises is also provided.109
The response which the proponent of contextualism is able to put forward is that
this “skeptical paradox arises from inattention to shifts in context.”110 Thus, the skeptic is
correct in accepting (i) and (iii) and rejecting (ii) relative to the high standards context in
which all three propositions are entertained. But this does not mean that we are not
typically correct in accepting (ii) in most of the everyday contexts in which we believe
that we have hands. The merits of responses of this type will be discussed in greater
detail in Section 4. What is important to note now is that the ambiguity theory is once
again able to give an equally (if not more) satisfying response.
Just as the proponent of contextualism claims that the paradox arises from
inattention to shifts in context, so the proponent of the ambiguity theory claims that the
paradox arises from inattention to shifts in the sense of ‘know’ employed. If the low

107

This general strategy will work with other hypothetical cases put forward like the bank cases given by
DeRose (1992) and Stanley (2005) and the train cases by Fantl and McGrath (2002).
108
The general form for such triads comes from G.E. Moore (1959), who rejected statements of type (iii)
on grounds of statements of type (i) and (ii). Another triad of the same form is Dretske’s zebra/cleverlydisguised mule case. Dretske chooses to reject statements of type (i) while accepting statements of types (ii)
and (iii) (Dretske, (1970)).
109
Cohen writes that “So what we want is a resolution of the paradox that preserves our strong intuitions
that we know things. But any such resolution must explain the undeniable appeal of skeptical arguments.
For this is what gives rise to the paradox. Though, initially we claim to know many things, under skeptical
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sense of ‘know’ is used consistently throughout, then (iii) is false while (i) and (ii) are
true. If the high sense of ‘know’ is used consistently, then (ii) is false while (i) and (iii)
are true. The reason both (ii) and (iii) seem plausible is because for both there is a sense
of ‘knows’ that makes the claim true.111 The skeptic and the Moorean go wrong only to
the extent that they fail to recognize that there is a sense of ‘knows’ in which the
respective opponent can sensibly affirm the proposition which they themselves reject.112
Thus, like contextualism, the ambiguity theory is able not only to provide a solution to
this type of paradox but is also able to explain the initial plausibility of each of the
premises.
This examination of the responses the proponent of the ambiguity theory can give
to such epistemological puzzles also shows how the ambiguity theory preserves the truth
of everyday knowledge ascriptions. This results from the fact that on the ambiguity
theory, skeptical arguments are unsound when the low, everyday sense of knowledge is
employed. (Or at the very least, if they are unsound on contextualism, they are also
unsound on the ambiguity theory such that no theory has an edge over the other in this
regard). This shows that not only is the ambiguity theory able to solve the same
epistemological puzzles that contextualism claims to solve, but that it also preserves the
truth of everyday knowledge ascriptions just as well.
In this section I’ve aimed to show that the ambiguity theory has the same
strengths as contextualism. Contextualism explains how Smith and John and Mary can be
correct in Cohen’s airport case, but so does the ambiguity theory. Contextualism offers a
solution to skeptical arguments and explains the appeal of each of the premises in such
arguments, but so does the ambiguity theory. Contextualism preserves the truth of
everyday knowledge ascriptions, but so does the ambiguity theory. In Section 4 I aim to
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It would be a mistake for one to claim that the ambiguity theory leads to a failure in closure. On the
ambiguity theory, the only situations in which (i) would not hold would be situations in which there was an
equivocation in the sense of ‘know’ between the antecedent and the consequent of (i). And falsity due to
equivocation of course does not lead to a failure of closure.
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the ambiguity theory provides the conceptual space for both the skeptic and the Moorean to be right and
only go wrong so far as they fail to realize the other party is using the word ‘know’ differently.
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show that the ambiguity theory has several distinct advantages over contextualism. But
before turning to those arguments, I want to point out an explanation available to the
ambiguity theorist about why it is that a proponent of contextualism could easily
misidentify context as the key to solving these epistemological problems as opposed to
the different senses of ‘knows’. This is the topic of the next section.
2.3 An Ambiguity-Theory-Friendly Explanation of the Appeal of Contextualism
What is crucial in explaining why the proponent of contextualism could easily
misidentify context as opposed to ambiguity as the key to solving a number of
epistemological problems is the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. The
explanation the ambiguity theorist has available is that the role of context is purely
pragmatic instead of semantic as the contextualist claims.113 In other words, on the
ambiguity theory context affects only which knowledge ascriptions and denials it would
be appropriate to endorse while it is the sense of ‘knows’ which affects the truth
conditions of those knowledge ascriptions and denials. This is not a novel suggestion.
Jessica Brown and Patrick Rysiew have both developed detailed accounts of the
pragmatic role of context in their respective defenses of a moderate, subject-insensitive
form of invariantism,114 and more recently Baron Reed has made appeal to this
distinction in defending his preferred form of the ambiguity theory.115 The appeal of this
explanatory option is noted by proponents of contextualism as well. For example, Keith
DeRose writes that “the chief bugaboo of contextualism has been the concern that the
contextualist is mistaking variability in the conditions of warranted assertability of
knowledge attributions for a variability in their truth conditions”116 and acknowledges
that this idea is a frequent first reaction to contextualism. 117
Brown, Rysiew and Reed all appeal to Grice’s Cooperative Principle, which is the
maxim to “make conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it
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occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are
engaged.”118 Thus, a shift in our intuitions about whether an ascription or denial of
knowledge is correct is to be explained by a context-derived shift in what’s appropriate to
endorse. For both the advocate of the ambiguity theory and the advocate of invariantism,
this pragmatic explanation of context provides a tidy solution to the type of data that
contextualists typically offer in favor of their position. However, the fact that the
ambiguity theory allows for differing truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions and
denials depending on which sense of ‘knows’ is used gives the pragmatic explanation of
context additional power on the ambiguity theory which it lacks when combined with the
moderate subject-insensitive invariantism of Brown and Rysiew.119
To see why the ambiguity theory has this explanatory advantage, consider that on
invariantism, meaning and therefore truth conditions must remain fixed even when
context changes what is appropriate to say. Thus, those defending invariantism via a
pragmatic explanation of context will need to account for instances in which it is
appropriate to utter or otherwise endorse literally false assertions and most likely will
also need to explain why utterances that intuitively seem true are literally false. (For
example, an invariantist who holds a moderately non-skeptical classical view of
knowledge will need to explain why Mary’s and John’s knowledge denial of Smith is
literally false despite appearing true.) There is disagreement over how much of a cost this
is for a theory,120 and I myself do not see this challenge as insurmountable. However, the
ambiguity theory appears to be able to skirt this difficulty entirely.
Unlike proponents of invariantism, ambiguity theorists are able to avoid dealing
with instances of literally false but either appropriate or seemingly-true utterances. They
can claim that on the ambiguity theory the pragmatic role that context plays is merely to
indicate or convey which sense of ‘knows’ is likely being used by the speaker via the
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And, as I will argue in much greater length in the next chapter, this feature of the ambiguity theory is
what allows it to circumvent the most pressing problems DeRose raises for the pragmatic account of
warranted assertability.
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speaker’s context. This is because on the ambiguity theory, unlike on either invariantism
or contextualism, in a given context there is more than one proposition that can be picked
out by any given knowledge ascription or knowledge denial.
This phenomenon of context pragmatically conveying which sense of an
ambiguous word a speaker is using is perfectly clear in dealing with homonyms whose
homonymy is a mere morphological accident like ‘bank’ (the financial institution) and
‘bank’ (the side of a river). Imagine that we are having a picnic by a river and that there is
a duck down by the side of the river. If I tell you that “There’s a duck down by the bank”
it is clear to you that by ‘bank’ I mean the side of a river. And, given that there is a duck
down by the river, I’ve said something true. Whether or not there is a duck down by any
financial institution isn’t relevant to whether or not I’ve said something true, and you
most likely will not take it to be relevant because the context has pragmatically indicated
to you that by ‘bank’ I mean the side of the river. And if it is false that there is a duck
down by any financial institution, this does not cause my utterance of “There’s a duck
down by the bank” to be a case in which I’ve said something strictly speaking false but
only appropriate or seemingly true. In short, the ambiguity theory has the advantage over
invariantism of being able to utilize a pragmatic explanation of context on which context
serves to pragmatically convey which proposition a knowledge utterance picks out as
opposed to pragmatically conveying something potentially false given the fixed
proposition that the knowledge utterance picks out.
The fact that context plays an important role in what is being pragmatically
conveyed in many knowledge ascriptions and denials provides the ambiguity theorist
with an even stronger explanation for why one might mistakenly take context to be doing
the semantic work that the ambiguity theorist claims the sense of ‘knows’ is doing. The
source of this additional explanatory power is rooted in the fact that it seems very
reasonable to think that there is a strong correlation between usages of certain senses of
‘knows’ and certain types of contexts.
For example, it seems plausible to surmise that in most everyday situations the
“low” sense of ‘knows’ is the sense that speakers use in casual conversation. Similarly,
those situations in which someone is likely to use the “high” sense of ‘knows’ are almost
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always situations in which there is some other mark which indicates that the context has
shifted into a high standards situation (e.g. “Are you sure you know that? After all
couldn’t it be the case that you’re a brain-in-a-vat?) and in which there is a corresponding
reason for why the high sense of ‘knows’ is (at least taken to be) relevant. Given this high
correlation between certain types of contexts and the usage of certain senses of ‘knows’,
it would be easy to mistake the high correlation that results between certain types of
contexts and certain truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions and denials as a case in
which the change in context was responsible or a sufficient reason for the change in the
truth conditions.
2.4: The Advantages of the Ambiguity Theory over Epistemic Contextualism
As was noted in Section 2, endorsing the view that ‘knows’ is context-sensitive
allows contextualism to solve certain problems. However, the view that ‘knows’ is
context-sensitive creates problems as well. In this section I will argue that the ambiguity
theory is able to avoid several of these problems and that as a result, unless
counterbalancing evidence can be offered, the ambiguity theory is the theory that ought to
be preferred.
A first problem is noted by Ernest Sosa who writes that,
“An argument might be endorsed in any of at least three
ways: (a) by public affirmation, (b) by conscious and
occurrent thought, and (c) by implicit belief. DeRose’s
contextualism implies that Moore’s argument could not be
correctly endorsed at least in ways a and b, and perhaps not
in way c either…According to DeRose’s contextualism, the
Moorean combination…may be the abstractly sound
argument, as compared with its rival arguments favored
respectively by Nozick and the skeptic; but it can remain so
only at the cost of being unuttered and un-thought.”121
The rationale behind Sosa’s position is that any attempt to utter or consciously endorse
the Moorean position puts one into a high-standards context where the Moorean position
is made false. Thus, “Moore’s position may hence be correct but unendorsable.”122
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There are at least two ways in which the contextualist can try and argue that this is
not a mark against contextualism. The first is to argue that, contra Sosa, the unutterability
or unendorsability of the Moorean argument is not a very high cost. So long as we can
truthfully utter and endorse claims like “I have hands” in most everyday contexts, it
doesn’t matter that we cannot truthfully utter or endorse the Moorean argument. I find
this response plausible, and were it the case that no other alternatives were available, this
might be a bullet worth biting. However, biting this bullet would mean that there would
be a permanent sort of cognitive dissonance for most of us, as our (supposedly) best
reflective efforts would always be at odds with our ordinary practices.123 This result is
clearly less than ideal. 124
The second way a contextualist could offer a defense would be to argue that it is
false that one could never utter or endorse the Moorean argument on contextualism. The
contextualist could argue that in some situations one is able to control the context such
that the low-standards remain in place despite the fact that a skeptical alternative has been
brought into the context.125 Once again, this strikes me as a plausible response but less
than ideal. It is a bullet that one could bite, but it does not seem wise to bite it when there
is a better alternative available.
I think the ambiguity theory is this better alternative. On the ambiguity theory, the
problem of whether the Moorean position can be uttered or endorsed does not even arise.
For on the ambiguity theory both the Moorean position and the skeptical position can be
uttered and endorsed in any context so long as the proper sense of ‘know’ is used
throughout the argument for either position. A speaker interested in defending a Moorean
position can reply to the skeptic simply by pointing out that the skeptic was referring to
knowledge in a different sense.

123
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salient, there is strong upward pressure on the standards, this can sometimes be resisted. One device for
doing this is adopting a certain tone of voice. So in response to the skeptic, one might say, ‘C’mon, you’ve
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conversational participants, then everyday standards may remain in effect” (Cohen, 1999, 85, footnote 27).
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pressure (for example DeRose (2005, 176-78) and DeRose (2013, 89-91)).
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The ambiguity theory also fares better in response to those like Palle Yourgrau
who claims that contextualism licenses conversations like the following:
A: Is that a zebra?
B: Yes, it is a zebra
A: But can you rule out its being a cleverly painted mule?
B: No, I can’t
A: So, you admit you didn’t know it was a zebra?
B: No, I did know then that it was a zebra. But after your question, I no longer
know.126
DeRose rejects Yourgrau’s claim that contextualism licenses such conversations writing
that,
“If in the context of a conversation the possibility of painted
mules has been mentioned, and if the mere mention of this
possibility has an effect on the conditions under which
someone can be truly said to ‘know,’ then any use of ‘know’
(or its past tense) is so affected, even a use in which one
describes one’s past condition. B cannot truly say, ‘I did
know then that it was a zebra’…B can say, ‘My previous
knowledge claim was true’…”127
DeRose’s response successfully shows that contextualism does not license such
conversations. But with DeRose’s point taken into account contextualism would still
license the following conversation,
A: Do you know that to be a zebra?
B: Yes, I know it is a zebra
A: But can you rule out its being a cleverly painted mule?
B: No, I can’t
A: So, you admit you didn’t know it was a zebra?
B: Well, it’s complicated. My previous claim that “I know it is a zebra” was true.
However, it is not the case that I knew it was a zebra.
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This conversation, although more in keeping with the spirit of contextualism, does not
seem much better than the first. The reason B ends up in this unfortunate position on
contextualism is that the context in which B gives his first reply “Yes, I know it is a
zebra” is a context in which the epistemic standard is low enough for this to be true.
However, by the end of the conversation the context has changed such that B can neither
claim to know the animal is a zebra or claim to have known the animal is a zebra. But this
does not mean that B cannot comment on the truth of a previous knowledge ascription.
It does not strike me as unreasonable for a proponent of contextualism to simply
acknowledge that contextualism does license such conversations and then claim that this
is not particularly problematic for one reason or another. But this position may be a hard
sell. After all, it seems reasonable to find it problematic that we would accept a
conversation like the above for other context-sensitive terms (like ‘here’) but may balk at
doing so for ‘knows’? Can a term really be context-sensitive if competent speakers do not
recognize it as such, even upon reflection? The kind of “semantic blindness” that would
result from contextualism being true and our resistance to seeing this truth remaining is
something that advocates of contextualism have worked to explain.128 Whether or not
those arguments succeed are not part of the focus here. But what is important to note is
that, regardless of the success of these maneuvers by contextualists, the ambiguity theory
offers a much more attractive option. The ambiguity theory does not license this
conversation or the previous one. Instead the proponent of the ambiguity theory can
clarify that B was using ‘know’ in the low, everyday sense (knowL) in which one’s
inability to know in a high sense (knowH) that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule
does not threaten either the truth of B’s original knowledge claim or the fact of the matter
that B does knowL the animal is a zebra.129
One might think that the ambiguity theory still has some explaining to do—
namely, the ambiguity theory needs to explain B’s concession that she is not able to rule
out that the animal is a cleverly painted mule. There are at least three ways in which the
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proponent of the ambiguity theory can respond. First, the proponent of the ambiguity
theory can claim that B’s concession is unproblematic. It is true that B cannot rule out
that it’s a cleverly painted mule, but that’s not important because it is not relevant to
whether or not B can truly say “I knowL that the animal is a zebra.” Part of the value of
knowL is that we can knowL propositions without having to rule out any old alternative an
interlocutor might mention. Second, the proponent of the ambiguity theory could claim
that B does not need to concede that she can’t rule out its being a cleverly disguised mule.
The idea would be something like this—that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule
cannot be ruled out with certainty, but the type of circumstantial evidence and
background knowledge that B has makes the possibility unlikely enough that the option
can be ruled out practically speaking. This leads to the third response—namely, the
proponent of the ambiguity theory could claim that just as there is more than one sense of
‘knows’ there is also more than one sense of ‘ruling out.’ The response could then be
something along the lines that B cannot rule-outH that what B sees is a clearly painted
mule, but that B can rule-outL that it is a cleverly painted mule, and that this type of
ruling out is sufficient to knowL.
Another advantage which the ambiguity theory has over contextualism is that it
can accommodate situations in which both a knowledge ascription and a knowledge
denial seem true. Take, for example, the following case provided by Jessica Brown which
she titles SURGEON.130
“A student is spending the day shadowing a surgeon. In the
morning he observes her in clinic examining patient A who
has a diseased left kidney. The decision is taken to remove it
that afternoon. Later, the student observes the surgeon in
theatre where patient A is lying anaesthetized on the
operating table. The operation hasn’t started as the surgeon
is consulting the patient’s notes. The student is puzzled and
asks one of the nurses what’s going on:
Student: I don’t understand. Why is she looking at the
patient’s records? She was in clinic with the patient this
morning. Doesn’t she even know which kidney it is?
130
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Nurse: Of course, she knows which kidney it is. But, imagine
what it would be like if she removed the wrong kidney. She
should not operate before checking the patient’s records.”131
In this case the nurse’s claim that the doctor knows which of the patient’s kidneys is to be
removed is meant to be taken intuitively as a true statement and an appropriate response.
On its own, this case poses no problem for contextualism or the ambiguity theory.
However, things get more complicated once we consider Fantl’s and McGrath’s claim
that “the nurse in Brown’s surgeon case could just as easily and just as properly have
said, ‘Well, of course she’s checking the chart; it’s not enough to rely on her memory that
it’s the left kidney. She needs to know it is’.”132 The implication of such a claim on the
nurse’s behalf amounts to an implicit denial that the doctor knows which of the kidneys is
to be removed. Let us label the response that Fantl and McGrath claim the nurse could
give Nurse Response 2 (NR-2) and the original response that Brown claims the nurse
could give Nurse Response 1 (NR-1). Our options are then as follows:
NR-1: Of course, she knows which kidney it is. But, imagine what it would be like if she
removed the wrong kidney. She should not operate before checking the patient’s records
NR-2: Well, of course, she’s checking the chart; it’s not enough to rely on her memory
that it’s the left kidney. She needs to know it is.133
Both NR-1 and NR-2 deal with the same subject (the surgeon), the same proposition (it is
the left kidney of the patient that is to be removed) and are given in response to the same
context. NR-1 contains an explicit knowledge ascription, while NR-2 contains an implicit
knowledge denial concerning the same subject, proposition and context. 134 For those
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with the intuition that both NR-1 and NR-2 represent plausibly true and plausibly
appropriate responses, there is a problem for contextualism. For on contextualism, the
intuition that both NR-1 and NR-2 are plausibly true and appropriate responses cannot be
explained by a change in the context between NR-1 and NR-2 because the context
prompting each response is identical to the other. Thus, some other explanation is needed.
I take the most obvious candidate for providing an explanation to the plausibility
of the truth and appropriateness of NR-1 and NR-2 to be the ambiguity theory. For on the
ambiguity theory, what changes is the sense of ‘knows’ the nurse chooses to use. Both
the lower sense and the higher sense are practically relevant in this instance. (The nurse
validates the competency of the surgeon when refusing to retract the claim that the
surgeon knowsL that the left kidney is the one to be removed, or the nurse validates the
importance of getting it right in an important matter like surgery when claiming that the
surgeon needs to knowH that the left kidney is the one to be removed).
This same feature of the ambiguity theory can also accommodate what Steup calls
“the problem of upward-pressure resistance”—i.e. “the fact that when error possibilities
become salient, not everybody responds to the upward pressure on the standards of
knowledge by shifting to a high-standard meaning of the word ‘know’.”135 Steup offers
Roderick Chisholm’s resistance to such upward-pressure as an example. It is hard to see
how contextualism can render Chisholm as anything other than wrong or confused about
what he meant by ‘know’ when he discussed the meaning of ‘know’ in high-stakes or
other upward-pressure contexts (and if contextualism could avoid this, the result may be
that anyone who did give in to upward-pressure was wrong or confused about the
meaning of ‘know’ in situations of upward-pressure). The contextualist cannot avoid in
this situation that someone was confused: either Chisholm for resisting or others for
giving in. But on the ambiguity theory a simple explanation is available—Chisholm
chose to continue to use a lower sense of ‘knows’ than those who embraced a higher
sense of ‘knows’ when giving in to upward-pressure.
All these advantages reflect a general advantage that the ambiguity theory has
over epistemic contextualism, namely, that on the ambiguity theory speakers and thinkers
135
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are not slaves to the whim of context. It seems like someone’s asking whether or not you
are a brain-in-a-vat shouldn’t make it such that you can no longer affirm the truth of a
Moorean argument if you otherwise could have. Nor should the fact that you have an
important bill due tomorrow make it such that you can no longer claim you knew, in
some sense of the word, that the bank would be open tomorrow if you would have
otherwise been able to truthfully say so. It is difficult (if not impossible) to get around
such unpleasant outcomes on contextualism, but easy on the ambiguity theory.
In this chapter I’ve shown how the ambiguity theory is distinct from both
contextualism and invariantism. And I’ve argued in favor of the ambiguity theory by
showing how the ambiguity theory shares the major strengths contextualism has and by
showing that the ambiguity theory has certain important strengths that contexualism
lacks. My case for the ambiguity theory has been geared towards the proponent of
contextualism. For the proponent of invariantism, much more will need to be said in
favor of the ambiguity theory, but that will have to wait for another occasion. In
conclusion, I suggest that the considerations here have shown that those drawn to
contexutalism should give serious consideration to the ambiguity theory as well.
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CHAPTER 3: MODERATE CLASSICAL INVARIANTISM, WARRANTED
ASSERTABILITY MANEUVERS, AND THE AMBIGUITY THEORY OF
‘KNOWS’

The goal of the last chapter was to defend the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ against
contextualism. This was done by making clear what the differences between
contextualism and the ambiguity theory are, by arguing that the ambiguity theory has the
same strengths as contextualism, and by arguing that the ambiguity theory has certain
strengths that contextualism lacks. In this chapter a similar format has been adopted, but
the competitor has changed. In this chapter I will argue that the ambiguity theory fares
better than the view that Keith DeRose has called “the real threat to contextualism”136 and
“the most influential source of resistance to contextualism”137—namely, a form of
classical, moderately non-skeptical invariantism that employs what DeRose calls a
“warranted assertability maneuver”.138 (For those not familiar with the terminology, what
all this means will be explained shortly.)
More specifically, the outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 1, I briefly
review the definitions of contextualism and the ambiguity theory and give a definition
and explanation of both classical moderately non-skeptical invariantism and of a
warranted assertability maneuver. I conclude Section 1 by laying out what the relevant
differences and similarities are between contextualism, the ambiguity theory, and this
particular form of moderate invariantism. In Section 2, I present a set of cases in which I
argue that our intuitions are better accounted for by the ambiguity theory over the form of
moderate invariantism being put forward. In Section 3 I look at the data that DeRose
thinks poses a problem for the form of moderate invariantism under discussion. I argue
136
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that this moderate invariantist view is in a better position than DeRose claims that it is,
but that DeRose has identified at least one important weakness for this form of moderate
invariantism. In Section 4 I look at a problem that the ambiguity theory seems to have
which moderate invariantism does not and provide an account of how the ambiguity
theory can deal with this potential problem. I conclude that both the form of moderate
invariantism under discussion and the ambiguity theory are reasonable views to hold
given the data and that in neither case are their difficulties insurmountable. But I further
conclude that, on balance, the ambiguity theory is the stronger of the two views.
3.1 The Views Defined, Explained, and Compared
As outlined in the previous chapter, epistemic contextualism (hereafter referred to
simply as contextualism) is the view that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions
and denials, in virtue of making a knowledge claim, shift in accordance with certain
changes in the context of utterance. This is contrasted with the ambiguity theory of
‘knows’ (hereafter referred to simply as the ambiguity theory), which is the view that
‘knows’ and its cognates have more than one sense that can properly be used in
propositional ‘knows that’ constructions, and that which sense of ‘knows’ is used in a
knowledge ascription or denial determines, in part, the meaning (and as a result the truth
conditions) of that knowledge ascription or denial.139
The two key differences between the views can be described as follows. The first
difference is that according to contextualism context plays an essentially semantic role
which helps determine or fix the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions, while on the
ambiguity theory context plays an essentially pragmatic role and only guides speakers in
their sense selection and assists hearers in their recognition of what a speaker’s ascription
means.140 An upshot of this situation is that on both contextualism and the ambiguity
theory the following principle is true:
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Surface Conflict Without Inconsistency (SCWI): There are cases in which, for the
same subject S and proposition p, one speaker can truly say “S knows p” and another
speaker, at the same time, can truly say “S does not know p”.
However, only on the ambiguity theory and not on contextualism is this second principle
true:
Diverging Responses Without Inconsistency (DRWI): There are cases in which, for
the same subject S and proposition p, one and the same speaker says truly “S knows p”
but instead could have truly said “S does not know p”.
Contextualism must reject DRWI because context-sensitivity (via whatever the semantic
mechanism may be) allows sentences and/or utterances to pick out different propositions
and to have varying truth-conditions across different contexts, but doesn’t allow for a
sentence to pick out varying propositions or to have varying truth-conditions within a
particular context. In contrast, the ambiguity theory allows for DRWI because the
semantic mechanism of ambiguity allows sentences and/or utterances to pick out
different propositions and to have vary truth-conditions both across different contexts and
within a particular context. SCWI requires only what context-sensitivity and ambiguity
have in common, namely, the ability for varying truth-conditions for a sentence and/or
utterance across contexts. But DRWI requires what only ambiguity allows for, namely,
the ability for varying truth-conditions for a sentence and/or utterance within a particular
context.141 That the ambiguity theory is compatible with DRWI, but that contextualism is
not, is the second key difference between the ambiguity theory and contextualism.

competent speaker of that language. The term ‘meaning’ here is interchangeable with the term ‘sense’ as
used technically in a Fregean way.
141
From here on out the relevant difference between the truth-conditions of sentences versus the truthconditions of utterances will be suppressed with phrases like ‘the truth conditions of knowledge ascribing
sentences’ and ‘the truth conditions of knowledge ascribing utterances’ being used interchangeably unless
otherwise specified. On certain views, such as Geoff Pynn’s pragmatic contextualism (2015a, 2015b), this
distinction between the truth-conditions of utterances and sentences is relevant. But the distinction is not
relevant for our purposes.
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Now let’s take a look at how invariantism—and specifically the type of
invariantism we’re going to be stacking up against the ambiguity theory—fits into the
picture. As noted in the last chapter, there has been some inconsistency in how
invariantism has been defined. But that won’t cause us a problem here because it’s pretty
clear what constitutes classical, moderately non-skeptical invariantism even if it is not
clear what the boundaries of invariantism itself is. So let’s go piece by piece in order to
get a clear understanding of what this competing view to the ambiguity theory is.
One point of agreement among all parties is that the invariantist denies the truth of
epistemic contextualism. It is also typically assumed that invariantism denies SCWI (and
implicitly that it denies DRWI.) In this chapter I will assume that the invariantist denies
the truth of contextualism, SCWI, and DRWI. Thus defined, the ambiguity theory doesn’t
count as a type of invariantism (although it seems like it would count as a type of
invariantism on certain broad understandings of that term).
What Jessica Brown and Christoph Kelp (among others) have called classical
invariantism142 adds to invariantism the denial of the following claim:
Pragmatic-Encroachment (PE): A difference in pragmatic circumstances can constitute a
difference in knowledge.143
Therefore, classical invariantism does not include views like the interest-relative
invariantism of Jason Stanley or the subject-sensitive invariantism of John Hawthorne,
Jeremy Fantl, and Matthew McGrath.144 Rather, the classical invariantist seeks a view
more akin to that advocated in the post-Gettier program, where a single concept (and
analysis) of knowledge was typically assumed and it was assumed not to have any
pragmatic constituents or purely pragmatic features.145
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Brown (2005, 2006), Kelph (2008).
The phrasing of this claim comes from Ichikawa and Steup (2014). Like many others in the literature on
knowledge ascriptions, in this context, I take the terms ‘pragmatic’ and ‘practical’ to be interchangeable.
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See, for example, Stanley (2005), Hawthorne (2004), and Fantl and McGrath (2009).
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Here seems to be as good a place as any to include a note on why subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI)
has received relatively little attention in this dissertation. The reason for this is because, among the
dominant views in the literature on the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions and denials, SSI is the
most distant view from the ambiguity theory. More specifically, the things that separate SSI from the
143
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As has been noted by Brown, DeRose, and Hawthorne (among others), there can
be different types of classical invariantism depending on the level of stringency required
for knowledge.146 In general, two broad categories of classical invariantism have been put
forward. First, skeptical invariantism, a view held perhaps most famously in the postGettier era by Peter Unger in his younger years,147 refers to a type of invariantism on
which the standards for knowledge are high enough that most of our everyday knowledge
attributions are false, strictly speaking. Due to the relative unpopularity of this view, it
will not be focused on in this chapter.148
Instead, we will focus on the second view, which John Hawthorne has labeled
moderate invariantism.149 Moderate invariantism is a form of classical invariantism on
which the standard for knowledge is low enough such that most of our everyday
knowledge attributions are true. (What exactly those standards are isn’t an essential
element of the family of views picked out by the term moderate invariantism and what
those standards are exactly won’t be important for our purposes.) Thus, in short, classical
moderate invariantism (hereafter referred to simply as moderate invariantism or MI) is
the view that contextualism, SCWI, DRWI, and pragmatic encroachment are all false,
and that the single invariant standard of knowledge is low enough such that most of our
everyday knowledge ascriptions turn out true.
But in order to understand fully the type of invariantism we’ll be comparing the
ambiguity theory to, we also need to understand the response it gives to the typical
contextualist data (by contextualist data, I mean the things that contextualists usually put
forward to support their view—things like DeRose’s banks cases, Cohen’s airport case,
inconsistent brain-in-a-vat/hands triads etc.), which initially don’t seem to jive well with
ambiguity theory are things also shared by either contextualism or non-sensitive forms of invariantism like
the one being discussed in this chapter. Thus, in making the cases for the superiority of the ambiguity
theory over contextualism or other forms of invariantism I’ve already trotted out all the major reasons why
I think that the ambiguity theory is superior to SSI. Thus, I was unable to see any way of making a separate
chapter on the matter that was not awkwardly and unhelpfully redundant.
146
See Brown (2006), DeRose (1999), and Hawthorne (2004, ch. 3).
147
Unger (1975).
148
For a more modern (and in my mind quite plausible) defense of this view see Wayne Davis (2007).
Davis argues that most of our everyday knowledge claims are cases of loose use in which the claims are
strictly speaking false but appear both true and appropriate. This is roughly the skeptical parallel of the
invariantist view being considered in this chapter.
149
Hawthorne (2004, ch 3).
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moderate invariantism. The dominant (and I believe most compelling) method put
forward is to make, what DeRose calls, a warranted assertability maneuver. DeRose
explain a warranted assertability maneuvers (hereafter a WAM) as follows.
“A WAM involves explaining why an assertion can seem
false (or at least not true) in certain circumstances in which
it is in fact true by appeal to the fact that the utterance would
be improper or unwarranted in the circumstances in
question.”150
In the case of the debate between the contextualists and the classical invariantists, the
specific WAM employed by the proponent of MI is the following: “what the contextualist
takes to be a variation in the truth conditions of knowledge attributions is in reality only a
variation in the conditions for the warranted assertability of those claims.”151
In order to see more clearly how the WAM operates let’s look at a concrete
example of the WAM as used in response to DeRose’s popular bank cases.
Bank Case A: My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to stop at
the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we
notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although
we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially
important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive
straight home and deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning. My way says ‘Maybe the
bank won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.’ I reply, ‘No, I
know it’ll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It’s open until noon.’
Bank Case B: My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon as in Case A, and
notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning,
explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and
discovered that it was open until noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large
and very important check. If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account
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DeRose (2002, 171).
DeRose (2002, 171).
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before Monday morning, the important check will bounce, leaving us in a very bad
situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these
facts. She then says, ‘Banks do change their hours. Do you know the bank will be open
tomorrow?’ Remaining as confidence as I was before that the bank will be open then,
still, I reply, ‘Well, no, I don’t know. I’d better go in and check.’152
DeRose then adds the following: “Assume in each case that the bank will in fact be open
on the Saturday in question, and that there is nothing unusual about either case that has
not been included in the description of it.”153
The intuition that the contextualist expects and desires of listeners (and that
listeners often seem to have) is that both the speaker’s first person knowledge attribution
in Case A and the speaker’s knowledge denial in Case B are true and appropriately made
statements, and that this is so despite the fact that it remains true in both cases that the
bank will be open, the degree of confidence of belief remains the same, and the level of
justification remains the same. The contextualist argues that these intuitions are evidence
in favor of contextualism. I argued in the last chapter that this move is too quick, and that
this evidence just as strongly supports the ambiguity theory. However, that’s not the point
here.
Moderate invariantists must offer an explanation of these intuitions. For, on
moderate (or any form of classical) invariantism the knowledge assertion in Case A and
the knowledge denial in Case B cannot both be true, given the circumstances of the case.
For the moderate invariantist who employs a WAM, the basic response goes as follows.
The speaker’s knowledge assertion in Case A is both true and pragmatically appropriate
to assert. In Case A, the truth of the claim and the appropriateness of assertion are in
tandem. However, in Case B, the warranted assertability conditions of what it’s
pragmatically appropriate to assert come apart from the truth of the claim. In Case B,
according to our moderate invariantist, the knowledge denial is strictly speaking false, but
it is appropriate to assert given the circumstances. The details and merits of the
152
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153
DeRose (2009, 2).
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invariantist’s reasons for this claim will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3, but for
now the important point is that an invariantist who uses a WAM claims that the truth
conditions for knowledge assertions and denials remain constant across contexts, but that
what it’s appropriate to assert varies contextually. From here on out the only form of
classical invariantism that will concern us will be a form of moderate invariantism that
employs a warranted assertability maneuver in order to explain the contextualist data.
From here on out that view will be referred to simply as MI-WAM.
With the basics of MI-WAM before us, we can now compare the relevant
essential features of the view to its competitors, contextualism and the ambiguity theory.
To start, recall that while on contextualism context played a semantic role, on the
ambiguity theory context played a pragmatic role. MI-WAM, like the ambiguity theory
and contra contextualism, also gives context a pragmatic role. According to MI-WAM,
context changes what we’re attentive to and what it’s appropriate or warranted to assert,
but does not play a semantic role in altering the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions
or denials beyond the normal ways in which context determines the truth values of claims
generally. On this first point the ambiguity theory and MI-WAM are aligned in
opposition to contextualism.
Second, recall that both the ambiguity theory and contextualism entail that SCWI
is true, but that SCWI is not consistent with MI-WAM. This difference between MIWAM and its competitors is what allows the ambiguity theory and contextualism to
conclude that the speaker speaks truly in both Bank Case A and Bank Case B, while MIWAM must explain away the apparent truth of the speaker’s knowledge denial in Bank
Case B via a WAM. On this second point, the ambiguity theory and contextualism are
aligned in opposition to MI-WAM.
Finally, recall that both contextualism and MI-WAM deny DWRI. That is, on
both contextualism and MI-WAM, given a particular context, there is only one sense for
which a speaker can properly use ‘knows’ in propositional constructions. This is in
contrast with the ambiguity theory which claims that any propositional sense of ‘knows’
remains properly available for a speaker to use in any context (so long as the proper
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syntax is present.) On this third point, contextualism and MI-WAM are aligned in
opposition to the ambiguity theory.
These similarities and differences may be more readily grasped graphically. They
are depicted in the following two tables:
View

True Claim Made in Case A?

True Claim Made in Case B?

Contextualism

Yes

Yes

Ambiguity Theory

Yes

Yes

MI-WAM

Yes

No (But Still Appropriate)

View

# of senses of ‘knows’ available per

Role of context

context
Contextualism

One

Semantic

Ambiguity Theory

More than one (as many as there are)

Pragmatic

MI-WAM

One

Pragmatic

In the three sections that follow, I aim to make a case that the differences between the
ambiguity theory and MI-WAM as outlined above given the ambiguity theory the upper
hand (although not decisively so). In Section 2 I begin my case by presenting cases in
which the most desirable theory of ‘knows’ appears to be one on which more than one
sense of ‘knows’ remains available within a context—a feature, that among the views
being considered, only the ambiguity theory has.154
3.2 The Case for the Ambiguity Theory via DRWI
Recall that the ambiguity theory entails the following principle,

154
If having this feature is an advantage—which I will argue that it is—this is also an advantage that the
ambiguity theory has over SSI, which doesn’t allow for more than one sense of ‘knows’ to be properly
available within a given context of utterance.
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Diverging Responses Without Inconsistency (DRWI): There are cases in which, for
the same subject S and proposition p, one and the same speaker says truly “S knows p”
but instead could have truly said “S does not know p”.
Recall also that this principle is incompatible with both contextualism and MI-WAM.
Thus, if we have reason to accept DRWI, then we have good reason to accept the
ambiguity theory over contextualism and MI-WAM. But what reason do we have to
accept DRWI?
In the spirit of the frequent appeals to ordinary language usage, which are
regularly made by both proponents of contextualism and MI-WAM in the literature, I
want to offer a couple of cases for which I think an acceptance of DRWI is the best
explanation of our linguistic intuitions. The base for the first case comes from Jessica
Brown (and was presented in the last chapter). The base for the second one comes from
Baron Reed. I’ve added to both cases in order to modify their original purposes to better
serve my own. Let’s begin with Brown’s SURGEON case. The case as originally
presented goes as follows.
“A student is spending the day shadowing a surgeon. In the
morning he observes her in clinic examining patient A who
has a diseased left kidney. The decision is taken to remove it
that afternoon. Later, the student observes the surgeon in
theatre where patient A is lying anaesthetized on the
operating table. The operation hasn’t started as the surgeon
is consulting the patient’s notes. The student is puzzled and
asks one of the nurses what’s going on:
Student: I don’t understand. Why is she looking at the
patient’s records? She was in clinic with the patient this
morning. Doesn’t she even know which kidney it is?
Nurse: Of course, she knows which kidney it is. But, imagine
what it would be like if she removed the wrong kidney. She
should not operate before checking the patient’s records.”155
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Brown (2008, 176).
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In this case the nurse’s claim that the doctor knows which of the patient’s kidneys is to be
removed is meant to be taken intuitively as a true statement and an appropriate response.
Initially, it likely is not clear why this case should favor either DRWI or its rejection.
However, the relevance of the case comes clearly into focus once we consider Fantl and
McGrath’s claim that “the nurse in Brown’s surgeon case could just as easily and just as
properly have said, ‘Well, of course she’s checking the chart; it’s not enough to rely on
her memory that it’s the left kidney. She needs to know it is’.”156 The implication of such
a claim on the nurse’s behalf amounts to an implicit denial that the doctor knows which
of the kidneys is to be removed. Let us label the response that Fantl and McGrath claim
the nurse could give (along with an explicit knowledge denial for good measure) Nurse
Response 2 (NR-2) and the original response that Brown claims the nurse could give
Nurse Response 1 (NR-1). Our options are then as follows:
NR-1: Of course, she knows which kidney it is. But, imagine what it would be like if she
removed the wrong kidney. She should not operate before checking the patient’s records
NR-2: Well, of course, she’s checking the chart; it’s not enough to rely on her memory
that it’s the left kidney. She needs to know it is, and without double-checking she doesn’t
know it.
Both NR-1 and NR-2 deal with the same subject (the surgeon), the same proposition (it is
the left kidney of the patient that is to be removed) and are given in response to the same
context. NR-1 contains an explicit knowledge ascription while NR-2 contains an implicit
knowledge denial concerning the same subject, proposition and context. 157 For those
with the intuition that both NR-1 and NR-2 represent plausibly true and appropriate
responses, this poses a problem for views that deny DRWI like contextualism and MIWAM, because the context prompting each response is identical to the other, yet both
claims seem very plausibly true. Thus, on contextualism and MI-WAM some explanation
156

Fantl and McGrath (2012, 71).
Obviously, once NR-1 or NR-2 is asserted the context is different than one in which the other claim had
been asserted instead. But prior to the assertion the context for the two scenarios is identical.
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as to why both the knowledge ascription and knowledge denial appear true (even though
one of them is not) is needed. In a moment I consider several attempts at giving such an
explanation, but before turning to those possible explanations, let’s look at another
scenario.
This following case comes from Baron Reed:
Punishment/reward case 1. You are participating in a
psychological study intended to measure the effect of stress
on memory. The researcher asks you questions about Roman
history—a subject with which you are well acquainted. For
every correct answer you give, the researcher will reward
you with a jelly bean; for every incorrect answer, you are
punished by an extremely painful electric shock. There is
neither reward nor punishment for failing to give an answer.
The first question is: when was Julius Caesar born? You are
confident, though not absolutely certain, that the answer is
100 BC. You also know that, given that Caesar was born in
100 BC, the best thing to do is to provide this answer (i.e.,
this course of action will have the best consequences—you
will be one jelly bean richer!).158
Reed then points out, however, that due to the significant stakes if you are wrong, you
may not want to answer. Reed says “it would be natural for a subject to say” the
following:
Subject Response 1 (SR-1): I know this one, but I’m not going to risk an answer.159
Aside from those who have a commitment to a knowledge-action principle who, for
theoretical reasons, may want to resist the conjunction, most of us will likely find this an
appropriate and accurate response. However, it also seems that the following would have
been a true, appropriate, and natural response as well:
Subject Response 2 (SR-2): I’m pretty confident about this one, but I don’t know this
one, so I’m not going to risk an answer.
158
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One again, in both SR-1 and in SR-2 we have the same subject (you via your first person
attribution or denial of your own knowledge), the same proposition (“this one” referring
to the proposition that Julius Caesar was born in 100 BC), and the same context. And
once again this looks initially like it causes a problem for MI-WAM.
MI-WAM may be able to explain why both claims strike us as appropriate
responses using its preferred WAM strategy. Its ability to do so is the topic of Section 3,
but the basic case usually goes as follows. In the case of SR-1 the appropriateness is
grounded in the truth of the claim. And in the case of SR-2, the advocate of MI-WAM
tells a story about how SR-2 implies something true (even though it is strictly speaking
false) and as a result strikes us as appropriate. However, MI-WAM cannot account for
why both responses might still seem true even after careful reflection, because, if this is
what is going on, the true implication generated by the false statement should be
cancellable. And on MI-WAM one response from each pair must be false. But it seems
that a reasonable case can be made that neither claim from either pair is false. Thus, cases
of this sort pose a problem for MI-WAM because they seem to imply the truth of DRWI.
The ambiguity theory can easily avoid this difficulty entirely by claiming that ‘know’ is
being using in a different sense in SR-1 than it is in SR-2.
I think it’s pretty clear that for someone who has the intuition that either both NR1 and NR-2 are true or that both SR-1 and SR-2 are true (or both these intuitions), at first
blush, these intuitions support the ambiguity theory. We can imagine the nurse to have in
mind the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard of knowledge, and we can imagine her to
have in mind a more demanding standard of knowledge according to which knowledge
requires double or even triple checking. Perhaps this argument can be undercut via a
WAM. But before considering that move in Section 3, it seems worth pausing to consider
what other sorts of explanations, might be given in order to offset this initial advantage
that the ambiguity theory seems to have. In what follows I’ll consider two other
explanations for the intuitions of the truth of both NR-1 and NR-2 and of SR-1 and SR-2.
The first potential explanation is that ‘knows’ is not ambiguous, but vague, and that these
cases pull us in inconsistent directions because they are in the fuzzy boundary area of
‘knows’. The second potential explanation is that while ‘knows’ is not vague, the
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situations in SURGEON and Punishment/Reward represent “close calls”, where the
threshold for knowledge is either just met or just not quite met. On this account, it is
because it is close call we are apt to be swayed that both the knowledge ascription and the
knowledge denial are true because neither is obviously false in virtue of it being a close
call.
Let’s start with the first potential alternative explanation, namely, that ‘knows’ is
vague.160 At the outset it’s worth noting that ‘knows’ being vague is compatible with
contextualism, the ambiguity theory, and MI-WAM. A contextualist could claim, for
example, that while ‘knows’ is context-sensitive, the standards generated by context still
have a fuzzy boundary resulting in a certain amount of vagueness in the term even within
a context. The ambiguity theorist could claim that, while ‘knows’ is ambiguous, one or
more of its senses are also vague.161 And the proponent of MI-WAM similarly could
claim that the single, invariant meaning of ‘knows’ is vague.
Given that the intended role that SURGEON and Punishment/Reward are meant
to play in this chapter (namely, as evidence for the ambiguity theory over MI-WAM), I
think the appropriate question to ask is the following. Can vagueness function as a
plausible explanation for our intuitions from SURGEON and Punishment/Reward in a
way that is compatible with MI-WAM? I will argue that it cannot. But before giving my
reason for that conclusion, let’s make more explicit how ‘knows’ being vague could serve
as an explanation on an invariantist account for the intuitions one may have that both
responses in SURGEON and/or in Punishment/Reward are true.
I’m assuming that if ‘knows’ is vague that this vagueness enters via the
vagueness of the level of justification required to count as knowing.162 How one accounts
for the vagueness in the level of justification required for knowledge will change
160

That ‘knows’ is vague is the view that Stephen Schiffer seems to favor in response to contextualist data
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Additionally, there has also been some interesting work done in linguistics suggesting that ambiguity
and vagueness ought to be seen as on a spectrum with polysemy (the type of ambiguity I claim ‘knows’
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or vague as to whether or not ‘knows’ is in fact vague or polysemous. For details on this view about the
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(1993).
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depending on other epistemological assumptions. For example, on an evidentialist
account, there will be a fuzzy strength of evidence threshold marking the difference
between knowing and not knowing; on a reliabilist account, there will be a fuzzy degree
of reliability threshold that marks that difference; same for safety theories, etc. The
important point unifying all these views is this: the justification threshold is not precise
but fuzzy. On any such account combined with invariantism, the resulting single sense of
‘knows’ is one with a fuzzy boundary, meaning that there likely will be cases where there
is no clear matter of fact about whether or not one knows. In order for SURGEON and
Punishment/Reward to be cases where the vagueness affects the truth of the utterances,
the level of justification that the nurse and you have respectively must be in that grey area
where it is not clear that the level of justification is high enough.
Thus, even though the claims made in the responses to SURGEON and
Punishment/Reward may not be true (whether or not they are depends on your theory of
the semantics of vague terms), given that the state of the putative knower in question was
in the penumbra, one can easily understand both the intuition that NR-1 is true and that
NR-2 is true. Similarly, one may have the intuition that a speaker referencing a man with
one hundred hairs on his head may be saying something true if she says of the man that
he is bald (due to the low number of hairs on his head) or if she denies that he is bald
(due to her focus on the fact that he does indeed still have one hundred hairs on his head).
This on its own strikes me as a plausible explanation of the intuitions one may
have about SURGEON and Punishment/Reward. However, I don’t think this explanation
is available for the defender of MI-WAM. The reason being that a constitutive part of
MI-WAM is that the standard of knowledge is low enough that most of our everyday
knowledge ascriptions turn out true. However, recall that in SURGEON the doctor has
strong justification for her belief that it is the left kidney that is to be removed (after all
she had consulted with that same patient earlier that very day). In order for the standard
of knowledge to be low enough for most of our everyday knowledge ascriptions to turn
out true, it would seem that the surgeon’s evidence ought to be strong enough to be a
clear case of knowledge. If that level of justification is part of the penumbra, it seems
many of our other everyday knowledge claims will also be in that penumbra—or worse,
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beyond the penumbra and no longer instances of knowledge. Note also that the defender
of moderate invariantism, if she is appealing to vagueness, cannot cite anything about the
practical importance of getting the matter right in the case of SURGEON as an
explanation for why this is an instance of a knowledge ascription in the penumbra. That
practical concerns like this affect whether one knows is one of the claims that the
moderate invariantist denies. In short, the SURGEON case is not a plausible case of a
fuzzy area on the MI picture.
I think this problem presents itself all the more clearly in Punishment/Reward
where we are told that “[y]ou are confident, though not absolutely certain, that the answer
is 100 BC.” Assuming that your confidence is warranted, it seems like it is the lack of
absolute certainly which is motivating the knowledge denial in SR-2. And for the
moderate invariantist, this should clearly put the level of justification past the fuzzy
boundary area. Trying to explain Punishment/Reward as a case of a fuzzy boundary for
knowledge will lead to either an implausibly large boundary area or to something akin to
skepticism. And neither option is desirable on moderate invariantism. Thus, while
vagueness may make a plausible response in its own right to what’s going on in
SURGEON and Punishment/Reward, it won’t be of much help to the moderate
invariantist.
Let’s turn now to our second potential explanation, that this is the case of a close
call where, because these cases are on the border of what counts as knowledge, our
intuitions are easily pulled both ways. Given what we’ve already established, this
suggestion can be treated much more quickly. This is because this second suggestion,
while once again plausible in its own right, cannot be paired up successfully with
moderate invariantism. The reason for this is that, unless the category of “close calls” is
very large (which seems perhaps antithetical to the concept of a close call in the first
place), SURGEON and Punishment/Reward being cases of close calls won’t allow for
most of our everyday knowledge ascriptions to be true. This is because the boundary
region where close calls happen would be at a justification level so high that many of our
everyday ordinary language assertions would cleanly fall outside of this close call region
and into the region of the clearly false. That this is so is once again a product of the fairly
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high level of justification had by the speakers in both SURGEON and
Punishment/Reward. Thus, this suggestion does no favors for MI-WAM.
This leaves the moderate invariantist with a third option: making a warranted
assertability maneuver on SURGEON and Punishment/Reward akin to the one made to
explain away the contextualist data. Because this maneuver mirrors what moderate
invariantists have done in responding to contextualist data (e.g. explaining away the
appearance of truth for a false claim via an appeal to a shift in warranted assertability
conditions), this third option as applied to SURGEON and Punishment/Reward will not
be assessed separately here, but will be addressed via the more general examination of
such maneuvers in Section 3. We’ll now turn to that section, noting that unless the
warranted assertability maneuver fares better than the other alternative explanations, the
appearance of truth for both responses in SURGEON and Punishment/Reward will
continue to function as evidence in favor of the ambiguity theory over MI-WAM.
3.3 The Viability of Moderate Invariantism’s Warranted Assertability Maneuver
Keith DeRose, who coined the term warranted assertability maneuver and its
shorthand WAM, is quick to acknowledge that many who reject contextualism are
inclined to appeal to a WAM in order to ground their rejection of the view. However,
DeRose believes that the WAM employed by the proponent of MI-WAM fails to have the
appropriate good-making features of an acceptable WAM.163 To begin this section, we’ll
look at the features DeRose claims are required for a good WAM along with why he
believes that MI-WAM fails to contain these features. We’ll then look at the responses
given by the most prominent and well-developed versions of MI-WAM, those put
forward by Jessica Brown and Patrick Rysiew, both of whom argue that DeRose is
mistaken here. I’ll then provide my own assessment—arguing that MI-WAM is in a
much better position than DeRose thinks it is, but that it still comes with an important
cost which has been downplayed by its defenders. This sets up the central question for the
final section of this paper—does the ambiguity theory fare any better than MI-WAM in
explaining its own problematic data? This current section is quite long and may feel like
163
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a departure from the question at hand, but I trust that this detour is worth it in order to get
a better sense of how well MI-WAM currently fares in responding to the objections it’s
faced from the contextualist camp. It is only via an understanding of the pros and cons of
both MI-WAM and the ambiguity theory that a sensible assessment of the strength of the
views can holistically be made.
So to begin our detour of sorts, let’s look at what DeRose has to say about what
makes for a good or a bad WAM.164 DeRose begins his presentation by giving the
example of a hypothetical view of an imaginary “crazed philosopher of language” who
claims that the sentence ‘S is a bachelor’ is true if and only if S is a male. According to
this view, our intuitions that the truth conditions “contain any condition to the effect that
S be unmarried” are generated by our focusing on what’s appropriate to assert—i.e. the
warranted assertability conditions—and mistaking that warranted assertability condition
for an additional truth condition.165 On this view it would be false, strictly speaking, to
say of a married man that he is not a bachelor, but it would be appropriate and have
warranted assertability.166 Unsurprisingly, this hypothetical view serves as DeRose’s
model of a bad WAM.
This is in contrast with the view DeRose puts forward as the model of a good
WAM. On this view our WAMer accepts the following account for the truth conditions
of ‘It’s possible that P’ (where P is a proposition in the indicative):
DKO: S’s assertion, ‘It’s possible that P’ is true iff (1) S doesn’t know that P is false.
However, DeRose notes that if a speaker knows that P but claims that ‘It’s possible that
P’ (without any qualifier), we will often be inclined to think that what the speaker has
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said is inappropriate and/or false. (For example, if I ask you if a certain book is in your
office. If you know the book is there but respond with “It’s possible that the book is in
my office” this response certainly seems inappropriate and perhaps also seems false).
Thus, our WAMer may note that many people are inclined to accept the following
principle instead:
DKEW: S’s assertion, ‘It’s possible that P’ is true iff (1) S doesn’t know that P is false
and (2) S doesn’t know that P is true.
On this principle a second truth condition for ‘It’s possible that P’ has been added,
namely, that S doesn’t know that P is true. Our WAMer then suggests that the reason that
DKEW seems appealing, despite its falsity, is the fact that (2), S doesn’t know that P is
true, is a warranted assertability condition for when it’s appropriate to state that ‘It’s
possible that P’, but that it is not a truth condition. Thus, while you may be saying
something strictly speaking true when you claim “It’s possible that the book is in my
office” (even though you know the book is in your office), you have said something
misleading (via the conversational maxim of “Assert the Stronger”167) which generates
the false implication that you don’t know that P is true. It is for this reason that the
assertion seems false even though it is not.
Whether or not one thinks DKO is the right account of the true conditions of ‘It’s
possible that P’, it seems clear that there is a large gap in the plausibility and quality of
this second WAM over the initial WAM which tried to salvage the view that the true
conditions of ‘S is a bachelor’ are merely that S is a male. Recognizing this gap in
quality, DeRose identifies several key differences between the ‘bachelor’ WAM and the
DKO WAM to come up with a set of criteria for a good WAM. At least five such criteria
can be found in DeRose’s writings on the matter.
The first criterion that DeRose identifies for a good WAM is, as Brown puts the
matter, the criterion that the WAM “should start from a conflict of intuitions which
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requires explanation.”168 In the case of DKO it seems that many of us do indeed have
conflicting intuitions (both between and within hearers) about what’s going on here, but
in the case of the bachelor WAM, aside from our hypothetical proponent of the view,
competent speakers are in agreement about the meaning of the term bachelor and there
are no conflicting intuitions.
The second criterion is that a WAM should explain away the problematic
intuitions via an appeal to a false implicature—i.e. something false that is conveyed by
the making of the assertion that is not, strictly speaking, part of the utterance, and not
truly part of what is said.169 Note that in the case of ‘it’s possible that P’ the false
implicature generated is that one does not know that P. According to the DKO
interpretation of ‘it’s possible that P’ that one does not know that P is not strictly
speaking part of what is said when one claims that “it’s possible that P.” What the DKO
WAMer suggests is that this is instead something that is pragmatically conveyed.
However, in the case of ‘bachelor’ as equivalent in meaning to being a male, DeRose
claims that what happens is a “bare warranted assertability maneuver” according to
which it is simply claimed, without an additional layer of explanation, that it is
inappropriate to say of a married man that he is a bachelor even though this is not strictly
speaking false.170
But it seems that our philosopher of language in favor of this theory of the
meaning of ‘bachelor’ can satisfy this second criterion by simply adding to the view that
there is a false implicature generated, and that this philosopher can do so by positing a
rather peculiar conversational rule. DeRose expounds the point as follows:
“Suppose our crazed philosopher were to get even more
resourceful, and argue as follows: There’s a conversational
rule to the effect that you shouldn’t assert ‘S is a bachelor’
when S is married. Thus, when you make such an assertion,
your listener, assuming that you’re following the rule, will
168
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gather that S is unmarried. Thus, making such an assertion
will generate an implicature to the effect that S is unmarried.
When S is married, this implicature is false. That explains
why we find such assertions to be false, when they’re made
of married men…”171
The fact that the proponent of this crazy theory about ‘bachelor’ is able to add this
refinement doesn’t undermine DeRose’s second criterion for a good WAM. It just means
that, with modification, our crazy theory of ‘bachelor’ can at least satisfy this particular
criterion. However, the way in which the WAM for ‘bachelor’ is able to satisfy this
criterion leads to DeRose’s third criterion for a good WAM.
This third criterion is about the way in which a false implication is generated.
DeRose claims that a WAM ought to apply a general rule of conversation as opposed to a
special rule in order to explain the generation of a false implicature. The rationale for this
is a practical one—if we allowed such special rules to function as grounds for
implications, virtually any piece of recalcitrant linguistic data could be explained away
via an appeal to such a special rule.172 The WAMer defending DKO uses a general rule of
conversation, namely, “Assert the Stronger”, to explain why the weak claim of “it’s
possible that P” seems to imply that the speaker doesn’t know that P. But in the case of
the WAM for ‘bachelor’ a highly idiosyncratic and otherwise unmotivated rule is posited
in order to explain why a false implicature is generated when one says of a married man
that he is not a bachelor.
The fourth criterion DeRose puts forward is that a WAM should only explain
away an intuition of falsehood, but not an intuition of truth as well.173 To see more
precisely what this means let’s think about what is actually being explained on both the
DKO WAM and ‘bachelor’ WAM respectively. In the case of DKO, all one needs to
explain is why the claim “it’s possible that P” appears false when the speaker knows that
P, even though on DKO this claim is true. Thus, the WAM is being used to explain why a
true statement appears false—i.e. it’s explaining an intuition of falsehood. But things
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don’t stretch beyond that. For all other combinations of relevant epistemic states
(knowing that P, knowing that not-P, and neither knowing or not knowing that P) and
relevant utterances (“it’s possible that P” and “it’s not possible that P”) when the
utterance is literally speaking false according to DKO, our intuitions are that the claim is
false as well. There is no instance among these options in which something appears true,
but we have to explain why, in actuality, it is false according on DKO.
Contrast this with the ‘bachelor’ WAM. Like the DKO WAM, the ‘bachelor’
WAM needs to explain why certain true statements (according to the crazy ‘bachelor’
theory) appear false (e.g. ‘That married man is a bachelor’). But it also needs to do the
reverse. It needs to explain why certain false statements (according to the crazy
‘bachelor’ theory) appear true (e.g. ‘That married man is not a bachelor’).174 DeRose
thinks doing the latter is more problematic and explains the problem as follows:
“Even if you can come up with a good explanation for why
the assertion would generate some true implicature, this
wouldn’t seem to help much. For don’t we want to avoid
falsehood both in what we implicate and (especially!) in
what we actually say? So, it would seem that it would be
unwarranted to assert a falsehood, even if doing so generates
a true implicature. Thus it’s no wonder that most clearly
successful WAMs involve explaining away apparent
falsehood by appeal to the generation of a false implicature;
none I know of involve explaining away apparent truth by
appeal to the generation of true implicatures.”175
DeRose’s understanding of the asymmetry between explaining away intuitions via false
implicatures and explaining away intuitions via true implicatures seems to rest on the
recognition of a general asymmetry in our assessment of the truth value of conjunctive
claims. When all the conjuncts are true, the conjunction is true. When all conjuncts are
false, the conjunction is false. But when some conjuncts are true and others false, we still
consider the conjunction as a whole to be false. Thus, there is an asymmetry between the
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circumstances where we judge a conjunction to be true as compared to when we judge it
to be false.
If we think of what a claim literally says as one (or more) conjunct(s) in the set of
things the claim conveys, there will be an asymmetry between what happens when the
literal claim is true but false implications are added on the one hand and when the literal
claim is false but true implications are added on the other. In the case of a true literal
claim with false implications, we should go from having an intuition of truth when
focused solely on the literal meaning, to an intuition of falsehood when we look at the
whole conjunction of what is conveyed. However, in the case of a false literal claim with
true implications, we should have an intuition of falsehood whether or not we are
focusing merely on the literal claim made or the set of things the claim implies. The force
of this line of reasoning will be further examined later in this section.
A fifth criterion DeRose offers (and the final criterion in terms of the order of
presentation here) is that a WAM should be posited in circumstances where “we’re going
to have to explain away the misleading appearance of falsehood of something.”176 In the
case of DKO, both “it’s possible that P” and “it’s not possible that P” at least plausibly
carry the implication that the speaker doesn’t know that P, but, as DeRose notes “it seems
quite unlikely” that both of these claims are false (in a given context) and this gives us
“good reason to believe that something is not as it seems here.”177 The reason why this
makes the positing of a WAM particularly plausible is because it seems hard to see how
we could get by without it—at least not without biting a bigger bullet somewhere else.178
But when it comes to the misguided theory of ‘bachelor’ under discussion we don’t have
the sort of initial circumstances that require us to think that something’s got to give.
Rather, if one understands a bachelor to be by definition an unmarried male (or even
simply as a male, as our theorist wants to say) it will always be the case that either “X is a
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bachelor is true” or “X is not a bachelor is true” in any case with a fixed referent for X.
Unlike the other criteria we’ve discussed, DeRose seems to treat this more as a condition
for an ideal WAM and not as a necessary condition for a good WAM as he seems to treat
the other criteria.
In general, this criterion has received little attention in the ongoing debate
between DeRose, Rysiew, and Brown. (I suspect this has occurred in part because it is
quite similar to the first criterion discussed here—namely, that a WAM should start from
a conflict of intuitions. In a way this final criterion is a specific means by which a conflict
in intuitions is likely to be generated.) Regardless of the reason for its diminished
attention in the literature, this criterion will also play a smaller role in what follows here.
So in summary, using the DKO WAM as a model of a good WAM and the
‘bachelor’ WAM as a model for a bad WAM, DeRose has outlined five criteria for a
good WAM. First, a good WAM should start from a conflict of intuitions which requires
explanation. Second, a good WAM should appeal to a false implicature. Third, a good
WAM should appeal to a general rule of conversation to explain the presence of the false
implicature. Fourth, a good WAM should explain away intuitions of falsehood only, not
intuitions of truth as well. And ideally a WAM should be posited in circumstances in
which it seems like something must be explained away.
DeRose has concluded that the WAM employed by the moderate invariantist “is a
prime example of a WAM we should not give any credence to, since it fails every test we
discerned above.”179 DeRose has remained particularly adamant that MI-WAM fails to
successfully appeal to a general rule of conversation to ground its claim that false
implicatures are the source of the conflicting intuitions and that MI-WAM suffers the
defect of having to explain away intuitions of truth generated by true implications
conveyed by false claims.
We now turn to the work of Jessica Brown and Patrick Rysiew, the two most
sophisticated and detailed respondents to these charges against MI-WAM. Both Brown
and Rysiew think that a response can be given to DeRose to the effect that, in Brown’s
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words, “his [i.e. DeRose’s] objections to a WAM against contextualism are not
persuasive.”180 And both Brown and Rysiew employ very similar strategies in making
their cases.181
In aiming to rebut DeRose’s charges against the WAM of the moderate
invariantist, two general lines of response can be adopted. First, one can argue that MIWAM satisfies the particular criterion DeRose has suggested a good WAM must satisfy.
Second, one can argue that a particular criterion DeRose has suggested a good WAM
should satisfy is not in fact a criterion that a good WAM should satisfy. In looking at the
responses given by our invariantists, both strategies are employed.
In responding to DeRose, Brown identifies three criteria that DeRose puts forward
for a successful WAM, “namely, that it should start from a conflict of intuitions which
requires explanation, that is should involve explaining away only an intuition of
falsehood but not also an intuition of truth, and that it should appeal to a general rule of
conversation.”182 These criteria correspond to the first, third, and fourth criteria, as
outlined above, in that order. Narrowing our focus to what Brown focuses on will be
sufficient in examining the responses. We can set aside the second criterion for the
following reason. If one appeals to a general rule of conversation in order to explain the
generation of a false implicature (which is precisely what Brown and Rysiew do), then
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one has also satisfied the second of our criteria, namely, one has made an appeal to a
false implicature as opposed to making a “bare warranted assertability maneuver.” Thus,
by addressing the third criterion, we will automatically address the second as well. Thus,
there isn’t any need for a separate treatment of criterion two. Additionally, as stated
earlier, the fifth criterion—that our WAM be generated from a situation where it’s very
likely that something needs to be explained away due to the set of intuitions present—
ought, first, to be seen as an ideal criterion for a WAM and not a necessary one, and
second, can be viewed as a special form of the first criterion. Thus, we will follow
Brown’s model and focus on the three criteria she responds to.
Let’s start with the easy one. Regarding the first criterion, Brown thinks
conflicting intuitions are pretty easy to come by. She cites the conflicting intuitions we
commonly experience about incompatible triads such as “I don’t know I’m not a brain-ina-vat”, “I know I have hands” and some kind of closure principle that would entail that if
I know I’m not a brain-in-a-vat, then I don’t know I have hands as evidence that the
conflicting intuitions are present in the case of ‘knows’.183 It seems to me clearly right
that the presence of such conflicting intuitions is indeed a desideratum of a good WAM.
But it seems just as clear to me that, in the case of MI-WAM, Brown is right that the
relevant conflict in intuitions is present. I take it, therefore, that the moderate
invariantist’s WAM meets the first criterion. As a result, I won’t discuss it further. I think
such a move is further legitimized by the fact that denying this has not been a point of
focus in DeRose’s responses to Brown and Rysiew as far as I can tell.
This brings us to the two criteria that will be our central concerns moving
forward: 1) that a good WAM only explains intuitions of falsehood, and 2) that a good
WAM appeals to a general rule of conversation in order to explain what generates the
false implicatures. But before seeing how Brown and Rysiew defend their WAM against
these charges it will be useful to have before us the basic nature of the WAM they
employ.
As moderate invariantists, Brown and Rysiew are aiming to show that, for the
portion of the contextualist data where many of us have intuitions that we ought to retract
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a knowledge ascription and instead put forward a knowledge denial in moving from a
situation like Bank Case A to one like Bank Case B, these intuitions can be explained
away by pragmatic factors. That is, they want an account on which we can explain why a
knowledge ascription is true both in Bank Case A and in Bank Case B despite the fact
that many of us have an intuition that an ascription is appropriate in Bank Case A but a
denial is appropriate in Bank Case B. As moderate invariantists employing a WAM, they
are aiming to do this specifically via an appeal to warranted assertability conditions. And
in avoiding making a “bare warranted assertability maneuver” they seek to do this by
claiming that knowledge denials in scenarios like Bank Case B are inappropriate (and as
a result may appear false) because such knowledge denials generate false implicatures.
DeRose has suggested that a good WAM will appeal to a general rule of
conversation in order to explain why these false implicatures are generated. Appealing to
such a general rule of conversation is what Brown and Rysiew have aimed to do. Rysiew
was the first to put forward such a theory by appealing to H. P. Grice’s Cooperative
Principle (CP) which is to “make [one’s] conversational contribution such as is required,
at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange
in which [one is] engaged.”184 Rysiew appeals specifically to a subprinciple—the maxim
of Relation—which simply states the conversational rule “be relevant”. Rysiew claims
that this rule is “plausibly underwriting” the generation of the false implicatures.185
Rysiew puts forward the following hypothetical train of thought of the listener in the
Bank Case B scenario to show how this general conversational rule makes the knowledge
denial appropriate and, as a result, may also make it appear true:
“He has just said ‘I [guess I] don’t know that bank’ll be open
tomorrow.’ And he has said this in response to my raising a
doubt as to whether he can really be so sure—after all banks,
as I’ve just reminded him, do change their hours.
Presumably (on the assumption that he’s conforming to CP),
he wouldn’t have said what he has unless he thought that
there were possibilities incompatible with the bank’s being
open tomorrow—specifically, that it has recently changed its
184
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hours—that he could not rule out. For to say, ‘I don’t
know…’ is to indicate that one isn’t sure.”186
Despite the fact that a reasoner likely wouldn’t have put the matter quite like that, I think
Rysiew’s general point rings true. It’s plausible to think that in order to utter a relevant
response after one’s conversational partner has raised a possibility of error, one may put
forward a knowledge denial. This is because a knowledge denial is an effective means by
which to indicate that one can’t rule out the possibility of error raised. It would be
uncooperative to continue to insist that one knows in such circumstances if the goal of the
parties in conversation is to determine whether or not to remain in the lengthy bank
queue.
DeRose has been quick to dismiss this suggestion—with his only detailed
discussion of the matter (as far as I’ve been able to find) relegated to a footnote. The
heart of DeRose’s criticism goes as follows,
“I am highly suspicious of accounts that help themselves to
two such meanings in the way Rysiew’s does, disliking not
only the loss of economy of explanation, but also worrying
that we will not be able to combat all manner of absurd
theories about the truth conditions of various sentences if
defenders of those theories are able to posit separate
pragmatic meanings that do the work of accounting for usage
in the troublesome cases, allowing their account of the truth
conditions to sit safely off in the corner, out of the fray.”187
I see at least two major problems with this response. The first is with how DeRose
interprets Rysiew. Rysiew speaks about what one “saysLoose” as well as what one
“saysStrict”. Based on this DeRose seems to have taken Rysiew as positing a second sort of
meaning for sentences that would be controversial in philosophy of language.188 But this
doesn’t seem to me to be the best way to read Rysiew here. Rysiew, in describing
‘saysLoose’ and ‘saysStrict’ writes that,
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“Obviously, these two uses of ‘says’— saysLoose and
saysStrict—correlate more or less closely with speaker
meaning and linguistic meaning, respectively. Or, to use
Salmon’s terminology, they correlate more or less closely
with the proposition(s) pragmatically imparted or conveyed
by an utterance of a sentence, and the proposition(s)
semantically encoded or expressed by the sentence itself
(relative to a context of utterance).”189
While DeRose’s reading of Rysiew doesn’t seem implausible to me, neither is it obvious
to me that Rysiew isn’t just using ‘saysLoose’ to refer to the sorts of mundane types of
pragmatic conveyances we’re most all inclined to agree exist.
But second, and more importantly, this criticism of Rysiew’s usage of ‘saysLoose’
and ‘saysStrict’ doesn’t say anything critical about the usage of Grice’s Cooperative
Principle itself. It seems quite clear that if one agreed that Rysiew’s semantics was
problematic for one reason or another, that one could simply appeal to this general rule of
conversation coupled with a less controversial theory of semantics. And this is precisely
what Brown has done.190 Thus, at least for the time being DeRose hasn’t provided a good
theoretical reason to claim that the WAM of Brown and Rysiew fails to meet his criteria
of appealing to a general rule of conversation.
At this point, our WAMers have been able to rise and meet all the challenges
DeRose has put forward for them, minus one: the claim that a good WAM will seek to
explain away only intuitions of falsehood, but not also intuitions of truth. Recall that the
general reason why DeRose thinks this is an important point is because he perceives a
difference in kind between explaining away an intuition of falsity generated by a false
implicature of a literally true statement versus the explaining away of an intuition of truth
generated by a true implicature generated by a literally false statement. DeRose explains
this difference in kind, and the reason why he thinks the former is unproblematic while
the latter is generally unacceptable as follows.
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“It is not surprising that a true assertion will be
inappropriate, and may seem false, if it generates a false
implicature: We should avoid conveying falsehoods,
whether the falsehood conveyed is part of truth-conditional
content of the assertion or is an implicature generated by the
assertion, and where something false is conveyed by the
making of an assertion, it’s not surprising that we might
mistake that for the assertion’s itself being false.
By contrast, it seems much more problematic to claim that
an assertion that seems true is in fact false by means of a
claim that, thought the assertion itself is false, it generates a
true implicature and is therefore a warranted assertion. For,
except where we engage in special practices of misdirection,
like irony or hyperbole, don’t we want to avoid falsehood
both in what we implicate and (especially!) in what we
actually say? So it would seem that a false assertion will
remain unwarranted despite whatever true implicatures it
might generate.”191
DeRose’s reasoning has a certain force that may seem hard to resist—and he certainly is
correct in identifying the asymmetry—but can we generate from that the apparent blanket
conclusion that a false assertion will remain unwarranted despite whatever true
implicatures it might generate?
Brown argues that we need not accept this blanket claim, thus adopting the
strategy of challenging DeRose’s criterion for a good WAM in this instance (rather than
arguing that MI-WAM satisfies this particular criterion). Brown’s argument consists of
two parts. First, she provides a theoretical explanation of how one might come to think
that a literally true claim is false. Second, she attempts to offer counterexamples to
DeRose’s general claim that a false assertion will remain unwarranted (in the sense of
conversationally appropriate) despite whatever true implicatures it might generate.
Brown puts forward her theoretical explanation stating that “[i]f speakers
concentrate on what the utterance pragmatically conveys rather than on what’s literally
said, or if speakers mistake what the statement pragmatically conveys for what it literally
says, then the utterance will seem correct even though it is literally false.”192 Surely
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DeRose is right that we don’t want to assert or convey false things except in special
circumstances, but Brown offers a psychological account of what’s going on in
circumstances in which false statements appear true due to true implicatures that offers an
explanation for why there is no tension (at least psychologically) between our general
desire and responsibility not to convey false things, and our intuitions that certain false
claims are true. If for example we are focusing only on what’s conveyed and not on what
is said or if we mistake what is conveyed for what is said, we may think the literal
utterance true despite its being false. Brown seeks to give this theoretical explanation
concrete life by offering, what she takes to be, counterexamples to DeRose’s general
claim that successful WAMs occur only with cases of true statements generating
intuitions of falsehood via false implications.
Brown provides two types of examples, the first of which is definite descriptions.
Brown notes that on a Russellian account of definite descriptions there will be instances
in which an utterance is literally false but seems correct since it pragmatically conveys a
truth. For example, a speaker’s claim that “The man in the corner drinking a martini is a
lawyer” may be literally false if the man in the corner is actually drinking something
other than a martini, but will pragmatically convey a truth if that man, whom one takes to
be uniquely picked out by the description, is in fact a lawyer.
Brown is certainly right that such circumstances can arise, but does this provide
the kind of counterexample Brown is looking for? I don’t think so for a few reasons.
First, Russell’s theory of definite descriptions is not without its detractors, so one could
avoid seeing this as a counterexample by rejecting Russell’s theory. Second, this doesn’t
seem to be a case of a WAM, rather this seems to be a case of either reference failure
and/or a deficient description of a referent (depending on one’s account of definite
descriptions), and it’s not clear to me that the appearance of truth due to a reference
failure or a deficient description of a referent is the type of thing that DeRose is claiming
doesn’t typically happen. Regardless, the case of the definite description seems so
different from the claimed pragmatic conveyances of MI-WAM that the example
provides minimal (if any) support for the acceptability of an intuition of truth generated
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by a true implication from a false statement in the case of knowledge ascriptions and
denials.
The second type of example Brown gives are sentences in which a particular
parameter or constituent goes unarticulated—e.g. sentences such as ‘I have eaten’ which
we typically understand to mean I have eaten recently or ‘It’s raining’ which we typically
understand to mean it’s raining here. Brown notes that on views like Bach’s theory of
impicitures these sentences can sometime constitute cases of literally true claims that
appear false due to false implications. But this set of examples has the same weaknesses
as the case of definite descriptions—it rests on a controversial interpretation of the
linguistic data and it constitutes a very different sort of linguistic phenomenon to begin
with from instances of knowledge ascriptions and denials. I am skeptical of such cases as
counting as successful WAMs, and even if they did, I think they would provide little
reason to diminish the concern DeRose has raised in the case of the WAM for knowledge
ascriptions and denials.
Thus, for the time being, there seems to be at least one criticism of the moderate
invariantist’s WAM which it appears the defenders of the view have yet to successfully
counter. Brown’s examples may cast some doubt on DeRose’s blanket statement that
there aren’t successful cases of intuitions of truth via true implications conveyed by
literally false utterances, but to the extent that the asymmetry DeRose highlighted in the
first place strikes one as forceful, the force largely remains in place.
To briefly recap: DeRose outlined a number of problems he saw with the WAM
of the moderate invariantist. Rysiew and Brown were able to successfully respond to
several of these challenges, but the proponents of MI-WAM have yet to generate a
forceful response to DeRose’s charge that MI-WAM suffers from the weakness of
claiming that our intuitions of truth in cases like Bank Case B are generated by true
implicatures conveyed by strictly speaking false statements. The charge is that we ought
to predict (via our general aversion to and duty to avoid falsehood) that one ought to
retain the intuition that knowledge denials are false (and knowledge ascriptions true) in
scenarios like Bank Case B. And the fact that this often isn’t what happens is a mark
against MI-WAM.
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Before moving onto the final section of this chapter, it’s worth noting why this
particular charge doesn’t apply to the ambiguity theory, even though both the ambiguity
theory and MI-WAM appeal to pragmatic considerations in explaining our intuitions
about the Bank Cases. The answer is clear when one remembers that, despite an appeal to
pragmatics, the ambiguity theory has the resources to posit that both the knowledge
ascription in Bank Case A and the knowledge denial in Bank Case B are true. The role of
pragmatics is only to help the hearer interpret which sense of ‘knows’ is being used.
Thus, at no point is the ambiguity theory positing that one’s intuitions about the truth or
falsity of a claim are out of alignment with the literal truth of the claim. And it is the
particular form of misalignment in the case of MI-WAM that DeRose has objected to.
3.4 Semantic Blindness and the Ambiguity of ‘Knows’
Sections 2 and 3 each aimed to show a weakness with MI-WAM. In Section 2 the
weakness identified was the inability of MI-WAM to explain cases like SURGEON and
Punishment/Reward which appear to support the truth of DRWI. In Section 3 the
weakness identified was MI-WAM’s need to posit that certain intuitions of truth, like the
one in Bank Case B, are generated by true implicatures conveyed by false claims—a
move that is generally not part of a good WAM. The ambiguity theory easily skirted both
of these worries, giving the ambiguity theory a leg up.
However, there is a prominent advantage that MI-WAM has over the ambiguity
theory, namely, that, as Patrick Rysiew notes, we are “intuitive invariantists” about
‘knows’.193 Most of us just don’t have the gut reaction that ‘knows’ is ambiguous when
we first start considering the matter (which is not the case with most homonyms, for
example, when we are acquainted with both or all of the senses of the term). Rather,
‘know’ initially seems to most to be univocal. MI-WAM predicts that we will be intuitive
invariantists about ‘knows’, but why so many people are such stubborn invariantists
about ‘knows’ is a recalcitrant datum for the ambiguity theory. Given this, it might
appear that MI-WAM and the ambiguity theory are counterbalanced (or that MI-WAM
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wins) if a plausible explanation for why it would be that we are intuitive invariantists on
the ambiguity theory cannot be given. Providing such a defense is the goal of this section.
One might wish to argue that we are not in fact intuitive invariantists, but this
seems like a fool’s errand. Rather, the defense I offer here is an account of why the fact
that we are intuitive invariantists is not really surprising on the ambiguity theory. Thus,
just as contextualists like Cohen and DeRose have offered an “error theory” to try and
explain our “semantic blindness” of the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’,194 so I’ll provide
an error theory to try and explain our semantic blindness of the ambiguity of ‘knows.’
This defense can be broken into two primary parts. First, I aim to show that we are
intuitive invariantists about a lot of other words which certainly are ambiguous. Second, I
aim to show that the nature of the ambiguity of ‘knows’ has a number of features which
makes it the ideal sort of ambiguous word that we’d be apt to fail to realize is ambiguous.
In order to get started, a few pieces of terminology will be useful to have before
us. As I am using the term ‘ambiguity’ in this chapter, its use is restricted specifically to
instances of a single word having more than one sense (i.e. lexical ambiguity). Lexical
ambiguity can be broken into two types: 1) homonymy, which is when the different
senses of a word are not closely related in meaning (e.g. words like ‘bank’ or ‘bear’) and
2) polysemy, which is when the different senses of a word are closely related, and often
with a shared etymological root (e.g. words like ‘arch’ or ‘crane’). It seems to me that
any plausible theory of the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ will consider ‘knows’ to be a
polyseme, and in moving ahead we will be mostly concerned with the nature of
polysemes and not homonyms.195 Thus, more accurately, the first part of my error theory
for the ambiguity of ‘knows’ is to try and show that we often fail to notice the
polysemous nature of other polysemes, and that as a result we shouldn’t be surprised that
we often fail to notice the polysemous nature of ‘knows’ as well.
To begin, take, for example, the polyseme ‘newspaper’ and the following
conversation.
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See, for example, Cohen (1999, 2010) and DeRose (2006, 2009).
More about the nature of this distinction is covered in chapter 4.
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A: “Be careful if you go outside. I read in the newspaper this morning that a lion escaped
from the zoo last night.
B: “No need to worry. The newspaper just printed a retraction on their website.
A: “Really? Why?”
B: “It turns out the article in the newspaper was just the result of a prank pulled by an
intern.”
A: “Wow, I bet the newspaper didn’t waste any time before firing that intern!”
The first and third uses of the term ‘newspaper’ refer to the physical, paper-and-ink
object which a paper boy might throw at your door. The second and fourth uses refer to
the organization whose function it is to manage, write the content for, and print the
physical paper. Given their conversation, it seems likely that A and B each understand
both senses of ‘newspaper’ and are able to fluidly change usage from one sense to
another. But what would A and B say if they were asked whether or not ‘newspaper’ is
ambiguous or asked if they had changed back and forth between different senses of
‘newspaper’ during their conversation? The correct answers are that ‘newspaper’ is
ambiguous and that they had changed back and forth between the senses of ‘newspaper’
during the conversation. However, it seems plausible that A and B would get the answers
to these questions wrong if they answered without reflection and would likely get the
answers to these questions right only if they reflected on the conversation and how they
had used the term ‘newspaper’ first. My contention is that ‘knows’ works like that—we
have the ability to use and switch between the term’s senses fluidly in conversation, but
we are usually unaware of doing any sort of sense selection or sense switching when
using the term in conversation.
Of course, more needs to be said in developing this line of reasoning. For
example, why does it seem likely that A and B, upon reflection, would come to the
conclusion that there is more than one sense of ‘newspaper’ while many, even after
having carefully reflected on the matter, do not conclude that ‘know’ as used in ordinary
English has more than one sense? At least part of the answer might rest with the fact that
‘newspaper’ functions as a noun in both these senses and there is a certain ease with
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which the distinct things picked out by nouns can be shown to be separate. This is not as
easy with certain other parts of speech like verbs, of which ‘to know’ is one.
So let’s turn to our attention to verbs for a moment. According to the Oxford
English Dictionary, ‘know’ is the eighth most commonly used verb in the English
language.196 The other fourteen verbs comprising the top fifteen most used verbs are ‘be’,
‘have’, ‘do’, ‘say’, ‘get’, ‘make’, ‘go’, ‘take’, ‘see’, ‘come’, ‘think’, ‘look’, ‘want’ and
‘give’.197 In the next chapter I will argue that most commonly used verbs are ambiguous,
which I argue provides us with further reason to think that ‘knows’ is ambiguous. But for
now, let’s just focus on one of these verbs, ‘make’ in order to draw out the general line of
reasoning.
Initially, if asked whether or not the word ‘make’ is ambiguous, I suspect many
would say that it is not. ‘Make’ is not like ‘bank’ and ‘bank’—rather ‘make’ is the type of
word that allows us to straightforwardly say either you made it or you didn’t make it. But
of course, if one takes the time to reflect on the nature of ‘make’ one will see that this is
not so. If I say, for example ‘you made the train’ there are a number of things I could be
sensibly be saying in English even when the referents of ‘you’ and ‘the train’ are fixed. I
could be stating that you arrived at the train successfully before it left the station, or I
could be stating that you were the one who crafted or constructed the train by putting the
pieces together. Similarly if I say ‘she made history’ I could be claiming that her actions
will keep her remembered or I could be claiming that while she may not be remembered
herself, she was one who shaped how the record of facts will be remembered and
conveyed. The Webster-Merriman dictionary has twenty-five listings for the word
‘make’.198
But I think more can be said in favor of the ambiguity of ‘know’ due to its status
as a commonly used verb. Commonly used verbs, like ‘have’, ‘make’, and ‘want’ play a
structural role in the English language whereby they need to be able to be used to cover a
wide variety of situations in which certain specifics of the action are not as important as
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more coarse-grained features. To take the example of ‘make’ again, when the specifics of
how one crafted an item are important one might say “I carved this statue, I weaved this
basket, and I baked this cake”. However, if one is interested only in conveying who the
responsible artist is for an item (or if one is interested in conveying that the same
individual was the artist for all such objects) one might say “I made this statue, this
basket and this cake.” The verbs we use very frequently like ‘make’ are often used so
frequently precisely because of their flexibility. ‘Know’ is by far the most commonly
used epistemic verb. And it would seem sensible that ‘know’ would have the same type
of flexibility as other common, more coarse-grained verbs. Of course, this is not to say
that the word ‘know’ cannot be used as a technical term to pick out a particular epistemic
relation of import like certain philosophers have done with the term ‘understand’.199 But
such a technical usage of a verb does not negate a broad usage of the verb outside the
technical context.
The cases of ‘newspaper’ and ‘make’ provide us with examples of a more general
trend noted by linguists—namely that ambiguity is ubiquitous and that our savvy
negotiations with subtly ambiguous terms allows us to fail to notice that we are doing so.
Linguists Yael Ravin and Claudia Leacock note this point, along with several other points
favorable to the ambiguity theory, when they write,
“We are so adept at using contextual cues that we select the
appropriate sense of words effortlessly and unconsciously.
The sheer number of senses listed by some sources as being
available comes as a surprise: Out of approximately 60,000
entries in Webster’s Seventh Dictionary, 21,488, or almost
40 per cent, have two or more senses, according to Byrd (et
al.) (1987). Moreover, the most commonly used words tend
to be the most polyesemous. The verb run, for example, has
29 senses in Webster’s, further divided into nearly 125 subsenses.”200
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Thus, while initially the fact that most of us are intuitive invariantists seems to count in
favor of MI-WAM, this presumption in favor of MI-WAM is undercut to a certain extent
by the fact that we are also intuitive invariantists about many other ambiguous words.
But this undercutting effect is not complete, for in the case of words like
‘newspaper’, ‘make’, and ‘run’, while we may initially be intuitive invariantists, if given
enough time to reflect, most of us are probably willing to acknowledge that these terms
are ambiguous (and more exactly, polysemous). But it is not so with the case of ‘knows.’
Many people (or at least a good number of philosophers) are resistant to accepting that
‘knows’ is polysemous even after reflection. Thus, a full explanation for the alleged
semantic blindness that comes with the ambiguity theory will also provide reasons why
we are extra resistant to accepting the claim that ‘knows’ is ambiguous over and above
the normal sort of inattentiveness we experience to the ambiguity of many other words.
In the concluding part of this paper, I want to offer two additional suggestions as to why
this might be so. The first deals with the transient and developmental nature of polysemy
and the multi-functionality of ‘knows’. The second deals with the nature of multivocal
words and sense recognition across a linguistic community.
Polysemy is neither a necessary nor eternal property of a word. Rather it is
something that develops, often slowly and subtly overtime. Similarly, it is something that
can disappear slowly over time. Take the word ‘want’ for example. There is its primary
sense in twenty-first century English meaning desire, as in ‘I want (i.e. desire) a new car’.
There is also its more archaic meaning as lack or need, which in contemporary discourse
typically only shows up in select constructions such as ‘She wants (i.e. lacks) for nothing’
or ‘He is in want (i.e. need)’. The usage of ‘want’ in this latter way remains common
enough and well-understood enough such that this and the former sense of ‘want’
together constitute a case of ambiguity for ‘want’.201 But there may come a point where
the usage of ‘want’ in the archaic sense of ‘lacks’ becomes so marginalized and
uncommon that the word ceases to be ambiguous (or at least ambiguous between those
senses). Such a process would likely be slow (perhaps it has already begun) and there
201
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would no doubt be a somewhat lengthy period (perhaps we are already in this period)
where it is unclear whether or not ‘want’ remains ambiguous.
Conversely, as our understanding of the world (and the world itself) continues to
change, so does our language. And these changes often result in new cases of ambiguity,
and new cases of polysemy in particular. Take the word ‘web’ for example, which in the
age of the internet gained a new sense as used in the phrase ‘world wide web’. The clear
connection between the word’s original sense, as used in the phrase ‘the spider’s web’,
and this new sense make ‘web’ a good case as a polysemously ambiguous word. It’s
worth noting that the internet gave us a new linguistic purpose of sorts via a development
in the needs and interests of English speakers. And it was our past usage of the term
‘web’ to refer to the structures created by spiders, along with salient features we wanted
to capture about the nature of the networks forming the internet, that led to our adoption
of the new sense of ‘web’. Of course, in the case of ‘web’ it was quite clear that the word
was gaining a new meaning, and it happened in a relatively quick and concrete fashion.
But subtle changes in the needs of speakers may lead to subtler implementations of
ambiguity.
My claim is that something like this has likely happened in the case of ‘knows’ as
well. As has been shown by the difficulties in reaching consensus in the Edward Craiginspired project of trying to determine the purpose or reason why speakers think it is
valuable to pick out certain individuals as knowers, there likely isn’t one such purpose or
reason.202 Rather, it seems far more likely that there are a set of related epistemic reasons
as to why such labels are valuable.203 And certain distinctions among those purposes
seem likely to have developed over time. Thus, it seems plausible to suppose that the
polysemy of ‘knows’ is something that has been developing subtly and slowly over time,
perhaps in accordance with evolving human needs (or desires) for more nuanced
epistemic language. If the development at this point is either somewhat recent or
incomplete (or both), this could help mask the ambiguous nature of ‘knows’ and make it
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harder to detect even upon reflection. Thus, the developmental history of the ambiguity
of ‘knows’ may be a factor that can partially explain semantic blindness.
This leads to a second factor that might explain our resistance to the ambiguity of
‘knows’—namely, that not all senses of a term need to be understood by all the
competent speakers of a language (particularly in the case of polysemy) in order for that
word to count as polysemous. Think about the words ‘want’ and ‘web’ once more. In the
case of ‘want’ likely just about every current competent speaker of English (perhaps all
truly competent current speakers of English) understand that ‘want’ has a sense similar in
meaning to desire. However, there is no doubt a smaller percentage of current competent
speakers of English who recognize the sense of ‘want’ as deficiency or lack. But that
doesn’t change the fact that ‘want’ is ambiguous. Similarly, in the case of ‘web’—
particularly if we think about the situation in the 1980s for example—a significantly
smaller portion of the population was familiar with the modern tech sense of ‘web’ than
were familiar with the organic sense of ‘web’. But at some point enough speakers
recognized this new sense of ‘web’ that the word gained this new meaning as a proper
part of English. That such circumstances could arise in the case of subtly polysemous
words like ‘knows’ does not seem to me as unlikely.
I’ll take my own experiences as instructive here. Prior to the beginning of my
formal study of philosophy, it struck me as obvious that in order to truly know something
one required infallible evidence. I was comfortable using the word in other settings, but I
likely would have appealed to some sort of loose use explanation to justify those usages.
In fact, this seemed so clear to me that a great deal of epistemological questions seemed
to have obvious answers, and I only came to see what the real problems were once I
accepted that many other people didn’t understand the term ‘know’ to refer to a state of
true belief with perfect warrant or infallible justification. (It took me a number of tries
before I could see why the obvious answer to the Gettier problem wasn’t that the
justification level was too weak to count as knowing, for example). I’ve since come to
see that many English speakers (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) use the word
‘know’ in ways I initially didn’t recognize, and I’ve now accustomed myself to using and
accepting these senses as well. Similarly, it’s not uncommon for me to have a certain
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percentage of my undergraduate students (although almost always a minority) take it as
intuitively obvious that what we mean when we say we know something is that we have
an infallible true belief. Still others take it as obvious that we don’t mean this, and still
others lack a strong view or may even posit that we mean more than one thing.204
One response to these data would be to say that a certain percentage of individuals
are simply wrong about what knowledge is. But it strikes me as harder to make the
parallel claim that these significant portions of competent English speakers are simply
wrong about what ‘knowledge’ is or what we mean by ‘knows.’ Rather, it seems to me
more sensible to say that there is more than one meaning for such terms, but that all these
meanings are closely related. However, in the case of many individuals, we can perhaps
explain their inability to recognize ‘knows’ as ambiguous in virtue of their recognizing
only one sense of ‘knows’, despite the availability of other senses. A larger number of
English speakers could be in this position and ‘knows’ could still be ambiguous. Thus,
for some, their resistance to the polysemy of ‘knows’ may be appropriately reflective of
how they use and understand the word, yet still not accurately reflect the multiplicity of
senses available.
The error theory I’ve put forward in order to explain why many are so resistant to
the ambiguity of ‘knows’ can be summarized as follows. The specific form of ambiguity
‘knows’ embodies is polysemy, in which the different senses of the word are closely
related. Due to the ubiquity of polysemy and our adeptness as users of ambiguous terms,
we often fail to notice that words are polysemous. Beyond being polysemous simpliciter,
a number of specific features of the polysemy of ‘knows’, including that it is a verb, that
its polysemy may still be in its developmental phrase, and that not all the senses of
‘knows’ available to a speaker of English may be recognized by all competent English
speakers, each make it more likely that we would fail to notice, or see upon reflection, the
ambiguity of ‘knows.’ Even with this error theory in place, our intuitions about the
univocality of ‘knows’ are still more likely on MI-WAM (or invariantism generally) than
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on the ambiguity theory, but I think this explanation serves to lessen the gap in the level
of support that our intuitive invariantism gives to MI-WAM over the ambiguity theory.
In review, we’ve seen that MI-WAM has a couple of significant costs—namely, it
does a poor job explaining intuitions in situations like SURGEON and
Punishment/Reward and it is saddled with the explanatory burden of trying to explain
away intuitions of truth for literally false claims. We’ve also seen that the leg up that MIWAM has over the ambiguity theory in virtue of a common resistance to accepting the
ambiguity of ‘knows’ is not so great an advantage because a plausible error theory
explaining our semantic blindness to the ambiguity of ‘knows’ is available. This leads me
to conclude that, on balance, the view that currently better fits the data available is the
ambiguity theory.
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CHAPTER 4: A LINGUISTIC GROUNDING FOR A POLYSEMY THEORY OF
‘KNOWS’

In his book Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley offers an argument
for the conclusion that it is quite unlikely that an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ can be
“linguistically grounded.”205 In this paper I challenge this conclusion by trying to offer a
plausible linguistic grounding for a polysemy theory of ‘knows’. Given that a polysemy
theory of ‘knows’ is a type of ambiguity theory of ‘knows’, if I succeed in linguistically
grounding a polysemy theory of ‘knows’, then I have shown that at least one type of
ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ can be linguistically grounded.
This paper is divided into three sections. The first section presents and explains
the relevant terminology needed for the rest of the paper. The second section provides a
more detailed examination of Stanley’s argument for the claim that an ambiguity theory
quite likely cannot be linguistically grounded along with my rationale for why it is
important to respond to this argument. The third section lays out my case for the
linguistic grounding of a polysemy theory of ‘knows’. The basis for this case is an
examination of commonly used English verbs—of which the word ‘knows’ is one.
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4.1 Ambiguity, Polysemy, and Context-Sensitivity206
As Adam Sennet notes, ‘ambiguity’ is itself ambiguous.207 In this paper I am
concerned specifically with lexical ambiguity; i.e. the phenomenon of a single word208
having more than one sense or meaning.209 Thus, when the term ‘ambiguity’ is used in
this paper, the reader should take this to refer to lexical ambiguity. In keeping with
standard usage, I treat ‘ambiguity’ as an umbrella term that encompasses any way in
which a word has more than one sense. Thus, as I am using the term, both homonymy
and polysemy count as types of ambiguity.210
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There is some disagreement as to what kind of entity is (or entities are) the proper bearer(s) of
ambiguity. In this paper I’ve assumed that words can properly be described as being ambiguous (without
making any kind of claim limiting the proper application of the term ‘ambiguity’ to words only). Others
may wish to claim that it is signifiers only, and not words, that are technically capable of being ambiguous.
Other may claim it is vocables that are the proper bearers of ambiguity. Yet others may claim that
ambiguity technically applies to a mapping relation between signifiers and words (or to some other
mapping relation). While this debate is interesting and perhaps important, I do not think it is important for
the purposes of this paper. For the sake of simplicity and ease of presentation, I’ve chosen to speak of
words as ambiguous. I’ve also done this because it seems the most philosophically neutral and
linguistically generic way of talking about the topic of concern—namely, what are we to say about the
meaning of the entities like ‘know’ and ‘knows’ used in knowledge ascriptions and denials? For a reader
who believes ambiguity applies only to signifiers, my choice to apply the term ‘ambiguity’ to words and
my interchangeable usage of the differing conjugations ‘know’ and ‘knows’ of the root verb ‘to know’ may
seem to require justification given that these different conjugations pick out different signifiers. My
justification is two-fold. First, it is useful to be able to use examples in which the verb ‘to know’ is
conjugated as ‘know’ and at other times as ‘knows’—so there’s a certain practicality in going ahead and
using the two interchangeably. Second, I take it that if ‘know’ is polysemous, so is ‘knows’, and vice versa,
and for roughly the same reasons. Thus, the reader could see me as putting forth a joint account for the
polysemy of both the signifiers ‘know’ and ‘knows’. And I see no problem in combining the cases for both
into one argument.
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It is widely recognized that the line between homonymy and polysemy is
blurry,211 but for our purposes so long as there is a clear conceptual distinction between
homonymy and polysemy and paradigmatic cases of both, the fact that it is often difficult
to determine whether a particular ambiguous word is homonymous or polysemous is
unproblematic. Homonymy is the phenomenon of one word having two or more
meanings that are unrelated, etymologically or otherwise. Words like ‘bank’ and ‘bear’
are examples of the former and are called homonyms.212 Polysemy refers to the
phenomenon of one word having two or more closely related meanings which typically
share an etymological history. Words like ‘crane’ and ‘arch’ are examples of this. I will
call such words polysemes.213
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Depending on one’s philosophy of language one may think this sentence would read more accurately as
“Words like ‘bank’ and ‘bank’ and ‘bear’ and ‘bear’ are examples of the former and called homonyms.”
And one may wish a similar modification for the sentence that follows. I have no problem with such
alternations and find it inconsequential to the success of the arguments that follow.
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Polysemy may be described as distinct from homonymy both because the different senses of a
polysemous word share an etymological root and because a polyseme’s meanings are more closely related.
Of course, there may be circumstances in which an ambiguous word has meanings that share an
etymological root but do not have related meanings and circumstances in which an ambiguous word has
meanings that are closely related by a matter of accident and don’t share an etymological root. Because
these two features can come apart, one might think it wise to make one of these features the fundamental or
defining feature. Given the significance of closely related meaning over etymological history in this paper
I’ve here described closely related meaning as the fundamental feature. This way of defining polysemy
seems in keeping with definitions of polysemy such as those found in Lyons (1977, 550) and Zwicky and
Sadock (1975, 2) in which polysemes are expressed as a single lexeme with distinct senses (as opposed to
homonyms which are expressed with two (or more presumably) lexemes). However, if one wished to make
a common etymological root the fundamental feature of polysemy, given the frequent connection between
common etymology and relation of word meaning, I don’t think this would change the quality or outcome
of my argument.
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It is important to distinguish ambiguity from context-sensitivity which is a related,
but distinct semantic phenomenon. Adam Sennet explains the distinction nicely writing
that,
Context sensitivity is (potential) variability in content due
purely to changes in the context of utterance without a
change in the convention of word usage. Thus, ‘I am
hungry’ varies in content speaker to speaker because ‘I’ is
context sensitive and shifts reference depending on who
utters it. ‘I’, however, is not massively ambiguous. ‘Bank’
is ambiguous, not (at least, not obviously) context sensitive.
Of course, knowledge of context may well help
disambiguate an ambiguous utterance. Nonetheless,
ambiguity is not characterized by interaction with (extralinguistic) context but is a property of the meanings of the
terms.214
Sennet’s examples clearly show that a word can be ambiguous without being contextsensitive and that a word can be context-sensitive without being ambiguous. Even if one
were to make the case that ‘bank’ is context-sensitive, this wouldn’t be because it was
ambiguous and vice versa with ‘I’. This is, in part, because ambiguity is the non-contextbound property of a word having more than one meaning, any of which can be the
meaning used in any context where the appropriate syntax is present,215 while contextsensitivity is the property of content variation resulting from a change in context.
Given the description I gave of ambiguity earlier as “any way in which a word has
more than one sense,” and depending on one’s views about what it means for a word to
have more than one sense, context-sensitivity could wind up counting as a type of
214

Sennet (2011).
I include the qualifier of “where the appropriate syntax is present” to cover instances where due to an
ambiguous term’s meanings including different parts of speech certain meanings are blocked due to
syntactic structure. Take for example the word ‘duck’ which has both noun-form and verb-form meanings.
The syntax of the sentence “She saw him duck” blocks the possibility that the referent of ‘duck’ could be
the animal instead of the action. This example is given by Emma Borg (2004, 143). Sennet (2011) uses a
similar example to make a similar point.
215
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ambiguity. Which answer one gives to this question doesn’t really matter for our
purposes so long as two things are noted. First, this would make context-sensitivity a type
of ambiguity, not the other way around. Second, context-sensitivity would still be distinct
from both polysemy and homonymy.
One may feel that this treatment of the distinction between context-sensitivity and
ambiguity is too brief to fully explain what it is that makes the two phenomena distinct. I
think this is likely true. However, taking the time to put forward a fuller account of the
difference here seems to be unnecessary for the purposes at hand so long as the reader is
willing to grant that these two semantic phenomena are distinct and that there are clear
cases of both context-sensitive words (like indexicals) and ambiguous words (like
homonyms).
One might also be interested in making a distinction between ambiguous words
that are equivocal because they have two and only two senses and multivocal words—i.e.
words that have more than two senses. For our purposes, the only point worth noting
about two-sense equivocality and multivocality is that both are compatible with
polysemy. By this I mean that a polyseme can be either two-sense equivocal or
multivocal. My own leanings are towards a multivocal polysemy theory of ‘knows’, but I
am not arguing for that here. Rather, I am merely arguing that there exists good linguistic
grounding for a polysemy theory of ‘knows’ (i.e., the view that ‘knows’ and its
cognates216 are polysemes).

216

The phrase “and its cognates” from here on out will typically be omitted, but it should be taken as
implied where appropriate.
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4.2 Stanley’s Argument Against the Ambiguity Theory of ‘Knows’
In Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley devotes only a single
paragraph to the view that ‘knows’ is ambiguous. Stanley’s brief treatment of the view
goes as follows:
There really is not much to be said for a version of
contextualism according to which ‘know’ is ambiguous. To
ground an ambiguity claim linguistically, one would need
to show that there are languages in which the different
meanings are represented by different words. But such a
claim is unlikely to be substantiated in the cases of interest
to the contextualist. It is quite unlikely that there are
languages in which the word for ‘know’ in the
epistemology classroom is different from the word for
‘know’ outside the epistemology classroom.”217
A number of noteworthy claims are made in this paragraph. First, there is Stanley’s claim
that there is not much to be said for a version of contextualism according to which ‘know’
is ambiguous. Using a standard understanding of (epistemic) contextualism as the view
that the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions and denials vary according to the
context in which they are uttered for distinctively epistemic reasons,218 I would agree
with Stanley that there isn’t much to be said for such a view. This is because, as indicated
in the previous section, I take it to be a mistake to see an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ as
a type of contextualism. Thus, on my view, one should reject the claim that there is a type
of contextualism on which an ambiguity concerning ‘know’ is posited because such a
view is not a type of contextualism at all. But clearly this is not what Stanley sees as the
problem with an ambiguity theory. Thus, I will put aside this taxonomic concern and
focus on what Stanley takes the problem with an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ to be.
217
218

Stanley (2006), 81.
See, for example, Cohen (1999, 58), DeRose (1992, 914), (2002, 618), and Rysiew (2011).
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Stanley puts forward a necessary condition for the linguistic grounding of an
ambiguity claim—namely, one can linguistically ground an ambiguity claim only if one
can show that the different meanings are represented by different words in other
languages. In making this claim, Stanley likely has a rationale in mind something along
the lines of the one Kripke offered in 1977 when he wrote that “we would expect the
ambiguity to be disambiguated by separate and unrelated words in some other languages”
(Kripke 1977). When one is thinking about homonyms, this line of thought makes a great
deal of sense. It would be highly improbable of any given homonym that its meanings
would be semantically encoded by a single word in all or even many other languages.219
But the line of thought is less forceful when it comes to polysemes whose
meanings are closely related. It seems plausible that in some cases whatever forces—
cultural, linguistic, evolutionary, etc.—led a univocal English word to eventually become
polysemous are forces that have led to similar developments from univocality to
polysemy in the equivalent word in other languages. Certainly this is not always the case.
There are cases where the different meanings of an English polyseme are semantically
encoded by separate words in other languages. And this separate encoding can and does
often function as evidence of the polysemous nature of such words. But the converse
doesn’t hold—i.e. the lack of such separate semantic encoding in other languages for the
(seemingly distinct) meanings of a word doesn’t show that the term is not polysemous.220
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An exception would be cases in which one or more senses of a word pick out a concept or object
linguistically referenced only by speakers of one language. That such circumstances might arise initially
seems to me to be all the more likely in the case of polysemes where a new sense might develop due to a
conceptual idiosyncrasy of a particular shared-language-using community.
220
My conclusions here are in keeping with the wariness about such a test like Stanley’s for ambiguity in
the field of linguistics. See for example Cruse (1982, 66-67) who provides proposed counterexamples to
such a test for ambiguity and Lyons (1977, 404).
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Of course, this claim is compatible with Stanley’s. There is no logical
inconsistency between the claims that 1) the lack of separate semantic encoding in other
languages for the meanings of a word doesn’t show that a word isn’t polysemous and that
2) the only way to linguistically ground that a word is ambiguous (including when it is
ambiguous in virtue of being polysemous) is to show that there are separate semantic
encodings for the meanings of a word in other languages. On such a picture, a lack of
such separate semantic encodings entails neither that one obtains a sufficient reason to
accept nor a sufficient reason to reject that the term is polysemous (although one may
have a sufficient reason to reject that the term is homonymous). However, this does entail
that when such separate semantic encoding can’t be found, there is no hope of
linguistically grounding an ambiguity claim, because a necessary component of that
grounding is absent.
But the difficulty of this position for the proponent of any form of ambiguity
theory of ‘knows’ is exacerbated on Stanley’s account because Stanley treats the ability
of an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ to be linguistically grounded as a necessary condition
for taking an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ seriously. While Stanley does not explicitly
state this, I infer this from the following facts: 1) The only objection Stanley gives to the
ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ is that it lacks linguistic grounding, 2) he concludes that
there isn’t much to be said for an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’, and 3) given the context,
an implication of his conclusion that there isn’t much to be said for an ambiguity of
‘knows’ seems to be that the view ought not be taken seriously. Thus, on Stanley’s
account a linguistic grounding for an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ is needed if the theory
is to be taken seriously. This, in conjunction with Stanley’s claim that evidence of
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separate semantic encoding in other languages of the meanings of a word is needed to
show that the word is ambiguous, results in it being a necessary requirement, on Stanley’s
account, that there be evidence of separate semantic encoding in other languages of the
meaning of a word in order for one to be able to take an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’
seriously.
Requiring a ‘linguistic grounding’ in this sense for an ambiguity theory of
‘knows’ in order to take it seriously strikes me as mistaken, but I won’t argue for that in
this paper. Rather, in the next section I’ll argue that there is an appropriate linguistic
grounding for a polysemy theory of ‘knows’ which does not rely on showing that there
are languages in which the different meanings of ‘knows’ are expressed by different
words, and that, because a polysemy theory of ‘knows’ is a type of ambiguity theory of
‘knows’, at least one type of ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ can be linguistically grounded.
Before turning to that argument, there are a few additional points worth making
about Stanley’s treatment of an ambiguity theory of ‘knows.’ First, Stanley states that the
claim that there are languages in which the different meanings of ‘knows’ are expressed
by different words “is unlikely to be substantiated.” But he provides no reason for why he
thinks that. This seems to be merely armchair speculation on his part. Second, Stanley
follows this claim by stating that “[i]t is quite unlikely that there are languages in which
the word for ‘know’ in the epistemology classroom is different from the word for ‘know’
outside the epistemology classroom.” This claim has the same problem as the one
before—no reason for the claim is provided.
But I see a second problem with this claim. The second problem is that Stanley
seems to assume that the senses an advocate for an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ would
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claim exist are an epistemology-classroom sense and a non-epistemology-classroom
sense. But this need not be the case (either that the number of relevant senses is two or
that they are divided along in- and out-of-the- epistemology-classroom lines).221 Thus,
even if Stanley were correct that the linguistic grounding of an ambiguity theory required
showing that there are languages in which the different meanings are represented by
different words in those languages, Stanley still has not provided us with a good reason to
think that this requirement could not be met in the case of an ambiguity theory of
‘knows.’222
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A possible explanation for why Stanley made the step from an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ generally to
a two-sense ambiguity view of an epistemology-classroom sense and a non-epistemology classroom sense
of ‘knows’ is that Stanley may have just been following previous connections made between the two such
as the connection made in DeRose (1999, 191-2) in which DeRose cites the two-sense ambiguity theory of
‘know’ put forward in Malcolm (1952) and writes that “[t]heories according to which there are two senses
of ‘know’—a ‘low,’ ‘weak,’ or ‘ordinary sense on the one hand, and a ‘high,’ ‘strong,’ or ‘philosophical’
sense, which is much more demanding, on the other – can be viewed as limiting cases of contextualist
views.’
222

In fact, once we jettison this overly restrictive picture of the possible senses of ‘knows’ available, we
find potential candidates for such sense differentiation via the history of philosophy. Descartes’ usage of
the distinction between cognitionem and scientia, outlined perhaps most clearly in the Second Set of
Replies (CSMII, 105-6), has been taken by some to be a case of the identification of two senses of what we
call ‘knowledge’. For example, Fred Feldman, identifies two types of knowledge (and senses of
‘knowledge’) based on Descartes’ distinction. Feldman labels these senses ‘practical knowledge’ and
‘metaphysical knowledge’ respectively. One has practical knowledge when their true beliefs are “justified
well enough for the ordinary affairs of life” (Feldman 1986, 34). On the other hand, metaphysical
knowledge “is knowledge beyond the slightest shadow of a doubt” (Feldman 1986, 35). Metaphysical
knowledge is the type of knowledge employed in the “search after truth”. See Feldman (1986, 33-37).
Another possible example (and one which it has been suggested to me is a source from which Descartes
pulled in drawing his own distinction) comes from the Stoics. René Brouwer identifies two definitions of
‘knowledge’ (episteme) in Diogenes Laertius and four definitions of ‘knowledge’ in Stobaeus (Brouwer
2014, 30). While all these senses are for the same word, episteme, and in that sense don’t meet Stanley’s
criterion, Brouwer notes that the words used to define what knowledge is are distinct. Stobaeus defines
knowledge both as a cognition (katalepsis) and as a tenor or disposition (hexis) (2014, 30). Brouwer refers
to knowledge understood as katalepsis as knowledge “in the cognitive sense” and knowledge understood as
hexis as knowledge “in the dispositional sense” (2014, 32-33). So at the very least we at least get two
distinct words used to describe distinct types of thing that knowledge is in the case of the Stoics. (Of
course, for this to be enlightening, both sense of ‘knowledge’ here need to refer to knowledge in the
propositional sense. That this is so in the case of the Stoics is not as obvious as it is in the case of Descartes,
but the fact that both the cognitive and dispositional senses of knowledge are types of episteme seems like
good grounds in which to think it at least plausible that Stobaeus is picking out distinct types of what we
would consider propositional knowledge.) See (SVF 2.130, LS 31B and SVF 3.112, LS 41H).

118
Finally, before changing gears, I want to address why I think responding to
Stanley’s argument is important. One might think that, given how quickly Stanley put
forward this argument, my much lengthier response is not worth all this fuss. When
looking at Stanley’s argument in isolation, this is a sensible position. However, given the
current state of the philosophical conversation regarding the truth conditions of
knowledge ascriptions and denials, responding to Stanley’s argument is very important
for anyone interested in defending a polysemy theory of ‘knows’.
For the past decade or so the conversation about the truth conditions of
knowledge ascriptions and denials has been dominated by three camps—1) the epistemic
contextualists (in their various guises), 2) the advocates of pragmatic encroachment (the
view that there is a practical stakes or interests component in the analysis of knowledge)
including Stanley who is a leading proponent of the view, and 3) the strict invariantists
who tend to think there is a univocal, traditional meaning of ‘knows’ in the propositional
sense. In the decade before that the conversation was dominated by two camps—the
epistemic contextualists and the strict invariantists.
Throughout all this time relatively little attention (much less favorable attention)
has been given to the view that ‘knows’ might be ambiguous.223 This is in part because
the ambiguity theory has been assumed to be an inferior or rudimentary form of
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That said, there are some who more recently have advocated for views that would count as ambiguity
(or polysemy) theories of ‘knows’. Rene van Woudenberg (2005) offers an argument for a multivocal
version of an ambiguity theory of ‘knowledge’ while Fred Feldman (1986, 33-37) offers a case for a
Cartesian-inspired two-sense version of such an ambiguity theory. Matthias Steup (2005) entertains an
improvement on contextualism via a pair of views he calls “new contextualism” and the “multiple concepts
theory.” These views, taken in conjunction, at the very least lean strongly in the direction of an ambiguity
theory of ‘knows’ and perhaps should be properly seen as such. Most recently, Baron Reed (2013) has put
forward a case for a multivocal polysemy theory in which ‘knows’ is ambiguous in the same way that color
words like ‘blue’ are ambiguous.
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contextualism.224 Thus, Stanley’s choice to comment on an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’
as a type of contextualism, and only very briefly, reflects the view’s current position in
the dialectic. Given that the ambiguity theory has received little attention, it makes a great
deal of sense for Stanley to give it little attention. (And I want to recognize that Stanley’s
treatment was brief and that he very well may have further nuanced his position if the
ambiguity theory hadn’t received so little attention in the time leading up to the
publication of Knowledge and Practical Interests.) But for those of us interested in
defending an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’, it is important that we respond to the scant
objections—even those quickly given—that have kept the ambiguity theory from being a
serious contender in the discussion about the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions
and denials.

4.3: A Case for the Linguistic Grounding of a Polysemy Theory of ‘Knows’
Before arguing that a polysemy theory of ‘knows’ can be linguistically grounded,
it seems prudent to ask what it means to ground a claim linguistically. Stanley does not
say. On the face of it, it would seem that for a claim to have linguistic grounding is for
there to be sufficient linguistic evidence (i.e. evidence about language or language usage)
to provide one with a defeasible reason to accept the claim.225 I see no reason to reject
this natural first reading of the claim, and as a result that is what I will understand
linguistic grounding to consist in. That being said, should Stanley’s understanding of
what it takes to ground a claim linguistically differ substantially from my own
224

See, for example, DeRose (1999), 191-192 and 194-195.
This description is far from perfect (e.g. Who is this “one” who has this defeasible reason? What counts
as “linguistic”?). But I take these matters to be tangential to the matter at hand.
225
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understanding, I would need to assess whether or not my case for the linguistic grounding
of a polysemy theory of ‘knows’ would count as a linguistic grounding in his sense (and
if it doesn’t, I’d need to consider how important it is for those defending the ambiguity
theory to have a linguistic grounding in Stanley’s sense).
My goal in this section is to argue that regardless of whether or not there are
languages in which the different meanings of ‘knows’ are represented by different words,
a polysemy theory of ‘knows’ enjoys a kind of linguistic grounding. More specifically, I
aim to show that this grounding occurs in virtue of the type of word that ‘knows’ is—
namely, a very commonly used English verb. That said, it is important to note that the
case that follows is not meant to be an all-things-considered case for the view that
‘knows’ is polysemous. Such a complete case would have to deal more in depth with the
expansive literature on knowledge ascriptions and denials. Rather, the goal of this paper
is to argue against the claim that a component of such a case is in principle lacking—
namely, to argue against the view that in principle a polysemy theory of ‘knows’ lacks a
linguistic grounding.
The short version of my argument for this conclusion is simply this: The vast
majority of very commonly used English verbs are polysemous. The best explanation for
this is a functional explanation that commonly used verbs needs to be flexible and varied
in order to accommodate the functions that they play in communication between English
speakers. ‘Knows’ plays the same general type of functional role as these other common,
polysemous English verbs and there seems to be no relevant difference between ‘knows’
and other commonly used English verbs that would lead ‘knows’ to lack the feature of
polysemy possessed by most other commonly used English verbs. Thus, on linguistic
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grounds, we have defeasible reasons to take ‘knows’ to be polysemous, that is, we have
linguistic grounds for a polysemy theory of ‘knows.’ This in turn provides us with
linguistic grounds for a type of ambiguity theory of ‘knows’. The rest of this section will
be a defense of the claims made in this paragraph.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary ‘know’ is the fifty-ninth most
commonly used English word and the eighth most commonly used English verb. The rest
of the twenty-five most commonly used English verbs are (in order starting with the most
common) ‘be’, ‘have’, ‘do’, ‘say’, ‘get’, ‘make’, ‘go’, ‘take’, ‘see’, ‘come’, ‘think’,
‘look’, ‘want’, ‘give’, ‘use’, ‘find’, ‘tell’, ‘ask’, ‘work’, ‘seem’, ‘feel’, ‘try’, ‘leave’ and
‘call’.226 I claim that most, if not all, of these verbs are ambiguous. Many may find this
claim uncontroversial and be willing to grant me it without argument. However, it will
not be difficult to use some standard tests for ambiguity to provide further evidence that
many of these commonly used English verbs are ambiguous, so we’ll do so.227
Let’s start with the “Conjunction Reduction” test.228 In the Conjunction Reduction
test, one takes two sentences in which the possibly ambiguous word is supposedly being
used in different senses and combines the two sentences into one while using the
ambiguous term only once. One then looks to see if this new complex sentence is a
zeugma (i.e. a sentence in which a single words applies to two different parts of the
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“The OEC: Facts About the Language” http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/words/the-oec-factsabout-the-language.
227
As far as I know, there is no such thing as an ambiguity test that is widely consider to be infallible. It is
hard to avoid both false positives and false negatives—especially since such tests are typically intuition
driven. Still, the exercise of looking how these verbs fair on a few tests for ambiguity seems valuable in as
much as this is a means employs by linguists and as much as the ways in which works are used in such tests
often help elicit clearer intuitions about a word’s univocality or ambiguity.
228
I am using the name that Sennet (2011) uses for this test. Alan Cruse (1982) also discusses this test
calling it “the pun test”.
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sentence in two different senses).229 An example of a Conjunction Reduction that results
in zeugma is the following:
(1) The feathers are light.
(2) The colors are light.
(3) The feathers and colors are light.
The third sentence results in zeugma because ‘light’ means not heavy in regards to the
feathers and not dark in regards to colors.230
Such zeugmas can easily be constructed using many of the verbs listed above.
Take ‘want’ as an example.
(4) He wants for nothing.
(5) He wants pie.
(6) He wants for nothing and pie.231

229

One might wonder about the value of this test. If you cannot tell if the word has changed senses going
from one sentence to another, how would one be able to tell if the complex sentence is zeugmatic? This is a
fine question. I am not sure what the rationale is of those who have endorsed this test, but I think there is
something to be said for the particular juxtaposition that occurs in such a complex sentence that may make
it easier to tell.
230
This example comes from Sennet (2011).
231
It was once suggested to me that this example shouldn’t be counted as a proper case of zeugma because
“wants for nothing” is an idiom. I think that the boundary for what counts as an idiom is fuzzy, but I take
this suggestion as well motivated in the sense that it seems plausible to think that ‘wants for nothing’
currently functions as an idiom. However, I think it’s important to keep this example included for the
following reason. If at this point in the development of the English language the sense of ‘want’ as lacking
or in need is so archaic or marginalized that its remaining common uses in that sense (e.g. ‘wants for
nothing’, ‘to be in want’) are now idioms, this is due to the evolution of the English language such that the
once more robust meaning of ‘want’ as lacking or deficient has been overshadowed by its more common
modern meaning as desire. Polysemy is neither a necessary nor eternal property of a word, and as a result,
it is something that itself has a fuzzy boundary, at least during the periods in which certain senses of a word
are coming in or out of existence. I think it is plausible to suppose that at one point, perhaps not that long
ago, ‘knows’ was univocal (picking out a vague or perhaps incoherent epistemic concept) and that the
polysemous status of ‘knows’ is the result of the evolution of speakers’ epistemic needs and desires. If the
polysemy of ‘knows’ does happen to be a somewhat newer phenomenon, this may explain the tendency of
many competent English speakers to be hesitant in embracing or treating ‘knows’ as polysemous. This
relates back to the idea I discussed in chapter 3.
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In this instance ‘wants’ means lacks in relation to nothing and desires in relation to pie.
Zeugma can also be formed using ‘is’.
(7) She is a talented artist.
(8) She is running late.
(9) She is a talented artist and running late.
The zeugma turns on the dual usage of ‘is’ as indicating a persisting trait and a current
state.
Zeugma can also be formed where the word standing in both relations to the
ambiguous word is the same word. Take for example the following case using ‘made’.
(10) I made this [reed] basket.
(11) I made that [last second] basket [to win the game].
(12) I made this basket and that basket.
So far the use of two distinct direct objects has been used to show the presence of
zeugma, but this can happen with constructions in subjects as well as in this example with
‘tells’.
(13) He tells me that he has something to hide.
(14) His nervous demeanor tells me that he has something to hide.
(15) He and his nervous demeanor tell me that he has something to hide.232
If one were to go through all twenty-five verbs listed above, one would find most lend
themselves to forming zeugmas. The ability to create zeugmas using most of the
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I was prompted to think of this example due to a useful conversation with Aaron Thomas-Buldoc.
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commonly used English verbs is evidence for pervasive ambiguity of commonly used
English verbs.
While my argument rests on the mere fact that most commonly used English
verbs—of which ‘know’ is one—are ambiguous, it still seems worth asking if zeugma
can be created specifically with ‘know’. There is a rather uninteresting sense in which
zeugma can easily be obtained using ‘know’. Take the following:
(16) We know our neighbors
(17) We know that 2+2=4.
(18) We know our neighbors and that 2+2=4.
The zeugma here obtains from the use of ‘know’ in the acquainted with sense and the
propositional sense. But most would agree that ‘know’ is ambiguous between acquaintedwith and propositional senses. The interesting question is whether or not zeugma can be
obtained using knows in a propositional sense—i.e. ‘knows that.’ As one who believes
that ‘know’ has more than one propositional sense, it is easy for me to perceive many
combinations as zeugmatic, but I don’t know of an example that seems so clearly
zeugmatic that it would seem clearly zeugmatic to one who holds the view that there is
only one propositional sense of ‘know.’ Still for good measure, imagine a philosopher
who is convinced Descartes’ cogito provides one with an infallible belief in one’s own
existence which is expressed as “I know” and also convinced of Moorean propositions
because she takes herself to be capable of fallibly knowing things even if she can’t rule
out all alternatives. Imagine she makes the following utterances:
(19) I know I exist
(20) I know I have hands
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(21) I know I exist and have hands.
Given the background knowledge I have about the speaker, (21) to me sounds zeugmatic.
My guess is it will not to some, but my hope is at the very least it will strike one as
plausible that this could be a case of zeugma.
Another test for lexical ambiguity is the Contradiction test. On this test, a word is
deemed ambiguous if a sentence uses a word twice and is not contradictory but, due to
the form, would constitute a contradiction if the word used twice were univocal.233 That
is to say, on this test if there is a way for the sentence which appears in virtue of its
structure alone to be contradictory, to not be contradictory, the word used twice is
deemed ambiguous. For example, the sentence:
(22) That bank isn’t a bank.
Were ‘bank’ univocal, this sentence could only be interpreted in a contradictory manner,
but so long as the two referents for bank are different in the two usages—i.e. a financial
institution in one case and a riverside in another—it is not contradictory. Hence, because
there is a non-contradictory reading of this sentence, which appears contradictory solely
in terms of structure, the word ‘bank’ is deemed ambiguous.
In order for the contradiction test to avoid generating false positives, the
conception of structure being employed will need to be fairly thick. For example, on a
thin structure-as-mere-syntax conception ‘He was over there, but not over there’ might
seem to satisfy the conditions of the contradiction test, even though it’s fairly obvious
that the demonstrative ‘there’ should not as a result be viewed as ambiguous. There may
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be more than one way to properly delineate how thick the concept of structure being
employed should be.
For the time being I prefer the following elucidation. Structure includes syntax
plus what counts as the semantic or “context-supplementing” (via unarticulated
constituents) uses of context, in John Perry’s sense of those terms. But structure on this
account does not include what Perry considers to be presemantic or pragmatic uses of
context. To get a grasp of these four categories as Perry understands them, it will be
useful to look at what he writes about the presemantic, semantic, context-supplementing,
and pragmatic uses of context:
“Sometimes we use context to figure out with which
meaning a word is being used, or which of several words that
look or sound alike is being used, or even which language is
being spoken. These are presemantic uses of context:
context helps us to figure out meaning. In the case of
indexicals, however, context is used semantically. It remains
relevant after the language, words and meanings are all
known; the meaning directs us to certain aspects of context.
Both these uses of context differ from a third. In the third
type of case we lack the materials we need for the
proposition expressed by a statement, even though we have
identified the words and their meanings, and have consulted
the contextual factors the indexical meanings direct us to.
Some of the constituents of the proposition expressed are
unarticulated and we consult the context to figure out what
they are. I call this the ‘context-supplementing’ use of
context. Finally and importantly we use context to interpret
the intention with which the utterance was made; what was
the speaker trying to do? This is the pragmatic use of
context.”234
On this account of structure, the sentence ‘He was over there, but not over there’ won’t
pass the contradiction test, because the semantic indexicality of ‘there’ constitutes part of
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its structure. This is because, as I understand it, part of the structural nature of indexicals
is a certain emptiness that requires a referent for full meaning. Similarly, sentences
formed with non-indexical kinds of context-sensitive terms like ‘flat’ or ‘imported’ also
won’t be able to pass the contradiction test because the unarticulated constituent of a
context is required in order to determine their meaning via “context supplementing”. This
is in contrast with ambiguous words like ‘bank’ whose ambiguity is a non-structural,
presemantic feature of language and for which context plays a purely pragmatic role of
helping determine what sense the speaker is intending to convey. It is for these reasons
that the sentence “That bank isn’t a bank” passes the contradiction test and the word
‘bank’ can be considered ambiguous while “He was over there, but not over there” fails
and ‘there’ is determined to be indexical but not ambiguous.
The benefit of this account of structure is that the ability of commonly used verbs
to pass the contradiction test not only favors a polysemy theory of commonly used verbs
over a univocality theory of commonly used verbs, but it also favors a polysemy theory
of commonly used verbs over views like contextualism or contrastivism about commonly
used verbs.235 The downside is that it will likely be harder to get a strong intuition as to
whether or not a sentence passes the contradiction test. Still, I think in many cases it is
clear enough that the test is worth engaging in regardless.236
Before turning to sentences using commonly used English verbs, it’s worth
pausing to address that the sentence ‘That bank isn’t a bank’ probably still sounds
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For an examples of a contrastivist theory of ‘knows’, which appeals to unarticulated contrastive
constituents in knowledge ascriptions and denials, see Jonathan Schaffer (2004).
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I’m grateful to Maite Ezcurdia and Michael Veber who both helped show me in different ways the need
for an account of what constitutes structure on the contradiction test. The account I’ve given here is likely
still imperfect, and the fault for that lies completely with me and not them.
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somewhat unnatural to many. It is important to note that for a word to be deemed
ambiguous on the contradiction test, it need not be that the contradictory sentence sounds
natural.237 Rather what is required is that there be a reading of the sentence on which the
seeming contradictory sentence is not in fact contradictory.
Once again, it is relatively easy to craft sentences in which commonly used
English verbs pass the Contradiction test. Take the following examples:
(23)

She made the basket but she didn’t make the basket.

(24)

It seems red but it doesn’t seem red.

(25)

Amy called Gerad, but she didn’t call Gerad.

(26)

That’s what I said, even though that’s not what I said.

(27)

I use my friends but I don’t use my friends.

We can see why (23) is not contradictory if we think back to (10)-(12) and assign sinking
the shot as the meaning of ‘made’ and crafting or creating to ‘make.’ In (24) we can
avoid contradiction by taking ‘seems’ to mean looks visually and ‘seem’ to mean strike
one as. For (25) we can avoid contradiction when ‘called’ means harkened after and ‘call’
means contact via phone. With (26) contradiction is bypassed by taking the first ‘says’ in
the loose sense to mean what is conveyed and the second ‘said’ to refer to the actual
words uttered and their literal meaning.238 And (27) can pass the contradiction test if the
first instance of ‘use’ refers to utilizing in a non-abusive sort of manner and the second
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There are pragmatic reasons why these sentences often will not sound natural, despite the fact that they
do in fact pass the contradiction test.
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This example is a modified version of an example suggested to me by Jennifer Saul. Saul, among others,
has noted in writing that ‘says’ is ambiguous in this way. See Saul (2015). Similarly, Patrick Rysiew
identifies in uses these two sense of ‘says’ in his work contextualism and invariantism (Rysiew 2001, 2005,
2007).
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instance of ‘use’ refers to a sort of mere-means type of abuse of another, which Kant
famously condemned.239
Once again, my goal is to show that there is a linguistic grounding for ‘knows’
being ambiguous based on the ambiguity of most other commonly used English verbs.
This makes showing that ‘know’ passes the contradiction test inessential to my argument.
However, the ability of ‘knows’ to arguably pass the contradiction test would be further
evidence of the ambiguity of ‘know’. As with the Conjunction Reduction test, it will
probably seem to those that are sympathetic to ‘know’ being ambiguous that the “I know
I have hands but I don’t know I have hands” can pass the contradiction test. Take ‘know’
in the first instance to mean some relatively low-threshold justified truth belief and the
second usage to mean something more like certain, infallible proof that one’s belief is
true, for example. But my guess would be most who are opposed to an ambiguity theory
of ‘knows’ are unlikely to be convinced by this.
The initial plausibility of the view that most of English’s most commonly used
verbs are ambiguous, combined with the ability of many of those verbs to pass ambiguity
tests, serves to provide us with strong reason to think that most of English’s most
commonly used verbs are indeed ambiguous. Thus, without a reason to think that ‘know’
is unlike most other commonly used English verbs, this provides us with some reason to
favor the view that ‘know’ is itself ambiguous.
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It should be noted that an inability to pass a contradiction test does not show a word is not ambiguous.
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be impossible for such a verb to pass the contradiction test despite being ambiguous.
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But the force of this reason can be increased if we consider the best explanation
for why commonly used English verbs are ambiguous. The best explanation seems to be
a functional claim that these commonly used English verbs need to be flexible and varied
in order to do all the work that we use them for. The question of whether or not these
verbs became so commonly used because they were ambiguous or became ambiguous
because they were so commonly used is an interesting question worthy of research.
However, for present purposes, the answer is not necessary. For if commonly used
English verbs tend to become ambiguous because they are commonly used, then the
probability that ‘know’ is ambiguous increases. Conversely, if a verb’s being ambiguous
contributes to the likelihood that it will become commonly used, once again the fact that
‘knows’ is a commonly used English verb raises the probability that it is ambiguous.
Thus, regardless of what the causal impetus is for the high percentage of commonly used
English verbs that are ambiguous, on this functional explanation of the correlation, the
probability that ‘know’ is ambiguous further increases.
The connection between the functions a verb plays and polysemy can also be used
to respond to an objection: namely, that all my argument here has shown is that ‘knows’
is likely polysemous in some sense or other, but not the more specific claim that ‘knows’
in the propositional sense—i.e. that ‘knows’ as used in ‘knows that’ constructions—is
likely polysemous. As noted earlier ‘knows’ rather uncontroversially is recognized to
have more than one sense generally (take for example the difference between the
propositional and acquaintance senses of ‘knows’). An objector might suggest that
recognizing these sorts of sense distinctions is all that we should expect given the general
linguistic data of commonly used verbs being ambiguous. However, the force of this line
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of reasoning is somewhat undercut if we posit that there is a connection between the
functions that these verbs are meant to play and their polysemy. It is true that ‘knows’
serves the function of picking out that which subjects are acquainted with and well as
picking out a particular positive epistemic relation subjects can stand in to a proposition.
But, in addition, quite plausibly there are multiple functions that this latter type of
knowing—i.e. ‘knowing that’ or propositional knowing—serves. This is evidenced by the
variety of theories in place as to what the function of ‘knows’ is, and to the disagreement
about what that function is.240 In view of the plurality of answers as to what the function
or value of knowing is, one can either conclude that all but (at most) one of such answers
is mistaken, or one can adopt the view that there are a plurality of functions that
propositional knowledge serves.241 This latter view strikes me as by far the more
plausible view. But if there are a plurality of functions that propositional knowledge
serves, then it seems reasonable to think that this flexibility of functionality for ‘knows
that’ would lend itself to polysemy, even about ‘knows’ understood propositionally.
Before concluding, three types of remarks are worth making. First, throughout
this section I’ve argued that an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ has a linguistic grounding
due to its status as a commonly used English verb, yet at the outset I said I would be
arguing for a polysemy theory of ‘knows’. I have chosen to frame the majority of the
discussion in this section around ambiguity because I employed linguistic tests that check
for ambiguity more generally and not polysemy in particular. However, I wouldn’t want
to argue that we have good grounds to think most commonly used English verbs are
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See for example Craig (1990), Hawthorne (2004), Kelp (2008), and Rysiew (2012).
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homonymous—for indeed in most cases we can identify an etymological root and other
types of relationships between these verbs’ various senses. So while I have argued that
these verbs are ambiguous, more specifically I claim that they are polysemous.
Second, one might agree that the facts that most commonly used English verbs are
polysemous and that ‘knows’ is a commonly used English verb do provide a defeasible
linguistic grounding for a polysemy theory of ‘knows’, but may protest that this linguistic
evidence is too weak a to make it reasonable to conclude that ‘knows’ is polysemous. But
such a protest would be the result of missing the point of this paper. I would remind such
a critic that the goal of this particular project wasn’t to show that a polysemy theory of
‘knows’ is the all-things-considered best position to adopt. As stated before, to make a
strong all-things-considered case for a polysemy theory of ‘knows’ requires a great deal
of extra philosophical and empirical work. I think this work can be done. However, I am
not arguing for that here. Rather, my goal in this paper is merely to argue that Stanley
was mistaken in thinking there was no linguistic grounding for the claim that ‘knows’ is
ambiguous. This argument is but a small part of a much bigger case to be made for a
polysemy theory of ‘know.’
Third, my argument has relied implicitly upon there being no relevant difference
between ‘knows’ and the majority of other commonly used English verbs that should
give us reason to think that ‘knows’ would not share the feature of being ambiguous. If
one is able to provide a characteristic that differs between ‘knows’ and most other
commonly used English verbs that plausibly undercuts the likelihood that ‘knows’ shares
polysemy in common with most other commonly used English verbs, that is the type of
objection that requires response. One possibility for such a difference is that ‘knows’ is
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factive and there is nothing relevantly similar with other commonly used English verbs.
The reason one might think this characteristic is relevant is because factivity is nongradable. For one who thinks that the plausibility of ‘knows’ being polysemous depends
upon ‘knows’ being gradable, one might argue that the lack of factivity of ‘knows’ is
evidence for the lack of gradability of ‘knows’, and that this lack of gradabiltiy in turn
would suggest a lack of polysemy. As initially plausible as this line of reasoning might
seem, I don’t think it will succeed. The reason is because factivity is related to truth—that
is, only verbs that require truth (as it is commonly assumed is required in the dominant
sense of ‘see’ as well as for ‘know’) can be factive. And more than that, requiring the
truth of the propositions related to is what constitutes factivity. It is because generally we
don’t think that the truth of a proposition comes in degrees that we think factivity doesn’t
come in degrees. (And in fact, if one did think the truth-value for propositions came in
degrees, one would likely also think that factivity is something that comes in degrees
too.) But a plausible account of the polysemy of ‘knows’ won’t depend upon the
gradability of the truthfulness of the proposition known. If it depends on gradability at all,
it will be the gradability in the level of justification. And justification, it is typically
acknowledged, does come in degrees. Thus, if there is a salient difference between
‘knows’ and the other commonly used English verbs, factivity is likely not it.
Without such a salient difference being at the ready, given ‘knows’ status as a
commonly used English verbs, and the strong evidence we have that most commonly
used English verbs are ambiguous, I conclude that Stanley was mistaken when he
claimed that an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ lacks linguistic grounding. My hope is that
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this will help open up the way for a more holistic defense of the ambiguity theory of
‘knows’ in the future.242
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CONCLUSION

The focus of this dissertation has been on arguing for the plausibility of the
ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ as an explanation of the linguistic data regarding knowledge
ascriptions and denials. There is significantly more work to be done on this front. There
are also a number of other important areas of work relating to the ambiguity theory that I
take to be relevant to epistemology as well, which haven’t been addressed in this
dissertation.
The first area concerns providing a more specific account of what the senses of
‘knows’ are (or perhaps better put, a further assessment of the specific accounts already
put forward and the examination of what additional plausible accounts might be given).
The second area deals with what the philosophical upshots of the ambiguity theory are.
Some of these we don’t have to go too far to discover. For example, the ambiguity theory
provides a unique sort of response to the skeptic. However, there are a number of other
implications of the truth of the ambiguity theory. For example, one will need to rethink
principles like “knowledge is the norm of assertion” or any kind of knowledge-action
principles. The third area concerns what account of epistemology fits best with the
ambiguity theory’s linguistic proposal about ‘knows’. I tend to think that the ambiguity
theory goes best with an epistemic value pluralism—perhaps for obvious reasons.
However, questions about these three areas are questions for another place. My hope is
that the work contained in this dissertation may provide enough interest and/or respect for
the ambiguity theory that perhaps the space will be created in which these additional
areas of concern for the ambiguity theory can be addressed more fully.
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Epistemology Brownbag Series. Northwestern University. Evanston, IL. February,
2015.
5. “The Criteria for Personhood in C. S. Lewis’s Out of the Silent Planet.” Frances
White Ewbank Colloquium on C. S. Lewis and Friends. Taylor University.
Upland, IN. May, 2014.
6. “The Ambiguity Theory of ‘Knowledge’.” Northwestern/Notre Dame Graduate
Epistemology Conference. Northwestern University. Evanston, IL. April, 2014.
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7.

“The Ambiguity Theory of ‘Knowledge’.” University of Iowa Graduate
Philosophy Conference. University of Iowa. Iowa City, IA. April, 2014.
8. “Why We Don’t Have to Live with Tegmark’s Duplicate Prediction” (with
Chapman Waters). Butler University. Indiana Philosophical Association,
Indianapolis, IN. March, 2014
9. “Spinelessness about Messy Real-World Cases and the Equal Weight View.”
Kent State University May 4th Philosophy Graduate Student Conference. Kent
State, OH. March, 2014.
10. “The Ambiguity Theory of ‘Knowledge’.” Southeastern Graduate Philosophy
Conference. University of Florida. Gainesville, FL. February, 2014.
11. “Why We Don’t Have to Live with Tegmark’s Duplicate Prediction” (with
Chapman Waters). Southeast Philosophy Congress. Clayton State University.
Morrow, GA. February, 2014.
12. “Questioning the ‘Aprobability’ of Van Inwagen’s Defense: A Problem for
‘Defense-Based’ Skeptical Theism.” Kent State University May 4th Philosophy
Graduate Student Conference. Kent State, OH. March, 2013.
13. “Does Modern Science Predict Duplicates?” (with Chapman Waters). Midwest
Workshop in Philosophy of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics.
IPFW. Fort Wayne, IN. March, 2013.
14. “Deliberation and the Denial of Libertarian Free Will: A Question of
Consistency.” IUPUI. Indiana Philosophy Association, Indianapolis, IN.
November, 2012.
Conference Comments:
1. Comments on “Anti-Inflationism about Truth, Deflated” by Cory Wright. Indiana
Philosophical Association, Indianapolis, IN. March 2014.
2. Comments on “Branch-Relative Identity” by Christina Conroy. Midwest
Workshop in
Philosophy of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics. Fort Wayne,
IN. March, 2013.
3. Comments on “Fallibilism and Epistemic Luck” by Greg Stoutenburg. Joint
meeting of the Indiana Philosophical Association and the North American Kant
Society. New Albany, IN. March, 2013.
4. Comments on “Explaining the Difference Senses of Explanation” by Danny
Pearlberg. Indiana Philosophical Association, Indianapolis, IN. November, 2012.
Conference Sessions Chaired:
1. North Carolina Philosophical Society 2015; Session on Philosophy of Religion
Memberships, Honors, and Awards:
Purdue University College of Liberal Arts PROMISE Grant, 2016
McBride Graduate Student International Travel Grant, 2016
North Carolina Philosophical Society Best Graduate Student Paper Prize, 2015
American Philosophical Association, 2014 – present
Tau Sigma, National Honor Society, 2011 – present
SUNY Brockport Scholars’ Day Presenter, 2011
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Psi Chi, National Psychology Honor Society, 2009 – present
Houghton College Psychology Department Exceptional Senior Award, 2009
Houghton College Academic Excellence Scholarship, 2006 – 2009
National Merit Commendation, 2005
Professional & Community Service:
Lafayette Crisis Center, Rape Survivor Advocate, 2015-present
Mental Health America, Volunteer Outreach, 2015-present
Lafayette Crisis Center, Crisis Hotline Volunteer, 2014-present
Purdue University College of Liberal Arts Graduate Student Council Member,
2014-2015
Purdue University Philosophy Department Graduate Student Representative,
2013-2014
Purdue University College of Liberal Arts Grade Appeals Committee, 2013-2014
Referee for Synthese and Claremont Journal of Religion

